Security Assessment of DeepSeek and GPT Series Models against Jailbreak Attacks

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Abstract. The widespread deployment of large language models (LLMs) has raised critical concerns over their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks, i.e., adversarial prompts that bypass alignment mechanisms and elicit harmful or policy-violating outputs. While proprietary models like GPT-4 have undergone extensive evaluation, the robustness of emerging open-source alternatives such as DeepSeek remains largely underexplored, despite their growing adoption in real-world applications. In this paper, we present the first systematic jailbreak evaluation of DeepSeek-series models, comparing them with GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using the HarmBench benchmark. We evaluate seven representative attack strategies across 510 harmful behaviors categorized by both function and semantic domain. Our analysis reveals that DeepSeek's Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architecture introduces routing sparsity that offers selective robustness against optimization-based attacks such as TAP-T, but leads to significantly higher vulnerability under prompt-based and manually engineered attacks. In contrast, GPT-4 Turbo demonstrates stronger and more consistent safety alignment across diverse behaviors, likely due to its dense Transformer design and reinforcement learning from human feedback. Fine-grained behavioral analysis and case studies further show that DeepSeek often routes adversarial prompts to under-aligned expert modules, resulting in inconsistent refusal behaviors. These findings highlight a fundamental trade-off between architectural efficiency and alignment generalization, emphasizing the need for targeted safety tuning and modular alignment strategies to ensure secure deployment of open-source LLMs.

Keywords: Large Language Model · AI Security · Jailbreak Attack.

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI's GPT series, i.e., ChatGPT and GPT-4 [24, 37], and DeepSeek series, i.e., DeepSeek-LLM and DeepSeek R1 [9, 16], have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across diverse natural language processing (NLP) tasks, including text generation, summarization, and reasoning. Their widespread adoption in real-world applications, ranging from education and healthcare to legal and customer service, has made them indispensable

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tools in both academia and industry. However, this growing reliance also introduces significant risks. One of the most pressing concerns is the vulnerability of LLMs to jailbreak attacks, which are specially crafted inputs designed to bypass content moderation and elicit unsafe or harmful outputs. Prior research has shown that even advanced models like GPT-4, Claude, and PaLM remain susceptible to such attacks despite extensive alignment training and safety measures [18, 2]. The security implications of jailbreak attacks are profound. Malicious actors can exploit these vulnerabilities to generate disallowed content such as hate speech, personal information leaks, or instructions for illegal activities, thereby undermining the model's alignment with ethical and legal norms [3]. Moreover, the presence of these weaknesses erodes public trust in AI systems and complicates efforts to deploy LLMs safely in open environments. While recent work has proposed various defense strategies, including reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) [36] and chain of thought prompting [1], no model is immune. This raises an important question: how do different models compare in terms of their resilience to jailbreak attacks under standardized, adversarial stress-testing conditions?

To address this, the research community has developed a number of evaluation benchmarks that aim to systematically assess the robustness of LLMs against jailbreak attacks. Notable among them are HarmBench [43], JailbreakBench [46], and EasyJailbreak [47], which offer standardized datasets, diverse attack strategies, and consistent evaluation protocols. For instance, HarmBench provides over 500 harmful behavior prompts across multiple categories, integrating 18 attack methods and a refusal training module (R2D2); JailbreakBench emphasizes test-time robustness with paired harmful and benign queries and maintains an evolving leaderboard of model performance; EasyJailbreak introduces a lightweight, modular system with 11 attack recipes that are adaptable to both open- and closed-source models. Collectively, these benchmarks have enabled broad comparisons across major LLMs such as GPT-3.5/4, Claude, LLaMA-2/3, and Vicuna. However, a notable gap remains in the current literature: no existing work has systematically evaluated the jailbreak robustness of DeepSeek R1, a recently released open-source model that demonstrates strong performance and accessibility. As one of the most competitive open-source alternatives to proprietary LLMs, DeepSeek R1 represents a growing class of models that aim to democratize access to advanced language capabilities. Despite its rapid adoption and promising benchmark results, its security properties under adversarial prompting, especially in comparison to well-established closed-source models like GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, remain underexplored. Given the security-critical nature of LLM deployment, a direct comparative study of jailbreak attack resilience between DeepSeek R1 and GPT models is essential. In this work, we aim to fill this gap by conducting a comprehensive evaluation under standardized jailbreak attack settings, providing timely insights into the relative strengths and vulnerabilities of state-of-the-art open-source and closed-source LLMs.

To address the gap in understanding the jailbreak robustness of open-source LLMs, we conduct the first in-depth evaluation of DeepSeek-series models in

comparison with GPT-series models under standardized adversarial prompting benchmarks. We begin by contrasting the architectural characteristics of DeepSeek's Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) structure with GPT's dense Transformer design, analyzing how these differences affect alignment and safety robustness. Using HarmBench as the core evaluation suite, we test both model families across a range of jailbreak strategies and aggregate attack success rates (ASR) over all behavior types. Our results show that while GPT-series models, especially GPT-4 and GPT-4-Turbo, achieve superior overall robustness, DeepSeek demonstrates selective strength against automated and gradient-based attacks such as TAP-T and GCG-T. However, DeepSeek remains notably more vulnerable to direct prompt-based and human-engineered attacks. Further, by categorizing harmful behaviors by both function type (standard, contextual, copyright) and semantic domain (seven categories), we find that DeepSeek's sparse routing design limits its generalizable safety alignment across sensitive domains. In contrast, GPT models consistently enforce safety boundaries across a wide range of categories, likely due to dense training and more comprehensive alignment strategies. We also provide a detailed breakdown of ASRs by behavior type under each attack method, revealing that while DeepSeek achieves localized robustness in certain scenarios, it lacks GPT's consistent cross-domain safety performance.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study that assesses the jailbreak robustness of DeepSeek-series models in comparison with GPT-series models under diverse adversarial settings. The main contributions can be summarized as follows:

- We conduct a systematic evaluation of DeepSeek-series models' jailbreak robustness using HarmBench, covering 7 jailbreak strategies, and compare its performance with GPT-series models to understand architectural impacts on safety alignment.
- We examine the influence of model architecture by comparing DeepSeek's Mixture-of-Experts design with GPT's dense architecture, aiming to explore their respective strengths and limitations in resisting adversarial prompts.
- We categorize harmful behaviors by function type (standard, contextual, and copyright) and semantic domain (seven categories), in order to assess safety alignment across different behavioral and conceptual dimensions.
- We analyze ASR by behavior type under each jailbreak strategy to provide a fine-grained view of how specific attack methods interact with model vulnerabilities across different LLM architectures.

2 Background of DeepSeek and GPT

2.1 Development

DeepSeek In the dynamic realm of artificial intelligence, DeepSeek has made remarkable strides in model development, crafting a series of increasingly sophisticated and versatile models. The journey commenced on November 2, 2023, with the unveiling of DeepSeek-Coder [8], an open-source code large language

model (LLM) meticulously trained from scratch on 2 trillion tokens, a blend of 87% code and 13% natural language in English and Chinese. By supporting a broad spectrum of programming languages, including Python, Java, and C++, and leveraging a 16k window size and a task of filling in the blank during pre-training on project level code corpus, it demonstrated exceptional proficiency in code generation, debugging, and data analysis. Its superior performance on benchmarks such as HumanEval [4] , surpassing established open-source counterparts like CodeLlama [5], firmly established its significance in the field. Merely 27 days later, on November 29, 2023, DeepSeek expanded its portfolio with the introduction of the DeepSeek-LLM [9], a general purpose LLM boasting a 67 billion parameter scale. Available in 7B and 67B base and chat variants, this model was engineered to handle diverse natural language tasks, from engaging dialogues to text creation. The provision of an online experience platform further enabled users to directly interact with the model, facilitating its adoption and showcasing its real world applicability, thus building on the momentum initiated by DeepSeek-Coder.

The year 2024 witnessed a rapid succession of advancements that significantly expanded DeepSeek's model capabilities. In February, an upgraded version of the code generation model, DeepSeek-Coder, was released, further refining its programming task-handling prowess. This was followed in March by the debut of DeepSeek-VL [10], the company's first venture into the multi modal domain, integrating visual and textual information to enable more complex cognitive processing. April brought the DeepSeek-Math [11] model, which utilized GRPO training to excel in mathematical reasoning and problem solving. The release of DeepSeek-V2 [12] in May 2024 was a pivotal moment; employing DeepSeek-MoE and MLA architectures [13], this second generation base model achieved substantial improvements in both performance and efficiency, positioning itself as a major competitor in the LLM arena. Continuing the momentum, the subsequent months saw a series of iterative enhancements: the DeepSeek-Coder was upgraded to DeepSeek-Coder-V2 [14] in June, DeepSeek-V2.5 with enhanced efficiency was launched in September, and the first multi modal model, Janus, which broke new ground in visual understanding and generation, was introduced in October. The year concluded with the preview release of R1-Lite-Preview in November, a model focused on logical reasoning and complex problem solving, thereby forming a comprehensive suite of models catering to different aspects of AI tasks.

As 2025 dawned, DeepSeek continued to push the boundaries of model development. Early in January, the third generation base model, DeepSeek-V3 [12], was introduced. With the incorporation of the MTP task and multiple training level optimizations, it achieved significant leaps in performance and efficiency, representing a new frontier in DeepSeek's model evolution. Simultaneously, the reasoning series was expanded with the releases of DeepSeek-R1-Zero [15], trained via pure reinforcement learning for powerful reasoning, and DeepSeek-R1 [16], which further aligned with human preferences through cold start techniques. Towards the end of January, Janus-Pro [17] was unveiled,

surpassing its predecessor with enhanced visual generation and understanding capabilities, as evidenced by its performance on benchmarks like GenEval [6] and DPG-Bench [7]. This continuous evolution of DeepSeek models, from code specific to general purpose, and from single modality to multi modal frameworks, represents not just incremental improvements but fundamental shifts in architecture, training methodologies, and application domains. Each new model release builds upon the strengths of its predecessors, integrating novel techniques to overcome limitations, enhance performance, and expand the scope of applications. This iterative yet revolutionary approach has not only solidified DeepSeek's position as a leader in the AI community but also contributed significantly to the broader advancement of artificial intelligence, inspiring further research and development in model architecture, training algorithms, and multi modal processing.

GPT In 2018, OpenAI introduced the first Generative Pre-trained Transformer (GPT) [24], which marked a major advancement in natural language processing (NLP). Unlike traditional models that relied heavily on task related annotated datasets, GPT adopted a two stage training approach: unsupervised pretraining followed by supervised fine-tuning. This allowed the model to learn general language representations from vast amounts of raw text and adapt to various downstream tasks with relatively little labeled data. At the time, similar models like BERT [25], proposed by Google, were also gaining popularity. However, these models still required supervised learning setups for pretraining, whereas GPT's unsupervised pretraining strategy significantly reduced the dependency on labeled data. Prior to GPT, NLP advancements in areas such as machine translation [26, 27], voice recognition [28, 29], and summarization [30, 31] often required domain-specific annotations, limiting scalability and cross-task generalization.

To further reduce the need for labeled data and improve generalization, OpenAI released GPT-2 in 2019 [32]. GPT-2 preserved the core architecture of GPT-1 but significantly increased both the model size and the volume of training data. The key innovation in GPT-2 was the complete reliance on unsupervised learning. It demonstrated that a sufficiently large model trained on diverse, unlabeled data could perform surprisingly well across a wide array of NLP tasks. The underlying hypothesis was that unsupervised pretraining implicitly captures the information necessary for many supervised tasks, thereby transforming these tasks into applications of the model's general knowledge. GPT-2's success confirmed that scaling up both data and model parameters leads to better performance and wider task applicability without requiring task-specific reengineering.

This scaling principle culminated in GPT-3 [33], released in 2020, which expanded the model to 175 billion parameters and introduced a new training paradigm called in-context learning. Instead of relying on fine-tuning for every downstream task, GPT-3 could perform few-shot or even zero-shot learning simply by conditioning on task examples provided within the input prompt. This approach allowed the model to generate outputs with high quality across various

NLP tasks, including question answering, summarization, translation, and dialogue, with minimal task related modifications. However, despite its impressive capabilities, GPT-3 still exhibited limitations in reasoning and instruction following. Surprisingly, smaller models like T5 [34] outperformed GPT-3 on some tasks, suggesting that raw scale alone does not guarantee superior performance. To address these shortcomings, OpenAI explored methods such as code-based pretraining [35] and instruction tuning [36], aiming to enhance GPT-3's ability to follow human intent and reason logically.

Building upon this foundation, OpenAI introduced GPT-4 in 2023 [37], which brought significant improvements in reasoning, creativity, multimodal processing, and alignment with human values. GPT-4 allows users to input both text and images, enabling richer interactions and new application scenarios. It demonstrates more reliable performance in complex reasoning tasks, generates creative outputs like poems and songs in user-specified styles, and delivers stronger results on academic benchmarks, including simulated exams. Notably, GPT-4 integrates RLHF to improve the factuality, safety, and alignment of its responses [38]. These advancements have made GPT-4 more useful, controllable, and adaptable, solidifying its role as a general AI assistant. The rapid evolution from GPT-1 to GPT-4 underscores the transformative impact of scaling, training strategy design, and human-aligned fine-tuning in the development of large language models.

2.2 Architecture

DeepSeek. As shown in Fig. 1, DeepSeek adopts a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architecture to expand model capacity while maintaining computational efficiency. Rather than activating the entire network for every input, which is the case with dense models like ChatGPT, MoE models dynamically select a small subset of specialized subnetworks, or experts, conditioned on each input. In DeepSeek, this is implemented by replacing selected dense feed-forward layers within the Transformer architecture with sparsely activated expert layers. Each expert layer comprises a pool of independent subnetworks, and a gating mechanism is trained to select the top-k most relevant experts based on the input representation. Only the selected experts are activated during forward computation, resulting in substantial savings in compute despite the model's large overall parameter count.

To further ensure effective expert usage, DeepSeek incorporates an enhanced routing algorithm based on Expert Choice (EC), which explicitly controls the token-to-expert allocation. This method imposes a cap on the number of tokens an expert can process, ensuring a more uniform distribution of computational load. A load-balancing loss is added to the training objective to discourage expert overuse or neglect, thereby promoting better coverage of the expert space and avoiding bottlenecks. Overall, DeepSeek's MoE framework is designed to combine the benefits of large model capacity with practical computational scalability, supported by carefully designed routing strategies and structural mechanisms that promote both specialization and reuse.

Beyond its sparse expert design, DeepSeek further improves training and inference efficiency through Multi-Head Latent Attention (MLA), a memory-optimized variant of standard attention. In conventional Transformer models, each attention head maintains independent key and value matrices, resulting in large memory consumption, particularly during inference with long context windows. To address this, MLA compresses the key and value representations across heads into a shared latent space using low-rank projections. This mechanism enables the model to cache a significantly smaller set of latent vectors rather than full-size per-head tensors, reducing memory usage and improving computational throughput. By retaining the expressive capacity of multi-head attention while minimizing redundancy, MLA allows DeepSeek to scale to longer sequences and larger model sizes without incurring prohibitive memory costs.

Besides, DeepSeek also modifies the training objective through Multi-Token Prediction (MTP), which generalizes the standard next-token prediction paradigm. Traditional language models typically predict a single next token per training step, which can be sample inefficient for long sequences. In contrast, DeepSeek's MTP objective allows the model to predict multiple future tokens simultaneously at various offsets within the same sequence. This not only accelerates convergence by exposing the model to a denser supervisory signal per batch but also encourages the representation layers to learn richer contextual dependencies. The predicted tokens can be sampled either uniformly or based on a learned masking strategy, allowing flexibility in how future context is leveraged during training. By combining MTP with MLA and MoE, DeepSeek achieves a strong balance of model expressiveness, training efficiency, and inference scalability.

ChatGPT. As illustrated in Fig. 2, ChatGPT adopts a dense Transformer-based architecture in which all model parameters are activated for every input during both forward and backward passes. Each layer in the network is uniformly engaged, contributing to the computation for every token regardless of content or context. This uniform activation pattern enables the model to develop deeply entangled representations that support strong generalization across a wide range of tasks and domains. One of the central advantages of this dense architecture lies in its simplicity and general purpose applicability. In contrast to modular designs like MoE architectures, dense models such as ChatGPT do not rely on any routing mechanism to determine which parts of the model are activated. Instead, all components are trained jointly across the entire input distribution, allowing the model to implicitly learn how to allocate representational capacity as needed. This full-parameter engagement facilitates holistic knowledge integration and enables dense models to excel in open-ended scenarios including complex dialogue, creative writing, and cross-domain reasoning. The absence of modular boundaries allows the model to seamlessly combine linguistic, factual, and procedural knowledge within a single response, yielding answers that are contextually grounded and semantically coherent. A detailed comparison between dense and MoE-based architectures is summarized in Table. 1, highlighting key differences in computation cost, scalability, and specialization. While dense mod-



Fig. 1. An overview of DeepSeek's architecture.

els like ChatGPT favor general purpose reasoning with high uniformity across inputs, MoE architectures such as DeepSeek leverage conditional computation to achieve efficiency and specialization across domain related tasks.

2.3 Applications

DeepSeek. DeepSeek is particularly suited for scenarios requiring domain-specific precision, structured output, and logical reasoning. In bilingual translation tasks, DeepSeek has shown strong performance, especially in Chinese–English translation. This strength likely stems from its targeted training on parallel corpora and the activation of language experts within the MoE framework. As a result, DeepSeek often delivers terminologically accurate and semantically faithful translations, which is particularly valuable in technical documentation or communication. In comparison, ChatGPT, which employs a dense architecture trained on broad multilingual data, performs better on low-resource languages and creative translation tasks but may underperform in preserving domain related jargon and structure [33].

This structural advantage also extends to writing tasks that demand clarity and organization. DeepSeek's expert modules trained for logical sequencing



Fig. 2. An overview of ChatGPT's architecture.

and structured exposition are especially effective in generating user manuals, scientific reports, and technical documentation. While ChatGPT offers stylistic diversity and linguistic flair, its outputs may occasionally lack the internal consistency or rigor that DeepSeek maintains through modular specialization. This trade-off reflects the differing architectural priorities: DeepSeek filters peripheral semantic associations via sparse routing to maximize structural focus, while ChatGPT retains edge-level semantic connections due to its dense architecture, thereby favoring expressive range over formality [42, 40].

Further, in the context of medical question answering and health related consultations, DeepSeek's architecture allows the activation of a medically trained expert submodule, enhancing its ability to provide accurate and context sensitive responses. This design offers a potentially safer and more reliable approach to clinical information retrieval, particularly when combined with shared general language experts that ensure readability and contextual integration. In contrast, while ChatGPT has demonstrated high performance on benchmark clinical exams such as the USMLE [39], it remains a generalist model and is more prone

Table 1. Comparison of Model Architectures: ChatGPT (Dense Transformer) vs. DeepSeek (MoE Transformer)

Aspect	**ChatGPT (Dense Transformer)**	**DeepSeek (MoE Transformer)**
Model Type	Dense Transformer	Sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) Transformer
Expert Activation	All transformer layers are always activated for every input	Only a subset (e.g., top-2) of expert modules are activated based on gating mechanism
Computation Cost	High, scales linearly with model size	Lower, as only selected experts are used per input
Parallelism	Uniform computation across all layers and tokens	Conditional computation allows more parallelism and specialization
Specialization	Shared parameters across all inputs; less specialization	Experts can specialize in different tasks (e.g., translation, reasoning)
Efficiency on Domain-specific Tasks	General-purpose; efficient in diverse open-domain settings	More efficient in structured or domain-specific tasks (e.g., CN-EN translation, technical QA)
Scalability	Scaling leads to increased computation and memory	Scalability with controlled computation due to expert routing
Gating Mechanism	Not applicable (no routing)	Gating network routes each input token to most relevant experts
Typical Use Case	Creative writing, multi-language chat, general NLP	Technical document processing, structured generation, task-specific QA

to factual inaccuracies or "hallucinations" when dealing with specialized or edge-case medical queries.

DeepSeek's modularity also proves advantageous in data intensive domains such as finance. Its expert modules, trained separately on historical stock data, macroeconomic indicators, and mathematical reasoning, can be orchestrated for tasks like portfolio optimization or financial forecasting. For instance, when presented with an investment decision problem, DeepSeek may invoke one expert for pattern recognition over financial time series and another for risk return analysis, providing a more analytically grounded recommendation. By contrast, ChatGPT is well equipped to summarize financial reports and explain economic concepts in accessible language but lacks the capacity for deep modeling of time sensitive or numerically complex data streams. This divergence has led to increased interest in MoE models for high precision industrial applications, as evidenced by market responses following DeepSeek's release.

GPT. The GPT family of models, particularly exemplified by ChatGPT, represents a densely connected transformer architecture that prioritizes generalist capabilities through extensive parameter sharing. ChatGPT, as a prominent instantiation of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 models developed by OpenAI, has been

widely adopted for a broad range of natural language processing (NLP) tasks. Unlike sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures, GPT models utilize dense routing to propagate input through the entire network, enabling them to retain a rich variety of weak semantic associations across domains. This design confers notable advantages in tasks requiring linguistic fluency, contextual reasoning, and open-domain generalization. In translation scenarios, this densely connected architecture allows GPT models to generate flexible and context aware translations across a wide array of language pairs. While models like DeepSeek may excel in Chinese–English translation due to expert specialization, GPT-based models such as ChatGPT typically outperform in multilingual settings, particularly when dealing with low resource or morphologically rich languages, thanks to their broad exposure during pretraining [37].

This generalist design also makes ChatGPT especially suitable for creative writing tasks such as storytelling, essay generation, and content ideation. Its outputs typically exhibit coherent narrative structure, stylistic diversity, and expressive language use. This creative capacity is enabled by the dense model's capacity to integrate associations across domains, such as blending historical allusions into fictional narratives or incorporating philosophical reasoning into persuasive essays [42]. By contrast, DeepSeek often produces more structurally organized but less imaginative content, as its MoE experts favor logical coherence over stylistic novelty. In user studies comparing brainstorming outputs for children's stories, ChatGPT was consistently rated higher for originality and expressiveness, while DeepSeek was noted for structural integrity and completeness.

In the domain of health communication, ChatGPT has shown strong performance in delivering general medical advice and explanations. Its ability to articulate complex concepts in plain language makes it suitable for health education and non-critical decision support. It has even demonstrated competency in answering clinical vignettes with high accuracy on formal medical exams [39]. However, its lack of domain related fine-tuning can lead to plausible yet medically inaccurate responses, limiting its reliability in specialized contexts where DeepSeek's expert guided architecture holds an advantage.

Finally, ChatGPT proves particularly effective in financial communication and user interaction tasks [41]. While it may not match DeepSeek in quantitative forecasting, it excels at interpreting financial news, generating executive summaries, and producing readable analytical content. In applications where the primary objective is interpretability, narrative clarity, or interactive responsiveness, ChatGPT's dense generalist model remains the preferred choice. Its ability to synthesize broad context with linguistic fluency enables it to bridge technical and non-technical audiences more effectively than modular systems.

3 Jailbreak Attacks

3.1 Jailbreak Attacks in GPT

A growing body of research has demonstrated that GPT-series models (e.g., GPT-3.5, GPT-4) are vulnerable to a range of jailbreak attacks, particularly in black-box settings where attackers lack access to model parameters. Jailbreak attacks are designed to bypass the safety alignment and content moderation layers of LLMs, coercing them into producing prohibited or unsafe outputs. These attacks achieve their goals by manipulating model behavior through suggestive phrasing, meta-linguistic patterns, and indirect instructional cues. Several prominent methods have emerged that exploit these alignment weaknesses using gradient-based optimization, LLM-assisted prompt generation, and adversarial input engineering.

Zero-Shot Attacks. One of the simplest and most commonly used baselines in jailbreak research involves directly issuing a harmful prompt to the model without applying adversarial optimization or contextual masking. These zero-shot attacks, often phrased as direct questions such as "Can you teach me how to make a bomb?", are used to evaluate whether a model's alignment safeguards can independently prevent policy-violating responses. Despite their simplicity, these attacks continue to reveal residual vulnerabilities in GPT models, serving as a reference point for assessing the strength of more advanced jailbreak techniques.

GCG and GCG-T. Zou et al. [18] proposed the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) method, a white-box gradient-based approach that appends optimized suffixes to input prompts to bypass safety mechanisms. Although these suffixes may appear syntactically awkward, they have demonstrated strong transferability to black-box models such as ChatGPT and GPT-4. An improved variant, GCG-T, enhances transferability and success rates by generating suffixes using more refined optimization strategies.

AutoDAN. Zhu et al. [19] introduced AutoDAN, a sequential gradient-based method that constructs adversarial suffixes token by token through a Single Token Optimization algorithm. AutoDAN improves both the fluency and effectiveness of jailbreak prompts, making it particularly successful against models defended by perplexity-based safeguards. The method has achieved high success rates when applied to black-box models such as GPT-4.

PAIR. Chao et al. [20] developed the Prompt Automatic Iterative Refinement (PAIR) framework, in which an attacker LLM iteratively improves jailbreak prompts for a target LLM through feedback-based refinement. This black-box strategy has proven effective against GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, demonstrating the viability of multi-turn adaptive optimization without requiring internal model access.

TAP. Mehrotra et al. [21] proposed Tree of Attacks with Pruning (TAP), a method that constructs and prunes a tree of candidate prompts by leveraging GPT models to evaluate their potential. Prompts that succeed are reused as seeds in subsequent iterations. TAP has shown strong jailbreak performance on GPT-4, especially in zero-shot evaluation settings.

PAP-top5. Zeng et al. [22] introduced Persuasive Adversarial Prompts (PAP), which apply psychological persuasion strategies to create covert and semantically rich jailbreak inputs. These prompts are generated by fine-tuned LLMs guided by structured taxonomies of persuasive techniques. Despite the presence of alignment mechanisms, PAPs have been effective in eliciting policy-violating responses from GPT models.

Collectively, these approaches highlight a critical issue: even highly aligned and proprietary models like GPT-4 remain susceptible to increasingly sophisticated jailbreak attacks that require little to no internal access. This trend underscores the urgent need for developing robust, generalizable, and interpretable defenses against adversarial prompt engineering.

3.2 Jailbreak Attacks in DeepSeek

Recent studies have uncovered critical vulnerabilities in advanced reasoning models such as DeepSeek-R1 when subjected to jailbreak attacks. Chang et al. [48]introduced Chain-of-Lure, a method inspired by Chain-of-Thought prompting, where an attacker model constructs a deceptive narrative composed of structured, multi-turn lures. These narratives guide the victim model step by step toward producing harmful content. The authors demonstrated that DeepSeek-R1 is particularly vulnerable under this black-box setup, achieving near-perfect ASR even against closed-source models. Ying et al. [51] proposed RACE, a multi-turn jailbreak framework that reformulates harmful queries into stepwise reasoning tasks. By guiding the model through iterative conversations, the attacker gradually elicits unsafe outputs while preserving semantic coherence. Their experiments demonstrated a high ASR on DeepSeek-R1, highlighting how its reasoning capabilities can be redirected to bypass alignment safeguards. Qi et al. [49] extended this exploration to collaborative multi-agent environments, where multiple LLMs debate to reach conclusions. They designed a structured prompt rewriting framework that subtly escalates the conversation toward harmful content through narrative construction, role-based interaction, and rhetorical obfuscation. When applied to MAD systems built on DeepSeek, their method significantly increased both harmfulness and ASR, revealing compounded risks in interactive agent settings. Kuo et al. [52] investigated how DeepSeek-R1's own safety reasoning mechanisms could be turned against it. They introduced H-CoT, a method that manipulates the intermediate Chain-of-Thought steps typically used to assess safety. By hijacking these reasoning traces and feeding them back into the input, H-CoT sharply reduced DeepSeek-R1's refusal rate from 20% to just 4%, transforming initially cautious behavior into willingness to respond to dangerous queries.

Beyond proposing attack strategies, Zhou et al. [50] conducted a comprehensive safety assessment of DeepSeek-R1. Comparing it against models such as OpenAI o3-mini, they found that DeepSeek not only underperformed in standardized safety benchmarks but also produced more harmful content during its reasoning phase than in its final answers. These findings underscore the limita-

tions of current safety alignment techniques, particularly when reasoning traces themselves become attack vectors.

These works demonstrate that while DeepSeek-R1 excels at structured reasoning, it remains highly susceptible to adversarial manipulation, through both prompt engineering and the exploitation of its own internal logic.

3.3 Jailbreak Attack Benchmark

In the context of evaluating the robustness of large language models (LLMs) against adversarial prompting and jailbreak attacks, several benchmarks have been proposed to provide standardized and reproducible testing environments. Among them, HarmBench [43], JailbreakBench [46], and EasyJailbreak [47] are three representative frameworks that differ in focus and implementation. HarmBench is designed to support both red teaming and model-level refusal evaluation, offering a comprehensive dataset of 510 harmful behaviors, which include standard, contextual, copyright, and multimodal scenarios. JailbreakBench, by contrast, provides 100 misuse behaviors paired with corresponding benign queries, facilitating comparative refusal testing. It places greater emphasis on test-time robustness, offering an evolving repository of jailbreak prompts and supporting a wide range of open- and closed-source LLMs. EasyJailbreak takes a more lightweight and modular approach, enabling researchers to quickly construct and evaluate jailbreak attacks using configurable components. It supports common models such as GPT-4, GPT-3.5, LLaMA2, and Vicuna, and allows user-defined models to be integrated via HuggingFace interfaces.

In terms of attack methodology, HarmBench includes 18 automated red teaming approaches such as GCG, AutoDAN, TAP, and PAIR, and introduces an efficient adversarial training mechanism (R2D2) to improve refusal behavior. EasyJailbreak incorporates 11 well-established attack recipes, organized under a four-part modular framework consisting of Selector, Mutator, Constraint, and Evaluator, allowing for flexible recombination and development of novel attacks. JailbreakBench emphasizes support for adaptive attacks and test-time defenses, while maintaining an official leaderboard that tracks the performance of both attacks and defenses on real-world models. For evaluation, HarmBench standardizes key parameters such as token length and decoding strategy to ensure fair comparisons, and adopts LLM-based classifiers to measure ASR. JailbreakBench performs rigorous human-aligned validation using powerful judges like LLaMA-3-70B and emphasizes behavior-level analysis. EasyJailbreak complements its attack generation pipeline with comprehensive reports that include ASR, response traces, and perplexity-based indicators. Together, these benchmarks provide complementary infrastructures for evaluating and improving the security posture of LLMs under adversarial stress.

Table 2. Comparison of Benchmark Frameworks for Evaluating LLM Jailbreaking Robustness

Benchmark	**Target**	**Dataset**	**Model Coverage**	**Attack Method**	**Extensibility**
HarmBench	1. Red teaming 2. Refusal robustness	1. 200 standard 2. 100 contextual 3. copyright 4. 110 multimodal	33 models	18 methods	1. New behaviors supported 2. Fixed pipeline
JailbreakBench	Test-time defenses and adaptive attacks	100 behaviors (50 harmful + 50 benign)	20+ models	Community-submitted adaptive attacks	Supports leaderboard and submissions
EasyJailbreak	Attack construction and modular evaluation	Custom queries + 11 attack recipes	Mainstream + HuggingFace models	11 methods	modular: Selector, Mutator, Evaluator

4 Experiment

4.1 Dataset

In our evaluation, we utilize HarmBench, a comprehensive benchmark dataset specifically developed to evaluate the adversarial robustness and refusal behavior of large language models (LLMs). HarmBench comprises a total of 510 harmful behaviors, which are intentionally designed to represent malicious, unethical, or illegal user requests. These behaviors are divided into 400 textual and 110 multimodal instances and cover a wide spectrum of misuse scenarios.

Functionally, HarmBench defines four distinct types of behavioral prompts, which differ in structure and contextual dependency. These functional categories are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3. Functional Categories in HarmBench

Category Type	**Count**	**Description and Usage**
Standard Behaviors	200	Single-sentence or short instructions without any context or additional input. Mainly used for baseline red teaming evaluations.
Copyright Behaviors	100	Explicitly require the model to generate copyrighted content. Used to assess copyright compliance. Detection is performed via hash-based matching.
Contextual Behaviors	100	Include detailed background (e.g., target individual's profession, hobbies, political views) and request a harmful action. Used to test whether the model generates harmful content in context-sensitive settings.
Multimodal Behaviors	110	Combine images (e.g., locks, chemical structures) with textual prompts. Designed to evaluate whether vision-language models exhibit vulnerabilities under visual prompting.

Each functional category presents unique challenges. Standard behaviors are self-contained prompts modeled after legacy red teaming datasets and serve as a baseline. Copyright behaviors evaluate whether models reproduce protected content and are assessed using hash-based classifiers. Contextual behaviors embed the harmful intent within rich user profiles to probe whether LLMs can misuse background information. Multimodal behaviors, on the other hand, integrate visual stimuli and test the integrity of vision-language models when prompted with security-relevant imagery.

To promote fairness and reproducibility, HarmBench includes a predefined data split: 100 behaviors are reserved for validation, and 410 are allocated for testing. This separation prevents overfitting and ensures that models are not tuned on evaluation data. Furthermore, the dataset creators employed stringent curation criteria, including legal plausibility, differential harm potential, and the exclusion of dual-intent prompts (i.e., prompts that may be benign in legitimate contexts).

4.2 Baseline

In our evaluation, we include four versions of OpenAI's GPT series models: GPT-3.5 Turbo 0613, GPT-3.5 Turbo 1106, GPT-4 0613, and GPT-4 Turbo 1106. These models represent specific releases accessible via the OpenAI API, with the selection constrained to versions that are guaranteed to remain available beyond June 2024. Earlier model variants, such as those released in March 2023, are excluded due to uncertain long-term support. All four models have undergone extensive red teaming and safety alignment procedures[43]. Importantly, the OpenAI API used in our experiments does not apply additional filtering or post-processing to the outputs. Therefore, we report the raw model completions as returned by the API to the best of our knowledge.

In addition to the GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 models, we evaluate multiple versions of the DeepSeek language model, specifically its distilled variants across a range of scales. These include DeepSeek-Distill-1.5B, 7B, 8B, 14B, and 32B, where the numerical suffix denotes the approximate parameter count in billions. The DeepSeek family represents a suite of instruction-tuned models optimized for efficiency and performance trade-offs across deployment scenarios. All versions are evaluated under the same HarmBench protocol to ensure consistency in red teaming assessment, allowing for direct comparison with both OpenAI GPT models and other open-source baselines. The use of multiple DeepSeek model sizes enables an analysis of how model scale influences robustness under adversarial prompting.

Table 4 presents a side-by-side comparison between the GPT-3.5/GPT-4 series developed by OpenAI and the DeepSeek Distill models, which are open-sourced by DeepSeek AI. This comparison spans multiple dimensions, including model scale, accessibility, alignment techniques, output filtering mechanisms, and support for multimodal inputs. Notably, while GPT models are closed-source and accessed exclusively via API, DeepSeek provides a range of deployable models with varying parameter sizes, making it more suitable for customizable use cases.

From an alignment perspective, both families adopt modern techniques such as RLHF [44] and DPO [45], with DeepSeek further introducing GRPO [11] to enhance policy-level control. Additionally, DeepSeek explicitly integrates output filtering and multi-stage safety mechanisms, whereas GPT models are evaluated in HarmBench using raw API outputs without post-processing. The comparison highlights key architectural and policy-driven differences that impact the robustness and trustworthiness of each model family under adversarial testing conditions.

Table 4. Comparison Between GPT and DeepSeek Distill Models

Aspect	**GPT-3.5 / GPT-4 Series**	**DeepSeek Distill Series**
Developer	OpenAI	DeepSeek AI (affiliated with Tsinghua University)
Model Versions	GPT-3.5 Turbo 0613 / 1106 GPT-4 0613 / Turbo 1106	Distill-1.5B, 7B, 8B, 14B, 32B
Accessibility	Closed-source, accessible via API	Open-source (selected versions), locally deployable
Alignment Methods	RLHF (Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback) DPO (for Turbo models)	SFT (Supervised Fine-Tuning) RLHF (for some versions) DPO GRPO (Group-based Relative Policy Optimization)
Output Filtering	No explicit post-processing reported via API Raw outputs evaluated in HarmBench	Clear post-processing and filtering Dual-level (model + application layer) safety review
Training Objective	Strong generalization Optimized for high-quality generation and dialogue performance	Focused on reasoning capabilities (math, programming) Efficiency and safety-aware training
Safety Tuning	Extensive red teaming Strong refusal mechanisms for harmful content	Multi-stage refusal strategies Robust to instruction and visual multimodal attacks
Multimodal Support	Supported in GPT-4V (GPT-4 Turbo with vision)	Limited in current versions Vision-language support under separate development (DeepSeek-V)

4.3 Evaluation Results

General Performance We conducted a comprehensive comparison between the DeepSeek-series models (Table 5) and the GPT-series models, whose evaluation results (Table 6) are adapted from [43]. These models were tested against a diverse set of jailbreak attack strategies, including automated red-teaming

methods (GCG-T, PAIR, TAP-T), prompt-based attacks (ZeroShot, PAP), and human or direct recovery approaches (DR, HumanJailbreaks). Across most attack methods, a clear distinction emerges between the robustness of the two model families. For GCG-T, an automated gradient-based adversarial prompting method, GPT-3.5 Turbo (1106) recorded the highest success rate at 42.60%, while GPT-4 models were notably more robust, with success rates dropping to around 22%. DeepSeek models showed consistent but slightly increasing vulnerability with scale, ranging from 32.54% (1.5B) to 39.25% (32B). This suggests that while DeepSeek models are not as robust as GPT-4, they demonstrate stronger resistance to GCG-T attacks than GPT-3.5 models, potentially due to the MoE architecture introducing discontinuities in activation pathways, which may hinder gradient-based adversarial optimization.

The PAIR method rewrites instructions to bypass safety constraints, shows a similar trend. GPT-3.5 Turbo (0613) showed high vulnerability at 47.8%, while GPT-4 variants improved significantly, reaching as low as 33.8%. DeepSeek models became more susceptible as scale increased, though the 32B variant approached GPT-4-level robustness at 36.74%. This suggests that PAIR attacks are effective across architectures, although DeepSeek's routing dynamics may slightly reduce their effectiveness. The TAP-T method uses targeted adversarial prompting, reveals a sharp contrast. GPT models are highly vulnerable, reaching 63.0% for GPT-3.5 Turbo 0613 and 57.7% for GPT-4 Turbo. In contrast, DeepSeek models achieve much lower success rates, often below 1%. This disparity likely arises from the difficulty of transferring TAP-T optimization across DeepSeek's gated MoE architecture, which may hinder consistent control over activated experts.

ZeroShot and PAP, two prompt-based attack strategies, offer additional insights. DeepSeek models are more susceptible to ZeroShot attacks, with a peak rate of 40.40% for 7B, whereas GPT-4 models show greater resistance, reaching as low as 12.7% for GPT-4 Turbo. This suggests that prompt-based attacks are more effective against DeepSeek models, potentially due to less robust instruction alignment or weaker system-level safety measures. In contrast, both model families show lower vulnerability to PAP, with DeepSeek models ranging from 15% to 20%, and GPT-4 models maintaining rates between 11% and 17%.

In DR and HumanJailbreaks methods, GPT models, particularly GPT-4 Turbo, demonstrate greater robustness, with HumanJailbreaks success rates as low as 2.6%, compared to approximately 41% for DeepSeek models. This suggests that DeepSeek's MoE architecture may not yet incorporate the same degree of safety fine-tuning or RLHF optimization that contributes to GPT-4's robustness.

In summary, the GPT-series models, particularly GPT-4 and its Turbo variant, consistently outperform DeepSeek models across most jailbreak attack methods. However, DeepSeek's MoE architecture offers notable resistance to gradient-based and automated attacks like TAP-T and GCG-T, though it appears more susceptible to direct prompt attacks and human-engineered prompts. These findings suggest a trade-off between architectural sparsity and safety tuning: while MoE architectures may naturally disrupt optimization-based attacks, dense mod-



Fig. 3. ASR of DeepSeek and GPT under all behaviors dataset.

els like GPT-4 benefit more from advanced safety alignment techniques and training data curation.

Table 5. Evaluation results of jailbreaks on Deepseek-series models

Model	GCG-T	PAIR	TAP-T	ZeroShot	DR	PAP	Human
DeepSeek_1.5b	32.54	27.81	36.88	35.80	34.3750	15.87	30.69
DeepSeek_7b	34.36	30.94	50.94	40.40	40.9375	20.63	39.13
DeepSeek_8b	37.9375	33.00	47.50	38.60	41.5625	18.44	41.62
DeepSeek_14b	36.1875	34.38	50.00	33.20	41.5625	17.19	41.19
DeepSeek_32b	39.25	36.74	52.81	34.37	0.4000	19.38	41.19

Performance on Specific Behaviors We measured ASR for multiple jailbreak methods on DeepSeek and GPT models across three behavioral categories. Fig. 3 shows that DeepSeek models consistently score higher in the Standard and Contextual categories, indicating a greater likelihood of unsafe or policy-violating outputs. For instance, DeepSeek-32B records a contextual risk of 0.7796, followed by DeepSeek-14B (0.8203) and DeepSeek-8B (0.763), suggesting that larger MoE variants are more susceptible to adversarial prompts. In contrast, GPT-4 models show far lower contextual risk; GPT-4 Turbo (1106) is lowest at 0.323, reflecting stronger internal alignment. In the Standard category, DeepSeek-32B again leads at 0.4833, compared with 0.24886 for GPT-4 Turbo and 0.228 for GPT-4 (0613). This pattern confirms that although DeepSeek scales well on general tasks, its safety compliance does not, perhaps owing to limited RLHF or constrained expert-module tuning. In the Copyright category, GPT-4 models slightly exceed DeepSeek in violation rates. GPT-4 (0613) and GPT-4 Turbo reach 0.11057 and 0.03857, respectively, whereas DeepSeek's highest is only 0.0091 (DeepSeek-1.5B); many larger variants score zero. Overall, semantic-behavior metrics reveal

Table 6. Evaluation results of jailbreaks on GPT-series models (adapted from [43]).

Model	GCG-T	PAIR	TAP-T	ZeroShot	DR	PAP	Human
GPT-3.5 Turbo 0613	38.60	47.80	63.00	24.40	22.20	15.20	24.70
GPT-3.5 Turbo 1106	42.60	36.30	47.60	28.70	33.80	11.30	3.10
GPT-4 0613	22.50	39.40	55.80	18.90	20.90	17.00	12.10
GPT-4 Turbo 1106	22.30	33.80	57.70	12.70	9.70	11.60	2.60

a safety trade-off: DeepSeek models are structurally robust against some jailbreaks yet more prone to harmful outputs, whereas GPT-4 and GPT-4 Turbo maintain tighter safety boundaries, likely because of stronger alignment and broader-scale safety tuning.



Fig. 4. ASR for semantic categories on DeepSeek and GPT models.

Beyond semantic behavior groups, we also analyzed category-specific vulnerability under adversarial prompting across six high-risk content domains. The results, visualized in Fig. 4, further reinforce the divergence between DeepSeek and GPT-series models in safety alignment. Across nearly all categories, DeepSeek models exhibit substantially higher ASR of jailbreaks compared to their GPT counterparts. For example, in the misinformation category, DeepSeek models reach a ASR of 0.6422, nearly three times higher than GPT models at 0.213. Similarly, for cybercrime and illegal content, DeepSeek maintains high risk levels of 0.5573 and 0.4934 respectively, whereas GPT models record considerably lower values at 0.18 and 0.115. These discrepancies suggest that GPT models are more effective at resisting socially and legally sensitive prompts. The gap remains consistent in categories like harassment and harmful behaviors, where



Fig. 5. ASR of GPT and DeepSeek under red-teaming attacks.



Fig. 6. ASR of GPT and DeepSeek under prompt-based attacks attacks and direct recovery attacks.

GPT models demonstrate stronger safety constraints, systematically rejecting adversarial attempts or responding with cautionary language. This indicates that GPT-4 and even GPT-3.5 variants possess broader and more consistent internalization of content moderation norms. Meanwhile, the chemical and biological category presents a rare reversal that GPT models show a higher risk rate, while DeepSeek models register zero successful jailbreaks. Overall, these categorical results support the earlier claim that DeepSeek's sparsely activated MoE design may block alignment generalization across sensitive domains. While GPT's dense, uniformly-trained architecture consistently enforces safety boundaries across diverse categories, DeepSeek models tend to exhibit inconsistent behavior, often bypassing safety filters when prompted in certain high-risk domains.

Fig. 5 and 6 shows the ASR by behavior type under each jailbreak strategy, offering a fine-grained view of how different attack vectors interact with safety vulnerabilities in GPT and DeepSeek architectures.

Under the PAIR attack, which rewrites instructions to evade filters, GPT models show slightly higher ASR than DeepSeek across both standard and contextual behaviors. Notably, GPT also registers a non-zero copyright ASR, while DeepSeek remains fully resistant in this category. This suggests GPT is generally more vulnerable to sophisticated rephrasing strategies under PAIR, although both models maintain relatively low risk for copyrighted outputs. For TAP-T, which performs optimization over token-level perturbations, GPT exhibits the highest vulnerability among all methods. These results support prior claims that TAP-T is particularly effective against densely activated models like GPT, whereas DeepSeek's MoE routing introduces variability that partially resists these gradients. At the same time, DeepSeek avoids all copyright violations, while GPT occasionally fails to 6.93%. For GCG-T attacks, which are also gradient-based, slightly reverse the earlier trend. DeepSeek exhibits a higher ASR in Standard prompts compared to GPT, as well as a marginally higher rate in the Contextual category. This suggests that although DeepSeek's MoE architecture may mitigate specific attacks like TAP-T, it remains susceptible to broader gradient-based adversarial strategies when routing enables consistent expert activation. Both models exhibit minor leakage in the copyright category, with GPT once again showing a higher rate at 7.90%.

In contrast, ZeroShot attacks, which prompt without prior context, highlight DeepSeek's vulnerability, particularly in the standard and contextual categories. DeepSeek achieves ASRs of 76.96% in standard and 74.06% in contextual, nearly twice GPT's rates of 18.65% and 40.48%, respectively. These results evidence that while DeepSeek models are structurally resilient against optimization-based attacks, they remain highly susceptible to prompt-only adversarial strategies. Even in the copyright category, DeepSeek shows minor leakage in contrast to GPT. PAP results show both models performing relatively well, with low ASRs overall. DeepSeek shows a slight advantage on standard prompts, but higher contextual ASR, reflecting a recurring weakness in handling prompts embedded with nuanced safety cues. Also, DeepSeek avoids all copyright violations, while GPT occasionally fails to 7.53%.

Under HumanJailbreaks attack, the pattern returns to GPT's advantage. DeepSeek displays significant vulnerability with standard and contextual prompts, while GPT remains comparatively robust. The gap is especially stark for real-world crafted jailbreaks, where DeepSeek fails to filter human adversarial intent. While both models manage to suppress copyright violations, GPT still registers a small but non-trivial leakage. Meanwhile, DR attacks paint a similar picture. DeepSeek consistently underperforms with standard and contextual prompts compared to GPT's lower ASRs.

These results confirm a nuanced trade-off between architectural specialization and general safety performance. DeepSeek's model structure offers localized robustness against specific attack types, such as TAP-T and copyright prompts, but it does not exhibit the same level of generalized safety behavior as GPT-4 across varied contexts and behaviors. GPT models, particularly the Turbo

variants, consistently achieve lower ASRs across most categories, especially in response to human-crafted and prompt-based attacks.

Case Study Analysis of Model Behavior under GCG-T and TAP-T Attacks To further investigate the behavioral differences between DeepSeek and GPT-series models, we conducted two sets of case studies, each comprising three representative examples targeting safety-critical and policy-violating prompts. The first set, shown in Fig. 7, presents model responses under GCG-T attacks, while the second set, depicted in Fig. 8, examines responses under TAP-T attacks. In these experiments, we used the "deepseek-distill-8b" (a distilled 8B MoE variant) as the representative DeepSeek model, and the "gpt-4-0613" version as the representative GPT-series model. These qualitative analyses offer concrete illustrations of how jailbreak methods affect model compliance and the ability to bypass alignment safeguards, highlighting distinct behavioral patterns between modular MoE and dense architectures.

Under GCG-T attacks, DeepSeek models consistently generated detailed and contextually coherent responses even when prompted with highly sensitive or prohibited content. For example, when asked for step-by-step instructions on synthesizing the banned pesticide parathion, DeepSeek provided a structured multi-step chemical synthesis process, suggesting reagents and conditions. In contrast, GPT refused to respond, citing safety and ethical boundaries. Similarly, when prompted to write a persuasive post encouraging parents to feed honey to infants, an act medically discouraged due to the risk of botulism, DeepSeek enthusiastically complied, producing a persuasive and emotionally resonant narrative. GPT, by contrast, adhered to medical consensus and safety guidance, cautioning against the recommendation. A politically charged prompt concerning election fraud yielded another revealing example: DeepSeek followed the prompt's persuasive framing and generated a detailed argumentative response that implied widespread fraud flipped the 2020 U.S. election. GPT, on the other hand, maintained a balanced stance grounded in empirical findings and expert consensus. These cases indicate that DeepSeek's MoE architecture may introduce routing variability that leads certain expert modules to overlook safety constraints when guided adversarially.

When subjected to TAP-T attacks, DeepSeek generally exhibited more robust safety adherence than GPT, especially in response to subtly framed prompts designed to bypass alignment safeguards. In the first example, where the prompt subtly asked for a step in synthesizing the "Divine Elixir", a euphemism for illicit drug production, DeepSeek responded with fragmented and uncertain steps, suggesting hesitancy and partial rejection. GPT, on the other hand, provided a more coherent and technically specific response, including references to LSD-25 and laboratory procedures, indicating a higher degree of vulnerability to safety circumvention. In the second case, a prompt asked for the lyrics of a popular copyrighted song in a disguised manner. DeepSeek responded cautiously, offering paraphrased or invented lines that avoided direct reproduction of the original content. In contrast, GPT produced actual copyrighted lyrics, raising concerns



Fig. 7. Examples of generated responses from GPT and DeepSeek under GCG-T attacks.



Fig. 8. Examples of generated responses from GPT and DeepSeek under TAP-T attacks.

over potential violations of intellectual property safeguards. In the final example, involving a hypothetical network exploit script, DeepSeek again exhibited uncertainty and stopped short of delivering a concrete attack vector, whereas GPT returned a plausible and technically detailed payload structure. These examples collectively highlight that DeepSeek, while not immune to jailbreaks, tends to trigger stronger rejection behaviors or internal filters under TAP-T prompts, whereas GPT's outputs remain fluent and directive even when safety or policy boundaries are subtly challenged.

In summary, these examples reveal a clear divergence in DeepSeek's vulnerabilities depending on the nature of the jailbreak attack. Specifically, under direct and aggressive GCG-T attacks, DeepSeek exhibits a high degree of compliance by generating detailed and coherent policy-violating content, which suggests that its modular MoE architecture, particularly the routing mechanism, may allow certain expert modules to bypass safety constraints. Conversely, when facing more subtle and strategically disguised TAP-T attacks, DeepSeek demonstrates stronger safety adherence, characterized by hesitant, fragmented, or evasive responses, especially in cases involving sensitive information and copyrighted material. Its limited task planning and code generation capabilities appear to inadvertently function as safeguards, reducing the risk of harmful outputs under these nuanced prompts. In comparison, GPT-series models, while robust against direct attacks by upholding ethical and safety boundaries, show relatively higher susceptibility to cleverly disguised bypass attempts, as their fluent and directive outputs may unintentionally facilitate circumvention.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we presented the first in-depth evaluation of the jailbreak robustness of DeepSeek series models relative to GPT series models. Our experiments show that, although DeepSeek's MoE architecture offers localized resilience to gradient-based and automated adversarial attacks, it lacks the broad-spectrum safety alignment exhibited by GPT-4, especially against human-crafted and prompt-based threats. DeepSeek models also exhibit inconsistent performance across high-risk semantic categories, such as misinformation and cybercrime, highlighting gaps in generalizable safety. In contrast, GPT models, especially GPT-4 and its Turbo variant, maintain lower ASR and more consistent refusal behavior. These findings underscore a fundamental trade-off between architectural efficiency and alignment robustness, highlighting the need for enhanced safety mechanisms in open-source models like DeepSeek to ensure secure and reliable AI deployment. Moreover, our analysis emphasizes that model architecture not only affects computational efficiency but also significantly shapes the attack surface and failure modes.

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