Subverting the security base of GSM

> Karsten Nohl Sascha Krißler @ HAR 2009



GSM encryption has been broken over and over again

- Academic breaks of A5/1 cipher: EC1997, FSE2000, Crypto 2003, SAC2005, ...
- A5/1 crackers widespread among intelligence agencies
- Cracking tables computed in 2008 but never released

 After 15 years, still no public A5/1 exploit !!


 We'll change this over the next months

### GSM is global, omnipresent and insecure

80% of mobile phone market

200+ countries

3 billion users!




GSM security introduced in 1987 ...

... then disclosed and shown insecure in 1994

# GSM must not be used for security systems, especially not for new ones

Recent adoptions of GSM despite weak security:

- Home banking
- Payment
- Authentication




Google's SMS Payment Patent

Google in February 2006 filed a patent with the


GSM apparently seen as *secure enough* for payment & access. Falsely so!



#### We need a public GSM decrypt PoC



### Groundwork for table generation is complete and open sourced



\* CUDA graphic cards or Xilinx Virtex FPGAs needed

### A5/1 is vulnerable to generic precomputation attacks

- For ciphers with small keys, code books allow decryption
  Secret state Output
- Code book provides a mapping from known output to secret state

Output
52E91001
52E91002
52E91003

An A5/1 code book is 128 Petabyte and takes 100,000+ years to be computed on a PC

This talk revisits techniques for computing the code book faster and for storing it compressed

# Key to code book generation is a fast A5/1 engine

Time on single threaded CPU: **100,000+ years** 

Parallelization

- CUDA: hundreds of threads
- FPGA: thousands of engines


Algorithmic tweaks

- CUDA: compute 4 bits at once
- FPGA: minimize critical path

3 months on 80 CUDA nodes


# Algorithmic tweaks accelerate CUDA A5/1 engine significantly

- Shift registers are expensive in software, while memory is cheap
- Only a few state
  bits determine
  round function
- Trade table lookups for shifts; optimal for CUDA: 4 shifts at once




Clocking Table: 4096 x 16 bit **Table 1: 1024 x 8 bit** Table 2: 512 x 8 bit **Table 3: 256 x 8 bit** 

### Balancing memory lookups and computation maximizes throughput




- Look-up tables (16kByte SRAM) enable parallelization
- The tables are shared across 8 CUDA cores


## Pre-computation tables store the code book condensed



## Distinguished point tables save hard disk lookups




#### Rainbow tables mitigate collisions



Rainbow tables have no mergers, but an exponentially higher attack time


# The combination of both table optimizations is optimal

- The most resource efficient table for A5/1 is:
- 32 DP segments of length 2<sup>15</sup>
- Merged into one rainbow
- 725 such tables with height 2<sup>28.5</sup> needed



# Tables must be computed and stored distributed

- For efficiency, tables distributed over many nodes are preferred
- More importantly, no single point of failure should exist on the critical path to the GSM decode PoC



\*use random ID and advance parameter; publish as A51\_<ID>\_<parameter>.table

### A5/1 cracking is just the first step ...

- Pre-computation framework build to be generic
  - Any cipher (key size up to 64 bits)
  - Various backends: CPU, CUDA, FPGA
- Open source
- Please get involved
  - Compute tables and provide feedback
  - Extend the table generator to your projects

#### Questions?

Slides, source, documentation	reflextor.com/trac/a51
Mailing list	tinyurl.com/a51list
c't article	tinyurl.com/ct-rainbows

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