*Vulnerability Type*: Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) *Vendor of Product*: ZKTeco *Affected Product Code Base*: ZKTime Web - 220.127.116.1180 *Affected Component*: ZK Time Web Interface Management. *Attack Type*: Local - Authenticated *Impact*: Escalation of Privileges ------------------------------------------ *Product description:* ZKTime Web 2.0 is a cutting edge Web-based Time Attendance software, which provided a stable communication for devices through GPRS/WAN, hence, users can access the software anywhere by their Web Browser to remotely manage hundreds of T&A terminals under complex network condition (WLAN). The Application has an administrator role and application user role. *Attack Scenario:* The ZKTime Web Software allows the Administrator to elevate the privileges of the application user by simple click of a radio button namely "superuser". However when the request is generated there are no random tokens attached to this request to prevent any kind of Cross Site Request Forgery attacks. Moreover there no other protections (like administrator password verification etc.) mechanisms in place to block any kind of forged requests. An Attacker takes advantage of this scenario and creates a crafted link to add himself as an administrator to the ZKTime Web Software. He then uses social engineering methods to trick the administrator into click the forged http request. The request is executed and the attacker becomes the Administrator of the ZKTime Web Software. *Proof of Concept Code:* Forged HTTP Request used by the attacker:*Impact:* If the vulnerability is successfully exploited than an attacker (who would be a normal user of the web application) can escalate his privileges and become the administrator of ZK Time Web Software. *Recommendation:* Ensure that all sensitive CRUD Operations are appropriately protected with random tokens. Alternatively, the sensitive operations could also have an authentication layer to confirm user verification. *Credit*: Arvind Vishwakarma http://ultimateone1.blogspot.ae/ *Vulnerability Timeline:* 18th August 2017 a Vulnerability Discovered 20th August 2017 a Contacted Vendor a No Response 1st September 2017 a Contacted Vendor again a No Response 18th September 2017 a Vulnerability Disclosed Thanks Arvind V.