



ABYSSSEC RESEARCH

1) Advisory information

Title : Movie Maker Remote Code Execution (MS10-016)
Version : moviemk.exe 2.1 (XP SP3)
Analysis : <http://www.abyssec.com>
Vendor : <http://www.microsoft.com>
Impact : Ciritical
Contact : shahin [at] abyssec.com , info [at] abyssec.com
Twitter : @abyssec
CVE : CVE-2010-0265

2) Vulnerable version

Windows XP SP2,SP3

Windows Movie Maker 2.1

Windows Vista SP1,SP2 and x64 versions

Windows Movie Maker 2.6

Windows Movie Maker 6.0

Windows Movie Maker 6.1

3) Vulnerability information

Class

1- Heap overflow

Impact

Successfully exploiting this issue allows remote attackers to cause denial-of-service conditions or execute arbitrary code.

Remotely Exploitable

Yes

Locally Exploitable

Yes

4) Vulnerabilities detail

The vulnerable part starts at IsValidWMToolsStream function. In this function new is used to times for allocating space. In both cases, values of Size needed for allocating memory is read from .mswmm file.

In first case after calling 'new' function, ExtractData function of CDocManager is read to fill the content of allocated space. Content of this space is read from .mswmm file.

ExtractData function of CdocMnager class takes three arguments. First argument specifies a string that is to be called. Second argument is a pointer to a space that known string from the first arguments is copied to it. And third argument specifies length of data that should be read.

```
.text:011814C4      push [ebp+bstrString] ; unsigned int
.text:011814C7      call ??2@YAPAXI@Z ; operator new(uint)
.text:011814CC      mov ebx, eax
.text:011814CE      pop ecx
.text:011814CF      mov [ebp+psz], ebx
.text:011814D2      mov [ebp+var_3C], ebx
.text:011814D5      mov byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 1
.text:011814D9      push [ebp+bstrString]
.text:011814DC      mov ecx, esi
.text:011814DE      push ebx
.text:011814DF      push [ebp+var_30]
.text:011814E2      call ?ExtractData@CDocManager@@@QAEJPBGPAXJ@Z ;
CDocManager::ExtractData(ushort const *,void *,long)
.text:011814E7      mov edi, eax
.text:011814E9      test edi, edi
.text:011814EB      jge short loc_1181503
```

Then in next steps 'new' function is used for the second time for allocating new space which then ExtractData function is called for copying "WmtoolsValid" value to the allocated space.

```
.text:01181540      push [ebp+bstrString] ; unsigned int
.text:01181543      call ??2@YAPAXI@Z ; operator new(uint)
.text:01181548      pop ecx
.text:01181549      mov [ebp+var_14], eax ; ebp-14h = pBuffer
.text:0118154C      mov [ebp+var_40], eax
.text:0118154F      mov byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 2
.text:01181553      push [ebp+bstrString]
.text:01181556      mov ecx, esi
.text:01181558      push ebx
.text:01181559      push edi
.text:0118155A      call ?ExtractData@CDocManager@@@QAEJPBGPAXJ@Z ; ExtractData(ushort const
*,void *,long)
.text:0118155F      mov esi, eax
.text:01181561      test esi, esi
.text:01181563      jge short loc_118158A
```

If look at the above code carefully, you will notice second parameter of ExtractData function, is the pointer to the space that allocated by first call to 'new' function and here is the vulnerable point. Because the allocated space to

the second call is not used and instead the same space which is allocated by first call is used. As there is no bound checking on length of data that should be read from the file (third argument of ExtractData function), it is possible to copy longer data than size of the allocated space of first 'new' call by manipulating this value in file which cause an overflow.

This vulnerability can show itself in the first call after CDocManager::CStream::Read function within the ExtractData function.

```
.text:01180C07      mov     esi, [ebp+arg_8]
.text:01180C0A      mov     ecx, [eax]
.text:01180C0C      push   edi
.text:01180C0D      lea    edx, [ebp+var_14]
.text:01180C10      push   edx
.text:01180C11      push   esi
.text:01180C12      push   [ebp+arg_4]
.text:01180C15      push   eax
.text:01180C16      call   dword ptr [ecx+0Ch] ; CDocManager::CStream::Read
.text:01180C19      mov     edi, eax
.text:01180C1B      test   edi, edi
.text:01180C1D      jge    short loc_1180C34
.text:01180C1F      or     [ebp+var_4], 0FFFFFFFh
.text:01180C23      mov     eax, [ebp+var_10]
.text:01180C26      test   eax, eax
.text:01180C28      jz     short loc_1180C30
.text:01180C2A      mov     ecx, [eax]
.text:01180C2C      push   eax
.text:01180C2D      call   dword ptr [ecx+8] ; Crash Point
```

Exploit:

Note: Our vulnerability is a Heap Overflow class and Movie Maker 2.1 software doesn't have DEP protection. As we mentioned earlier, this vulnerability can show his face in the first call (call [ecx+8]) after CDocManager::CStream::Read function within ExtractData function. because this call instruction, calls one of the inputs of vtable and because our overflowed data can overwrite values of this vtable, so the program crashes.

By these backgrounds in mind, the only thing to execute shellcode is to manipulate values of vtable properly to execute our arbitrary address by calling [ecx+8].