iDefense Security Advisory 05.24.11
http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/
May 24, 2011

I. BACKGROUND

IBM Corp.'s Lotus Notes software is an integrated desktop client option
for accessing e-mail, calendars and applications on an IBM Corp. Lotus
Domino server. More information can be found by visiting the URL below.
<BR> <BR> http://www-01.ibm.com/software/lotus/

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of a stack buffer overflow vulnerability in IBM
Corp.'s Lotus Notes could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in
the context of the current user. <BR> <BR> The vulnerability occurs
during the processing of hyperlink information contained within a
Microsoft Office Document (DOC) file. The hyperlink may be crafted in a
manner which can cause a strcpy function call to overflow the bounds of
a stack buffer. This condition may lead to arbitrary code execution.

III. ANALYSIS

Exploitation of this vulnerability results in the execution of arbitrary
code in the context of the user opening an attachment delivered via
email. In order to be successful, an attacker must social engineer the
victim into processing a specially crafted email attachment in a certain
way. Specifically, the victim must open the attachment and click the
view button on the attachment dialog box.

IV. DETECTION

Lotus Notes versions 6.0, 6.5, 7.0, 8.0, 8.5 are vulnerable.

V. WORKAROUND

A workaround is available to disable MS Office Documents within the
Lotus Notes file viewer: <BR> <BR> Open the keyview.ini file in the
Lotus Notes program data directory (C:\Program
Files\IBM\Lotus\Notes\Data) and comment out all references to mw8sr.dll.
To comment out a reference, proceed the line with a semi-colon ';'.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

IBM has released patches and workarounds to address this vulnerability.
For more information, consult their advisory at the following URL.

https://www-304.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21500034

VII. CVE INFORMATION

A Mitre Corp. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) number has not
been assigned yet.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

07/27/2010  Initial Vendor Notification
07/27/2010  Initial Vendor Reply
05/24/2011  Coordinated Public Disclosure

IX. CREDIT

This vulnerability was reported to iDefense by binaryhouse.net.

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X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2011 Verisign

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Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
 There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect,
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