

### WINCC UNDER X-RAYS

Sergey Gordeychik Denis Baranov Gleb Gritsai

### Who we are

- Sergey Gordeychik
  - Positive Technologies CTO, Positive Hack Days Director and Scriptwriter, WASC board member

□ Gleb Gritsai (@repdet)

- Principal Researcher, Network security and forensic expert, head of PHDays Challenges team
- Denis Baranov
  - Head of AppSec group, researcher, member of PHDays Challenges team
  - http://www.phdays.com http://blog.ptsecurity.com http://scadasl.org

### SCADAStrangeLove.org

□ Group of security researchers focused on ICS/SCADA


### to save Humanity from industrial disaster and to keep Purity Of Essence


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# Why Siemens?

Common target during pentests
 Most common platform (market, ShodanHQ)
 Largest number of published and fixed bugs





http://www.ptsecurity.com/download/SCADA\_analytics\_english.pdf

### Special thanks to

Siemens ProductCERT
 Really professional team
 Quick responses
 Patches!

You guys rock!

### ...under X-Rays

Invensys Wonderware
Yokogawa
ICONICS








### Goals

to automate security assessment of ICS platforms and environment
 Objectives

 to understand system
 to assess built-in security features
 to create security audit/hardening guides
 to automate process

Vulnerabilities – waste production

Our approach









### Siemens SIMATIC WinCC

### WinCC Distributed Architecture

### WinCC Server

- Windows/MSSQL based SCADA
- WinCC Client (HMI)
  - WinCC runtime + project
- WinCC Web Server (WebNavigator)
  - IIS/MSSQL/ASP/ASP.NET/SOAP
- WinCC WebClient (HMI)
  - ActiveX/HTML/JS

### **B-Sides and Rarities**

Big Project Long History ■ A lot of obsolete code features third parties . . .


## 1825-day exploit

🔤 C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe

\_ 8

C:\>cd "\Program Files\Siemens"

C:\Program Files\Siemens>dir /s ¦ findstr "\.200." ¦ find "exe" > oldexe.txt



**DiagAgent (CVE-2012-2598)** Remote management tool (FS/registry), HTTP 8080

Not started by default and shouldn't be running ever

- No authentication at all
- XSSes

#### SOLUTION

Updates correcting the first three issues are now available in the Update 2 for WinCC V7.0 SP3 [1]. Siemens AG recommends applying this patch as soon as possible.

Siemens AG also recommends not using DiagAgent anymore since it is not supported anymore. Customers can migrate to the SIMATIC Diagnostics Tool [5] or the SIMATIC Analyser [6].



# Encrypt (Server Side)

Function Encrypt (secret, PassWord)

- ' secret\$ = the string you wish to encrypt or decrypt.
- 'PassWord\$ = the password with which to encrypt the string. dim L, X, s, Char

L = Len(PassWord)

For X = 1 To Len(secret)

Char = Asc(Mid(PassWord, (X Mod L) - L \* ((X Mod L) = 0), 1))

'Mid(secret, X, 1) = Chr(Asc(Mid(secret, X, 1)) Xor Char) s = s & Chr(Asc(Mid(secret, X, 1)) Xor Char)

Next

Encrypt = Escape(s) End Function

# Decrypt (Client Side)

Function Decrypt (secret, PassWord)

' secret\$ = the string you wish to encrypt or decrypt.

'PassWord\$ = the password with which to encrypt the string.

```
dim L, X, s, Char
```

```
secret = Unescape(secret)
```

```
L = Len(PassWord)
```

```
For X = 1 To Len(secret)
```

```
Char = Asc(Mid(PassWord, (X Mod L) - L * ((X Mod L) = 0), 1))
```

'Mid(secret, X, 1) = Chr(Asc(Mid(secret, X, 1)) Xor Char)

```
s = s & Chr(Asc(Mid(secret, X, 1)) Xor Char)
```

Next

```
Decrypt = s
```

End Function

### Encrypt vs Decrypt

```
Function EnDecrypt (secret, PassWord)
   ' secret$ = the string you wish to encrypt or decrypt.
   ' PassWord$ = the password with which to encrypt the string.
   dim L, X, s, Char
   secret = Unescape(secret)
   L = Len(PassWord)
   For X = 1 To Len(secret)
     Char = Asc(Mid(PassWord, (X Mod L) - L * ((X Mod L) = 0), 1))
     'Mid(secret, X, 1) = Chr(Asc(Mid(secret, X, 1)) Xor Char)
     s = s & Chr(Asc(Mid(secret, X, 1)) Xor Char)
   Next
End Function
```

# **Fighting with**

### To analyze:

- Files not changed for a while
- Third-party tools and libraries


### To automate:

- Control of change/commit dates
- Host-level scanners/fingerprint tools

**Processes:** 

Know your third-party!


## Know your third-party



CompanyName CompanyName

Blue Sky Software ClassWorks Datalogics, Inc. Free Software Foundation **IBM** Corporation and others InstallShield Software Corporation **Microsoft Corporation OPC** Foundation **Rogue Wave Software** Stingray Software Inc. Syncfusion Inc. The OpenSSL Project, VisualTools Inc. WexTech Systems, Inc.

### WebNavigator



# AutoComplete SOAP interface

Available at /WebCenter/AutoComplete.asmx
Well-documented

8 "getarchivelistdetails" - Gc ×											
← ⇒	G	🔒 h	https://www.google.com/search?q=DynamicPopulateDatabaseRT&oq=Dyna								/nami
+You	Sear	rch	Images	Maps	Play	YouTube	News	Gmail	Drive	Calendar	Mor
~											
Go	ogl	gle	"GetArchiveListDetails"								
			Web	Images	Мар	os Shop	ping	More 👻	Search	tools	

Your search - "GetArchiveListDetails" - did not match any documents.

Suggestions:

- Make sure all words are spelled correctly.
- Try different keywords.
- Try more general keywords.

# AutoComplete SOAP interface

# Available at /WebCenter/AutoComplete.asmx Well Self-documented

	く 💮 🎯 http://hostname/WebCenter/AutoComplete.asmx?op= ター さ×
← → @ http://hostname/WebCenter/AutoC	AutoComplete
	Click here for a complete list of operations.
AutoComplete	GETARCHIVELISTDETAILS
The following operations are supported. Fo	Test
DynamicPopulateDatabaseRT	The test form is only available for requests from the local machine.
<u>GetArchiveListDetails</u>	The following is a sample SOAP 1.1 request and response. The placeholders shown need to be replaced with actual values.
<u>GetCompletitionItemsForArchiveView</u>	POST /WebCenter/AutoComplete.asmx HTTP/1.1 Host: hostname
<u>GetHelpContext</u> GetLicenseInfo	Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: length SOAPAction: "Siemens.Simatic.WinCC.DataMonitor/GetArchiveListDetails"
<u>GetProcessScreenList</u>	xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"? <soap:envelope siemens.simatic.wincc.datamonitor"="" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org&lt;/th&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;u&gt;GetTagVariablenList&lt;/u&gt;&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;&lt;soap:Body&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;GetArchiveListDetails xmlns=" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"></soap:envelope>
	<contextkey>string</contextkey>  

### Not so well self documented

/GetServerList

# Undocumented method

### Siemens.Simatic.WinCC.DataMonitor

Uve HTTP Replay	- • • ×
POST  http://1995600724660WebCenter/AutoComplete.asmx HTTP Headers	HTTP/1.1 🔻
Host: 1 Host: 1 Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8 Content-Length; length	
SOAPAction: "Siemens.Simatic.WinCC.DataMonitor/GetServerList" Authorization: Basic	
POST ?	
xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"? <soap:envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.&lt;/th&gt;&lt;th&gt;org&lt;/th&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;th&gt;/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> <soap:body></soap:body></soap:envelope>	
<getserverlist xmlns="Siemens.Simatic.WinCC.DataMonitor"></getserverlist>	
<prefixtext></prefixtext> <count>9</count>	
Content-Length: 384	
Повтор	Закрыть

### But useful

```
<soap:Envelope>

- <soap:Body>

- <GetServerListResponse>

- <GetServerListResult>

- <string>

{"First":"STANDWINCC7 (WINCC)","Second":"STANDWINCC7WINCC"}

</string>

- <string>

{"First":"COMPUTER-D22053 (WINCCPLUSMIG)","Second":"COMPUTER-D22053WINCCPLUSMIG"}

</string>

- <string>

{"First":"COMPUTER-D22053 (WINCC)","Second":"COMPUTER-D22053WINCCPLUSMIG"}

</string>

- <string>

{"First":"KDA-34B1DA5A033 (WINCC)","Second":"KDA-34B1DA5A033WINCC"}
```

SQL Servers in subnet enumerationSQL-type Injection

### **Code review**

aTert(Html/2xml(ONODE)), oxml.loadxML("<NODES>"+oNode.innerHTML+"</NODES>"); alert(oxml.xml); return oxml.transformNode(strPattern);

// dreckige Hackerei
function Html2xml(oNode) {
 // copy the attributes first
 var attb;
 var str = new String;
 str = "<"+oNode.tagName;
 for(attb in oNode.attributes)
 {
 var atthyal = oNode getAttribute(att
 va

var attbval = oNode.getAttribute(attb); if(attbval!=null && attbval!="") {|

"str+=" \""+attb.nodeName+"\"=\""+oNode.nodevalue+"\"

# // dreckige Hackerei

### WebNavigator (round 1)

XPath Injection (CVE-2012-2596)
 Path Traversal (CVE-2012-2597)
 XSS ~ 20 Instances (CVE-2012-2595)

### Fixed in Update 2 for WinCC V7.0 SP3

http://support.automation.siemens.com/WW/view/en/60984587

# XSS in HMI? So what?

Can help to exploit server-side vulnerabilities
Operator's browser is proxy to SCADAnet!

# ?

Anybody works with SCADA and Internet using same browser?

# **Client-side WinCC Fingerprint**

	SURFPATROL	Русский	About SurfPatrol	Help	Forum	🔎 Login	
Home							
SurfPatrol has checked your browser and its plug-ins. Detected vulnerabilities: 3							
Ø	Internet Explorer 9.0.8112.16421	Open	Open recommendations				
X	Adobe Reader Plugin 10.1.0	Open	Open recommendations				
ActiveX       Siemens SIMATIC WinCC HMI ActiveX Control 700.2100.151.3       Hide recommender         SCADA       It is unsafe to use industrial control workstations for web browsing.       Vulnerabilities in SCADA systems, which can be exploited by malicious people to conduct cross-site scripting attacks, sensitive information, cause a DoS (Denial of Service), and compromise a vulnerable system.       Additional information						potentially	
<b>Sector</b>	Java Runtime 1.7.0.10	No flaws deter	No flaws detected				
to //www.surfpatrol.ru/on/report							

You should never underestimate the predictability of ...
■ A lot of "WinCCed" IE from countries/companies/industries

Special prize to guys from US for WinCC 6.X at 2012

# WebNavigator (round 2)

### ■ Lot of XSS and CSRF

- CVE-2012-3031
- CVE-2012-3028

### □ Lot of arbitrary file reading

• CVE-2012-3030

### SQL injection over SOAP

• CVE-2012-3032

# Username and password disclosure via ActiveX abuse


• CVE-2012-3034

### Fixed in Update 3 for WinCC V7.0 SP3

http://support.automation.siemens.com/WW/view/en/63472422


## Fun with ActiveX

 Interesting objects and methods WebClientInstall.RegReader.RegRead IsAdministrator() IsPowerUser() openConnection()



Can't use ShellExecute of something...
 Restricted but still exists for compatibility

### **ComRaider still rocks!**



#### CVE-2012-3034

WinCCViewer ActiveX store credentials in innerHTML
 We can get it via XSS



### It fixed, but...

How this ActiveX gets Basic account plaintext?
How to get Authorization header on Client?
Why ActiveX need password?

□ Lets check...

8		> +0.515 s		0,063 s	GE	
		~				
9		🕎 +0.577 s		<u>0,</u> 032 s	GE	
. €						
				<u></u>		
Headers Timing Content Cookies Query String Post Data Stream Status C						
		577 bytes sent to 192.168.17	7.90:80			
	1	GET /WNStandart W	ebNav.asp?Client	Side=2 H	TTP/	
	≣⊋	1.1				
	2	Accept: */*				
	3	Referer: http://1	92.168.177.90/pr	oject.as	p?	
	≡₽	loadbalancing=no				
	4	Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate				
	5	Host: 192.168.177.90				
	6	Connection: Keep-Alive				
	7 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDACCBSBSA=IAOBNLHDKDHAGJ					
	E₽ JNOIGEPF; ASPSESSIONIDAABATBSA=BMLBBPIDJBAJ				AJBI	
	≣⊋	GCOGBJLDGJ				
	8	Authorizatica: Ba	sic QXZndXI6Q29t	cDI0Mg=-		
	9					
	-					

🜱 /SCSWebBridge/SCSWebBridgeX.dll?ID=65537 - HTTP Analyzer V3						
<u>File Action View G</u> rid Fi <u>l</u> ter <u>T</u> ools <u>H</u> elp						
🕨 Start 👻 🛑 🚺 🔯 🥃 Save 🗸 👿 🚀 Clear 🔑 Find 💽 View	r 🔽 Filter ▼ 🐻 Tools ▼					
	hod 🖵 Result 🖕 Receive					
00:00:00.000 CCEClient.exe[5944] (Count=3, Sent=1,51 K, Received=0, ElapsedTin	ne=4,415 s)					
1 🏠 +0.000 s 📕 0,251 s PO	8 🖓 +0.515 s 0,063 s GE					
2 🏠 +3.339 s 🛛 🚽 0,234 s PO						
3 🛧 +4.165 s 0,250 s PO	9 ↔ +0.577 s 📕 0,032 s GE					
	Headers Timing Content Cookies Query String Post Data Stream Status C					
	577 bytes sent to 192.168.177.90:80					
•	1 GET /WNStandart_WebNav.asp?ClientSide=2 HTTP/					
	≣₽ 1.1					
Headers Timing Content Cookies Query String Post Data Stream Status C	2 Accept: */*					
504 bytes sent to 192.168.177.90:80	3 Referer: http://192.168.177.90/project.asp?					
1 POST /SCSWebBridge/SCSWebBridgeX.dll?ID=65537	. ≣⊋ loadbalancing=no					
E⊋ HTTP/1.1	4 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate					
2 Cache-Control: no-cache	5 Host: 192.168.177.90					
3 Connection: Keep-Alive	6 Connection: Keep-Alive					
4 Pragma: no-cache	7 Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDACCBSBSA=IAOBNLHDKDHAGJIO					
5 User-Agent: SCSPALClient	E₹ JNOIGEPF; ASPSESSIONIDAABATBSA=BMLBBPIDJBAJBI					
6 Content-Length: 219	E₽ GCOGBJLDGJ					
7 Host: 1.2.168.177.90	8 Authorization: Basic QXZndXI6Q29tcDI0Mg=					
Authorization: Basic V05VU1JfREM5MkQ3MTc5RTI5	9					
OkMxMDMyMzZDRThEOTg2ODhFNDgyMEQ4NTQ5NjIwNjc0						
9						
10						
あ     11 €ЂХ♀€  ↑НЃ И ♬ +     └њ@+ С*С9С       エ     Е२ Х′<Ѓ№ЃС ×-ŀЕ•Н↓\$К∱"К тЗ'I↓						
Text						

#### C103236CE8D98688E4820D8549620674??!



Not my department password!

#### Lets try again

http://
version="1.0" standalone="yes" ?>
erData>
rsion>K07.00.21.03_01.07.00.03
Date>Nov 23 2011 (//ileDate>
rverO>CpxoHfRatUFe90RZe1q/pJKPXC65//U9CrtiVoI8SnPGMrD4EI0RgA==
nnectionSummary>
Clients>0
DiagnoseClients>O

# Oh! En/c(r)ypt[10]n!

#### Resume

- ActiveX use hardcoded account to communicate with OPC Web bridge
- Password for WNUSR\_DC92D7179E29 generated during installation and probably strong
- Encrypted password for WNUSR\_DC\* can be obtained by request to WebBridge

#### But WHY?

### We don't know yet

#### Just for history

 Image: Sign of the system simon sign of the system sis simon sign

#### === Edited by Dec @ 12/1/2006 6:58 AM [GMT ] ===





applications also.

I would like to logon on the Web Site based on Integrated Windows Authentication regardless if I access WebNavigator or other parts of the


WebNavigator ISAPI filter WebFilter.dll uses a surrogate Account WNUSR\_DC92D7179E29 (big security flaw in my opinion because the password is fixed and easy to find) to impersonate Windows and uses the



I can see "fixing" this behavior by building a higher ISAPI filter but I am not done yet with the debugging

Dec

#### Database



# WinCC - Database Security

- Hardcoded accounts (fixed)
- MS SQL listening network from the box\*
  - "Security controller" restricts to Subnet
- Two-tier architecture with Windows integrated auth and direct data access
  - We don't know how to make it secure

## WinCC - Hardcoded SQL\*

- First noticed in May 2005
- Published in April 2008
- Abused by StuxNet in 2010
- Fixed by Siemens in Nov 2010\*\*
- Still works almost everywhere

\*Just for history \*\*WinCC V7.0 SP2 Update 1

<  →  C  ©i	adt.siemens.ru/iprum/viewtopic.php?p=2974
SIEMENS	
Пользов	атель WinCCConnect
новая тема) (	() ответить) Список форумов SIEMENS, Россия. IA&DT -> Системы SI
11-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-0	
Автор	
Макс Прилепский Известный Писатель	□ добавлено Вт Май 03, 2005 .1:42 Заголовок сообщения: Пользователь W Найден пароль для этого интегрированного пользователя БД WinCC
Зарегистрирован: 14.01.2005 Сообщения: 148 Откуда: Новокузнецк	
Вернуться к началу	Профиль 82 лс
<b>Cyber</b> Новый писатель Зарегистрирован	D добавлено Пт Апр 11, 2008 19:27 Заголовок сообщения: login='WinCCConnect' password='2WSXcder' login='WinCCAdmin' password='2WSXcde.'
22.10.2007 Сообщения: 14	

#### WinCC Database

{Hostname}\_{Project}\_TLG\*
TAG data

CC\_{Project}\_{Timestamp}\*
Project data and configuration
Users, PLCs, Privileges

#### Dynamic SQL in stored procedures

CC Test 1 12 05 15 13 58 57R 🛅 Database Diagrams Tables 🛅 Views 🦲 Synonyms 🧰 Programmability 🖃 🧰 Stored Procedures 🛨 🚞 System Stored Procedures 표 🔜 dbo.CC\_SP\_AlgHitList 표 🔜 dbo.CC\_SP\_AlgHitList\_Dro 🕀 📴 dbo.CC\_sp\_PrepareHitlistT 🛨 🔄 dbo.CCAlgCreateViews 🕀 📴 dbo.sp\_ccalg\_ClearDataLis 🕀 🔝 dbo.sp\_CCAlg\_CreateTem 🛨 🔝 dbo.sp\_ccalg\_GetMaxCour 🔄 🔤 dbo.sp\_ccalg\_PrepareData + 🕀 📴 dbo.sp\_ccalg\_PrepareTrac\_ 🔄 dbo.sp\_ccalg\_ReadAlgByS + 🛨 🔜 dbo.sp\_ccalg\_ReadData 🛨 🔜 dbo.sp\_ccalg\_ReadDataAM 🔜 dbo.sp\_ccalg\_ReadDataLis + Base dbo.sp\_CCAlgCheckV11 + 표 📴 dbo.sp\_CCAlgConvertQue 🛨 🔜 dbo.sp\_CCAlgConvertQue 🗉 🔜 dha shi catla GetCompres

```
PROCEDURE [dbo].[CCAlgCreateViews] ( @ViewName sysname )
CREATE
AS
BEGIN
DECLARE @Typ smallint
DECLARE @Type smallint
SELECT @Type = 0
SELECT @Typ=1
DECLARE @SQL varchar(8000)
SELECT @SQL = 'DROP VIEW '+@ViewName
IF exists (SELECT name FROM sysobjects WHERE name = @ViewName )
  EXEC 0SQL
DECLARE RArchiveCount int
DECLARE @DSN varchar(128)
SELECT @SQL = 'CREATE VIEW '+@ViewName+' AS '+ CHAR(13) + CHAR(1)
DECLARE AMT Cursor CURSOR FOR SELECT DSN FROM AMT Where Type =0T
OPEN AMT Cursor
FETCH NEXT FROM AMT Cursor into @DSN
SELECT @ArchiveCount = 0
```

#### Dynamic SQL in stored procedures

- Other procedures with SQLi
  - [dbo].[sp\_CCAlg\_CreateTempTable]
  - [dbo].[sp\_ccalg\_PrepareDataList]
  - [dbo].[sp\_ccalg\_PrepareTraceDataList]
  - [dbo].[sp\_ccalg\_ReadAlgBySchema]
  - [dbo].[sp\_ccalg\_ReadData]
  - [dbo].[sp\_ccalg\_ReadDataAMTPreselect]
- No way to exploit
- Or we don't know
- Yet

## WinCC accounts

- Managed by PASSCS.EXE
- Stored in dbo.PW\_USER

select	: ID, NAME, PAS	S, CAST(PASS :	as varbinary) from dbo.PW_USER
Results 📑 Messages			
ID	NAME	PASS	(No column name)
10	Administrator	0.'>k&a0rq:crv7 8\$;;	0x142E273E6B26613072713A636F372038243B3B202020202
11	Avgur	0<-''1&>p_M0 <sup>KS</sup>	0x143C2D2231263E705F4D122020202020202020202020202020202020202
12	Admin	0.'>kot(ds0W]WGO	0x142E273E6B6F7428647311575D57474F20202020202020202
13	LogonOperator	0%-8_0Q 0t*<	0x19252D385F1410510A0E742A3C20202020202020202020202020202020202020
14	Avgur2	0<+''w]0o (IQ\	0x143C2D22775D306F202912515C20202020202020202020202020202020202020

## One!

NAME	(No column name)
Administrator	0x142E273E6B26613072713A636F372038243B3B2020;
Avgur	0x143C2D2231263E705F4D122920202020202020202020
Admin	0x142E273E6B6F7428647311575D57474F20202020202
LogonOperator	0x19252D385F1410510A0E742A3C2020202020202020
Avgur2	0x143C2D22775D306F202912515C202020202020202020

# Two!

NAME	(No column name)			
Administrator	0x142E273E6B26613072713A636F372038243B3B202			
Avgur	0x143C2D2231263E705F4D1229202020202020202020202020202020202020			
Admin	0x142E273E6B6F7428647311575D57474F202020202			
LogonOperator	0x19252D385F1410510A0E742A3C20202020202020202020202020202020202020			
Avgur2	0x143C2D22775D306F202912515C20202020202020202020202020202020202020			

- Administrator:ADMINISTRATOR
- Avgur2 > Avgur

#### **Three!**

add	eax, [ebp+var 10]	
movsx	ecx, byte p <mark>off_463DFC</mark>	<pre>dd offset aThisIsMyEncryp ; DATA XREF: sub_4478C0+2CD1</pre>
mov	edx, [ebp+v	; sub_447CE0+11B1r
movzx	eax, [ebp+e	; "This is my encryptionkey"
VOR	900 V 900	

#### ; DATA XKEF: SUB\_4478C0+2C SUB\_447CE0+11B1r "This is my encryptionkey"

#### THEY KNOW MY ENCRYPTIONKEY!


### SELECTable by

test Properties	?				
General Member Of Profile					
Member of:	SERVER\WINCCQLQuery1.sql*	Object Explorer Detail:	s		<del>~</del> ×
SIMATIC HMI VIEWER	SELECT SYSTEM_USER				-
	SELECT * FROM [CC_Tes	t_1_12_12_02_22	2_04_37].[dbo	].[PW_USER]	
					-
	<b>↓</b>				
📰 Results 📑 Messages					
(No column name)					
	1 SERVER\test				
	ID NAME	PASS	GRPID EXPTIME	WEBSTARTPICTURE	
	1 10 Administrator	0.'>k&a0rg:co7 8\$;;	1000 1024		1033
	2 11 Avgur	0<-''1&>p_M0	1000 1024	Main.Pd_	1033
	3 12 Admin	I.'>kot(dsIW]₩GO	1000 1024		1033
	4 13 LogonOperator	0%-8_00Q 0t*<	1001 1024		1033
Changes to a	user 5 14 Avgur2	lk-"w]0o )0Q∖	1000 1024	Main.Pd_	1033
Add <u>Remove</u> are not effect user logs on.	ive until the next time the				
OK Cancel	Apply Help				

#### Database permissions

- Some restrictions for SQL roles
   OPENROWSET
   Extended Stored Procedures
   SQL Agent functions
   ...
- Not enough for distributed architecture
   High privileged account for proxy is used

#### System Architecture



#### Basic objects and comms

PdlRt.exe – graphic runtime
 CCRtsLoader.EXE – loader
 s7otbxsx.exe – network

- Inter process communication:RPC
  - Sections (memory mapped files)

BaseNamedObjects\TCPSharedMm and other interesting stuff

#### **Basic forensic algorithm**

- Detecting active project: HKCU\Software\SIEMENS\WINCC\Control Center\Default Settings
  - LastOpenPath
  - LastProject
- Detecting MS SQL database name (timestamp) \*ArchiveManager*\*AlarmLogging*\ \*ArchiveManager*\*TagLogging\**

Obtaining information from database and system objects

#### **The Project**

- What is Project?
  - Collection of ActiveX/COM/.NET objects
  - Event Handlers and other code (C/VB)
  - Configuration files, XML and other

Can Project be trusted?
Ways to spread malware via Project?


# Can Project be trusted?

#### ■ NO!


Project itself is dynamic code
It's easy to patch it "on the fly"
Vulnerabilities in data handlers

 Simplest way – to patch event handlers

# Examples?



#### S7 PLC



#### Siemens S7 1200 PLC

Firmware is in Intel HEX format
Several LZSS blobs and ARM code
Blobs contain file system for PLC
Web application source code

... And ...

#### Siemens S7 PLC

ASCII armored certificate!
For what?
For built-in Certification Authority

#### ?!?!??!!!??!

Is there a private key?

### We don't know yet

#### Vulnerabilities

Hardcoded S7 PLC CA certificate (Dmitry Sklarov)

http://scadastrangelove.blogspot.com/2012/09/allyour-plc-belong-to-us.html

 Multiple vulnerabilities in S7 1200 PLC Web interface (Dmitriy Serebryannikov, Artem Chaikin, Yury Goltsev, Timur Yunusov)

<u>http://www.siemens.com/corporatetechnology/pool/</u> <u>de/forschungstelder/siemens\_security\_advisory\_ssa-</u> 279823.pdf

#### Additional info

- MiniWeb WebServer and MWSL scripting languages (similar to WinCC Flexible)
- Ability to create and upload your own Web-pages
- InterNiche TCP/IP stack

# S7 protocol

- Can be protected by password
- Authentication simple challengeresponse
  - Password hashed (SHA1) on client (TIA Portal)
  - Server (PLC) provide 20 byte challenge
  - Client calculate HMAC-SHA1(challenge, SHA1(password) as response





#### Resume

- Hardcore mix of Windows and Custom Authentication/Access Control
- Weak cryptography
- No AppSec at all (before us Siemens PCERT)
- Project is not trusted
- Some weakness in system-level design no quick patches

#### Special S4x13 releases

TIA portal Security Hardening Guide
S7 protocol password brute force tool
WinCC Forensic checklist

http://scadastrangelove.blogspot.com/search/label/Releases

#### **Other releases**

#### Simatic WinCC Security Hardening Guide

http://scadastrangelove.blogspot.com/2012/12/siemens-simatic-wincc-7x-security.html

#### PLCScan tool

http://scadastrangelove.blogspot.com/2012/11/plcscan.html

#### ICS/SCADA/PLC Google/Shodan Cheat Sheet

http://scadastrangelove.blogspot.com/2012/12/icsscadaplc-googleshodanhq-cheat-sheet.html

### 2 DO

 New Siemens products (TIA Portal and 1500 PLC family)

■ S7 protocol vivisection

OPC/distributed architecture protocol analysis



#### SCADA UNDER X-RAYS

All pictures are taken from Engineer Garin movie and Google

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