

» Triple Play; Triple Threats? IPTV Security



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Agenda

- » "Triple Play" Strategy
 - The Business Case

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- » IPTV Introduction
- » IPTV Security
- » Countermeasures
- » Conclusion

Introduction

Yen-Ming Chen

- » Sr. Principal Consultant
- Been with Foundstone for 6 years
- Contributing author of four security books and numerous published articles.
- » Master of Science in Information Networking from C.M.U.
- Provide security risk assessment from web applications to emerging technologies

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Do Not Try This

At Home!!!



- IP TV Market
- » Triple-Play
 - Data, Voice and Video on the same network
 - Increase Average Revenue Per Unit (ARPU)
- » About 2 million IPTV subscriber world wide now
- » Expect to be 63 Million in 2010 (iSuppli)
- » IPTV generated revenue:
 - \$2 Billion now
 - \$26 Billion in 2010
- » IPTV has been there (remember Web TV?); but is getting more momentum now.

🌐 EMEA 🛄 North America 🛄 AslaPac



IPTV

- » Part of the "Triple-Play" strategy
 - Service provided on Telecoms' own network
 - Easy to control quality
- » Standalone service provider
 - Use the Internet as their own backbone
 - Watching TV from China in your home at London
 - P2P streaming, Web TV or RTP
- » Others (short videos, lower resolution)
 - YouTube, Google Video and other vBlogs
- » There are over 350 IPTV Service Providers
- » 60+ different vendors
- » We will focus on the first type of IPTV







Known Security Problems

- » Data Service
 - Home computers are turned into Zombies
 - Phishing, Spamming and DoS
- » Voice over IP (The Grugq will talk about this tomorrow)
 - Conversation eavesdropping
 - Phreaking, free phone calls
 - Device insecurity
 - Denial-of-Service

IP TV Overview

- » Video content offered on your broadband network
 - Subscription
 - Video-On-Demand
 - Interactive applications (web browsing, e-mail, games and others)
- » Architecture
 - Content Source
 - Delivery and Management Network
 - Home Network



IPTV Walkthrough (Home Users)

- » Home gateway (if any) boots up and authenticates
- » Set-Top Box boots up and authenticates
 - DHCP, TFTP or NFS to get the latest boot images
 - Authenticate with MAC, random nonce or public/private key
- » Choose and watch your channel
 - IP Multicast at work (unicast sometimes to reduce delay)
 - IGMP join/leave group to change channel
- » Purchase your VoD
 - Choose and purchase
- » Use other interactive applications
 - If available





Content Source

- » All devices, processes and networks that import and store video contents
- » Different sources
 - Satellite
 - RF
 - Pre-recorded tapes
 - Cable
 - Others



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Delivery and Management Network

- » All devices and network used to deliver video through the network to customers
 - Encoding and Streaming servers
 - On-Demand servers
 - Network backbone
- » Major functionalities
 - Customer authentication/authorization
 - Customer service
 - Provide video content (normal or ondemand) via
 - Multicast
 - Unicast





Home Network

- » Customer Premise Equipment
 - Anything that connects to a consumer's home network

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Alt State

- Computer
- Set-Top Box
- Home Gateway
- Game Console
- Phone
- Others



Attacker's Goals

- » Take control of a large amount of home networks
 - Service disruption
 - Spreading worms, trojans, virus
 - Broadcast own material (for political or other reasons)
- » Steal the content
 - For piracy or as simple as P2P TV source
 - For free TV/Video



IPTV Security Problems

- » Home Network
- » Deliver and Management Network

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» Content Source



Home Network

- » Understand how authentication and authorization are done
 - As easy as spoofing MAC Address
- » Security vulnerability on home network devices
 - Device management
 - Device weakness



Set-Top Box Communication

- » Set-Top Box downloaded boot image from a TFTP server
- » Set-Top Box register itself to a middleware server
- Set-Top Box receives channel listing, application directories (other than TV)
- » IGMP Membership report
 - To indicate the current channel or join a new channel
- » IGMP LeaveGroup
 - To leave a channel
- » Poweroff packet



Device Management

- » Most of the devices can be managed by SNMP or TELNET
 - telnet <set-top-box-ip> <telnet-port>
 - DSLFactoryTest> LeaveMGroup (Leave's the current multicast group)
 - DSLFactoryTest> JoinMGroup <multicast-groupaddress>:<mgroup-port> (Join the multicast group for Playboy[™])
- » Information transmitted in the clear
 - PIN (for parental control or VoD purchase)
 - Account number



Local Access to Device

- » Plug in USB keyboard/mouse
 - Command shell access
 - Tools on the STB
 - Modify EEPROM
 - Works if the authentication uses STB MAC Address
 - Access to other information
 - DRM-related

Weak TCP/IP Stack

- » Set-Top Boxes have limited memory and CPU resource.
- » Using isic to test:
 - Every set-top box starts a listener service to take video traffic
 - udpsic -s <streaming_server_ip> -d <stb_ip>,<listener_port> -r 1234
 - For some set-top boxes, this is Denial-of-Service
 - Useful if you want to perform DoS on each home network from your zombies.

Other Vulnerability

- » Web management interface
 - Data validation problem
 - Other standard web application issues

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- » Weak/default account and passwords
 - Might apply for
 - Web management interface
 - Telnet/SSH
 - SNMP



Delivery and Management Network

- » Access to other servers
 - Middleware problem
 - Streaming/Encoding server problem
 - Other servers



Access to Other Servers

- > Change your IP address to set-top box's IP address range, then you're on!
- > Scan the network range and you may find:
 - Middleware Server
 - Database Server
 - Other Servers



What Can You Find?

- » Passwords in spreadsheet or configuration files
- » Web management interface for middleware server

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- » Database servers
- » Movies for test
- » And



Streaming and Encoding Servers

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- » RTSP Buffer Overflow
- » Weak TCP/IP Stack



Real-Time Streaming Protocol

- » RFC 2326 (<u>www.rtsp.org</u>)
- » Used for video-on-demand server to deliver videos.
- » Sample:
 - DESCRIBE
 - SETUP
 - PLAY
 - GET_PARAMETER



Buffer Overflow

» DESCRIBE

rtsp://vodserver:554/mediacluster?ProviderId=company&Provid erAssetId=company00123 RTSP/1.0

- » Change the URI for the DESCRIBE method to a large chunk of data, you get buffer overflow on the VoD server.
- » Other location of the implementation might have the same problem
 - PROTOS for RTSP?



Weak TCP/IP Stack

- » Streaming or encoding servers are good at sending data out
- » They are not good at handling incoming traffic
- A nmap full-port scan could degrade the server response from 10ms to 3000ms for example.
- » An aggressive scan could cause denial-of-service



Content Source

- » Finding the backup
- » Finding the source
 - Hijacking VSAT connection talk tomorrow!

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- » VOD Manager
 - Web management interface



IPTV Security Summary

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- » Privacy
- » Confidentiality
- » Integrity
- » Availability
- » Interoperability

Privacy

- » How do Telecoms handle customer information?
 - Does any personal identifiable information (PII) goes through the network when you order a movie?
 - Any vulnerability on back-end billing system?
- » How do Telecoms manage CPEs?
 - Customer Premise Equipments, does it belong to the customer or the service provider?
 - How about Set-Top Box and other related equipments?
 - What's the Acceptable Usage Policy?

Confidentiality

- » Video Content
 - Is Digital Right Management (DRM) being used?
 - How about people stealing content directly from content source?
 - Remember all the backup tapes, laptops losses in 2005?
 - How are recorded contents protected?
 - Set-Top box as a DVR
- » Authentication and Authorization
 - How does the system perform authentication and authorization?
- » Other interactive applications

Integrity

- » Can Content be modified?
 - Multicast and unicast security
 - Content source security
- » Billing system integrity
 - Who should have access to billing system and how is internal fraud being prevented?

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- » Other systems on the network
 - How about their security?

Availability

- » Can someone disrupt your IPTV service?
 - To what scale?
- » Any of the IPTV device could be vulnerable to Denialof-Service attack?
 - Buffer overflow
 - Weak TCP/IP or protocol stack implementation
- If other service is down (Voice and Data) would it take down IPTV too?
 - System dependencies

Interoperability

- » There is currently no common standard on IPTV
 - Other than the use of multicast/unicast
 - May help security as a 'diversity factor'
 - One vulnerability for one telecom may not work for another
- » Standards on the work
 - ITU (ISO)
 - ISMA.tv
 - Others



Countermeasures

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- » Organization
- » Policies and Processes
- » Technology

Organization

- » Security team from the beginning
 - Integrate with current security teams
 - Responsible for security program management
 - From planning to deployment to incident response
 - Secure deployment lifecycle
 - Evaluate, Test and Response
- » Gap analysis
 - Understand security baseline at the beginning
 - Update status as new technologies are involved



Program and Procedure

- » Change management procedure
 - Access control list
- » Incident response program
 - Recognize
 - Response
 - Evolve
- » Security evaluation program and procedure
 - Evaluate security in technology and deployment

Technology

- » Product security
 - Secure SDLC
 - Security evaluation
- » Deployment best practice
- » Measure security impact to performance
- » Monitor and management
 - How do you recognize an IPTV fraud?
- » Bring security into standards
 - Next ITU IPTV workgroup meeting is in October

Conclusion

- » IPTV has been adopted as one of the "Triple Play" strategy by Telecoms
 - Evolved into "Multi Play" in the future
 - More interactive applications planned in the future
- » Risk still exist due to
 - Vulnerabilities in technology
 - Weakness in deployment
 - Incomplete or insecure processes
- » Countermeasure
 - Organization, process and procedures
 - Secure deployment (mitigating technology risk)



» Question and Answer



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