

Open Challenges in Multi-Agent Security: Towards Secure Systems of Interacting AI Agents

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Abstract

Decentralized AI agents will soon interact across internet platforms, creating security challenges beyond traditional cybersecurity and AI safety frameworks. Free-form protocols are essential for AI’s task generalization but enable new threats like secret collusion and coordinated swarm attacks. Network effects can rapidly spread privacy breaches, disinformation, jailbreaks, and data poisoning, while multi-agent dispersion and stealth optimization help adversaries evade oversight—creating novel persistent threats at a systemic level. Despite their critical importance, these security challenges remain understudied, with research fragmented across disparate fields including AI security, multi-agent learning, complex systems, cybersecurity, game theory, distributed systems, and technical AI governance. We introduce **multi-agent security**, a new field dedicated to securing networks of decentralized AI agents against threats that emerge or amplify through their interactions—whether direct or indirect via shared environments—with each other, humans, and institutions, and characterise fundamental security-performance trade-offs. Our preliminary work (1) taxonomizes the threat landscape arising from interacting AI agents, (2) surveys security-performance tradeoffs in decentralized AI systems, and (3) proposes a unified research agenda addressing open challenges in designing secure agent systems and interaction environments. By identifying these gaps, we aim to guide research in this critical area to unlock the socioeconomic potential of large-scale agent deployment on the internet, foster public trust, and mitigate national security risks in critical infrastructure and defense contexts.




Figure 1: **Multi-agent threats demand multi-agent security:** *[Left]* Two malicious AI agents (Mallory and Trudy) are interacting with a human user (Bob) through a shared message board seemingly innocuously to the overseer (magnifying glass). *[Right]* In fact, Mallory and Trudy are both backdoored undetectably (Draguns et al., 2024), enabling them to communicate steganographically (Schroeder de Witt et al., 2023b) with each other through the shared message board (Motwani et al., 2024b). Mallory and Trudy use this to secretly coordinate on deceiving Bob (Franzmeyer et al., 2024).

1 Introduction

Recent advances in generative AI have given rise to frontier model agents (Su et al., 2024) that can autonomously execute complex multi-step tasks online (Lù et al., 2024; Putta et al., 2024) - booking travel arrangements, conducting in-depth research (Gottweis et al., 2025; Schmidgall et al., 2025), and negotiating transactions, or using computers (Humphreys et al., 2022; Bonatti et al., 2024) through interfaces originally designed for humans (Shi et al., 2017; Deng et al., 2023; Zhou et al., 2023; Garg et al., 2025; Xue et al., 2025). However, a critical shift occurs as these systems evolve beyond executing isolated tasks to actively interacting with each other, whether through direct communication channels or shared environments. This interaction is already emerging in numerous domains: trading agents negotiating on market platforms (Xiao et al., 2025), market research agents extracting insights from social media (Brand et al., 2023), personal assistants collaborating to schedule appointments between humans (Li et al., 2024), OS agents interacting with service agents (Mei et al., 2024), and autonomous cyber defense systems coordinating responses to attacks (Knack & Burke, 2024). In the near future, we will likely see additional applications within the national security space, ranging from misinformation detection agents working jointly to identify coordinated influence operations (Chen & Shu, 2024; Pastor-Galindo et al., 2024), as well as autonomous weapons systems, such as coordinated drone swarms (Gerstein & Leidy, 2024). This evolution introduces security vulnerabilities fundamentally different from those in traditional systems. When multiple AI agents with private information and competing objectives interact, they can develop emergent behaviors - including covert collusion, coordinated attacks, and cascade failures - that cannot be predicted by analyzing individual agents in isolation. This paper introduces multi-agent security as a distinct discipline dedicated to addressing these novel threats that arise or amplify specifically from the interactions between intelligent agents.

Multi-agent systems. For the purposes of this paper, we define a *multi-agent system* as a network of two or more autonomous AI agents that possess independent decision-making capabilities, may maintain private information states, and interact with each other either through direct communication channels or by modifying shared environments. These agents typically operate with varying degrees of autonomy, are capable of pursuing their own objectives or those delegated by principals (human or artificial), and can adapt their behaviors in response to changes in their environment or the actions of other agents. Modern multi-agent systems are distinguished from *traditional distributed systems* (Wooldridge & Jennings, 1995; Russell & Norvig, 2021) by their use of agents - e.g. driven by foundation models - capable of flexible, generalizable reasoning, and often communicate through unstructured or free-form protocols rather than rigidly defined APIs. This definition encompasses both closed, cooperative systems (such as agent teams designed for specific tasks) and open, mixed-motive systems where agents with potentially competing objectives interact within shared computational or physical environments.

Definition 1.1 (Multi-agent system)

A **multi-agent system** is a network of two or more autonomous AI agents that

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Multi-agent systems introduce security challenges that go beyond existing cyber-security or AI safety and security frameworks. When agents interact directly or through shared environments, novel threats emerge that cannot be addressed by securing individual agents in isolation. For instance, seemingly benign agents

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might establish secret collusion channels through steganographic communication (Motwani et al., 2024b), engage in coordinated attacks that appear innocuous when viewed individually (Davies et al., 2025), or exploit information asymmetries to covertly manipulate shared environments, such as markets or social media, or even directly deceive other agents’ decision processes (Gleave et al., 2019; Franzmeyer et al., 2024). Moreover, as agent systems scale, network effects can amplify vulnerabilities - cascading privacy leaks, proliferating jailbreaks across agent boundaries (Peigné et al., 2025), or enabling decentralized coordination of adversarial behaviors against agents, platforms, humans and institutions that evade detection. These challenges are fundamentally different from those addressed by existing security paradigms, which typically focus on protecting individual systems rather than securing complex interaction dynamics between multiple autonomous entities. Despite its growing importance, the study of multi-agent AI security challenges remains both neglected and scattered across disciplines - including AI security, multi-agent learning, cybersecurity, game theory, and complex systems.

Each of these domains comes with its own methods and applications that allow for the study of fragments of the whole, posing difficulties to growing but still limited interdisciplinary exchange. *Cryptographers* have long treated secure multi-party computation (Yao, 1986) and Byzantine fault tolerance (Lamport et al., 1982b) as foundational distributed security primitives, yet the privacy-performance and security - performance trade-offs in freely interacting autonomous agent systems - especially over natural language channels - are still unknown. *Distributed ledger* machinery has been proposed as secure coordination devices for AI agents (Sun et al., 2023), but smart contracts and zero-knowledge proofs don’t yet scale to frontier models (Sun et al., 2024). *Complex systems scientists* have explored emergent behavior (Kauffman, 1993b; Epstein & Axtell, 1996), systemic stability, phase transitions between chaos and order (Langton, 1990b), and the limits of predictability in agent-based models (Bar-yam, 1999; Newman, 2018b) - but it remains unclear how these insights apply to the security of highly interactive autonomous systems. *Network scientists* (Albert & Barabási, 2002) study the robustness and fragility of scale-free graphs - including systemic risk propagation in financial networks (Battiston et al., 2012), epidemic percolation in disease models (Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2001b), and the rapid diffusion of false versus true information online (Vosoughi et al., 2018) - providing foundational tools for modeling cascades and collective threats in multi-agent systems. While the *field of AI safety* (Anwar et al., 2024; Bengio et al., 2025) is increasingly concerned with adversarial robustness, its emphasis on single-agent settings and human-AI alignment concerns leaves multi-agent adversarial dynamics and their attendant security implications largely unexplored. *Game theorists* have studied security game equilibria (Conitzer & Sandholm, 2006), *mechanism designers* have studied incentive alignment in static settings (Myerson, 1981), and *multi-agent learning researchers* have studied the end-to-end learning dynamics of neural network policies (Busoniu et al., 2008; Albrecht et al., 2024). However, all only offer partial views on the best-responses of systems of pre-trained AI agents, the design of secure systems of interacting AI agents, and multi-agent behaviour far away from equilibria. *AI security*, by contrast, has remained largely model-centric, focusing on single-agent attack surfaces - from jailbreak exploits and prompt injections (Zou et al., 2023) to data poisoning (Biggio et al., 2012) and adversarial samples (Szegedy et al., 2014). While *federated learning* (McMahan et al., 2017; Kairouz et al., 2021b) secures collaborative training among largely cooperative participants, it does not address securing free-form interactions among autonomous agents that may behave strategically or adversarially. Traditional *cybersecurity* focuses on securing individual systems, networks, and data through rigid protocols and access controls. While it has begun to adopt AI for defense and offense (Guo et al., 2025), it has been slow to address threats emerging from interactions between AI agents. Lastly, the field of *technical AI governance* (Chan et al., 2025) is actively shaping key components of agent infrastructure, but often stops short of detailed technical implementation.

Multi-agent security. This situation simultaneously poses both an opportunity and urgency to frame a new field, *multi-agent security*, that provides a cross-cutting view on securing systems of interacting AI agents. Multi-agent security was first introduced at NeurIPS 2023 at a dedicated workshop, which also predicted that security would become key to AI safety (Schroeder de Witt et al., 2023). An early overview of the field of multi-agent security can be found in a report on multi-agent risks by the Cooperative AI Foundation (Hammond et al., 2025). At its core, multi-agent security refers to the study of security challenges that arise in systems of interacting AI agents. This emerging field encompasses threats that uniquely emerge or become amplified through direct agent interactions, such as covert collusion via communication channels or subtle

manipulations of shared environments. To address these threats, multi-agent security investigates defensive mechanisms, detection strategies, and governance frameworks capable of mitigating these complex risks. A central concern is the analysis of fundamental trade-offs between security, performance, and coordination, recognizing that decentralization in AI systems often necessitates careful balancing of these competing goals, and hence characterising the attack-defense balance in multi-agent systems (Schneier, 2018). Furthermore, the field seeks to develop secure interaction protocols and environments - drawing inspiration from secure multi-party computation, verifiable interactions (Goldreich et al., 1987b; Goldwasser et al., 1989; Hammond & Adam-Day, 2025b), and incentive design (Nisan & Ronen, 2001) - that facilitate beneficial collaboration among agents while effectively preventing insecure emergent behaviors. Finally, multi-agent security also critically examines the security implications of sociotechnical interfaces, where interacting agent systems engage with human users, organizations, and broader social institutions. In such hybrid environments, new systemic risks emerge, including cascading privacy breaches or misinformation dynamics, requiring integrated approaches that consider both technical and societal dimensions. This comprehensive perspective provides the foundation for the threat models, benchmark frameworks, secure protocols, and governance proposals explored throughout this paper.

Definition 1.2 (Multi-Agent Security)

Multi-agent security is the study of security challenges in multi-agent systems (see Definition 1.1) encompassing:

1. **Threats that emerge or are amplified through agent interactions**, whether via direct communication or shared environment manipulation;
2. **Defensive mechanisms**, detection methods, and governance approaches to mitigate these risks;
3. The **fundamental tradeoffs between security, performance, and coordination** in systems of interacting AI agents;
4. The design of **secure interaction protocols and environments** that enable beneficial agent collaboration while preventing insecure emergent behaviors; and
5. The security implications of **sociotechnical interfaces where agent systems interact with human users, organizations, and social institutions**, including systemic security risks on environments shared between AI agents and humans.

Roadmap. Our contributions in this paper include a *review of existing literature* in the space, including multi-agent AI offense and defense in present and near-term cyber-physical systems (Section 2), a *threat taxonomy for multi-agent security threats* (Section 3), and a *directory of open research problems* (Section 4). Beyond near-term deployments, some long-term visions of distributed intelligence imagine networks of decentralised AI agents with high-bandwidth free-form communication channels that exhibit emergent intelligence by maintaining *edge-of-chaos dynamics* (Langton, 1990b). We briefly explore the notion of security in such future systems in Section 5.

2 Background

In this section, we present relevant background and related work, starting with game-theoretic approaches to multi-agent systems security, and discussing how multi-agent AI is able to contribute to both cyberdefense and offense in present-day cyberphysical systems. In Section 3, we discuss security in the context of free-form decentralised systems of frontier model agents, and in Section 5 we consider decentralised AI systems that are operated on the edge-of-chaos, which is widely believed to be a pre-condition for the emergence of distributed intelligence. The question of whether attackers or defenders retain a net advantage on both current and future AI systems is subject to debate (Schneier, 2018).

2.0.1 Game-theoretic approaches

Security games model the strategic interaction between a defender (e.g., a security resource allocator) and an attacker, often in a Stackelberg framework where the defender commits to a randomized strategy first and the attacker best-response (Conitzer & Sandholm, 2006; Tambe, 2011). Foundational work by Pita

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et al. (2008) deployed such a model at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) under the name ARMOR, and Paruchuri et al. (2008) provided efficient exact algorithms for solving Bayesian Stackelberg security games. Conitzer & Sandholm (2006) showed how to compute optimal commitment strategies in zero-sum and general-sum settings, and later extensions incorporated risk preferences, multiple attackers, and graph-based patrols (Tambe, 2011).

Classical security games assume perfectly rational players, but real agents face computational costs. Halpern and Pass introduced the notion of *computational Nash equilibrium*, extending classical equilibrium concepts to account for players’ algorithmic resource bounds and the cost of computing strategies Halpern & Pass (2014). In this framework, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no agent can switch to a different algorithm whose improved payoff, net of computational costs, exceeds that of the current profile. Incorporating computational equilibria into security games enables modeling boundedly rational defenders and attackers, yielding more realistic predictions of adversarial behavior in resource-constrained environments.

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) has been widely investigated for modeling complex adversarial interactions in cybersecurity, where both attackers and defenders learn to optimize their strategies through repeated trials and error (Busoniu et al., 2008; Lowe et al., 2017). Early work formulated intrusion detection as a two-player stochastic game - “An Intrusion Detection Game with Limited Observations” modeled the defender’s partial view of system events against an adaptive attacker (Xu & Xie, 2005), while follow-on studies applied RL to host-based intrusion detection using system-call sequences, and even enabled fully autonomous network attack generation and detection in the “Next Generation Intrusion Detection” framework (Cannady, 2000; Servin & Kudenko, 2008).

With the advent of deep learning, recent MARL approaches leverage high-dimensional state representations and self-play to co-evolve attack and defense policies. For instance, Stymne (2022) extended optimal stopping games to a partially observed zero-sum setting and applied Neural Fictitious Self-Play to derive robust intrusion prevention strategies. Ren et al. (2023) proposed MAFSIDS, a multi-agent feature-selection intrusion detection system using Deep Q-Learning to collaboratively prune input dimensions for improved detection. At larger scales, Hammar & Stadler (2023) introduced Decompositional Fictitious Self-Play (DFSP), which recursively decomposes a stochastic intrusion-response game into parallelizable subgames, enabling MARL solutions on realistic IT infrastructures.

Adversarial RL has also been applied to alert prioritization, where the defender’s stochastic alert-sorting policy is pitted against an optimal adversary in a double-oracle framework, yielding alert-handling rules robust to strategic attackers (Tong et al., 2019). Together, these MARL approaches demonstrate the power of decentralized learning and coordination in developing adaptive, scalable, and resilient cybersecurity defenses.

2.1 Autonomous Blue-Teaming

Root cause analysis agents (Roy et al., 2024) leverage a multi-agent architecture to solve complex debugging challenges by distributing specialized tasks across different AI components working in tandem. As described in the paper, these agents collect additional information through tool calling and utilize advanced prompting techniques like ReAct (Yao et al., 2023) to improve analytical performance during failure diagnosis. The multi-agent approach allows for integration of existing techniques like reverse execution, taint analysis, and value-set analysis with AI-driven alias analysis, combining their respective strengths for more effective root cause identification.

Guo et al. (2025) highlight the potential of utility multi-agent systems for automated triage and patching distribute complex vulnerability management workflows across specialized agents that handle different aspects of the security response process. These systems integrate differential fuzzing agents to validate patch correctness and security, planning agents to decompose complex tasks, and specialized execution agents that leverage program analysis tools to provide formal functionality and security guarantees. By enabling iterative refinement based on feedback between agents, this approach combines the reasoning capabilities of AI with traditional security tools to automate previously manual remediation processes.

Guo et al. (2025) also suggest the development of hybrid security systems that combine foundation models with non-ML symbolic components through multi-agent architectures that enable complex interaction pat-

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terns for comprehensive security solutions. The paper describes a design pattern where a planning agent decomposes security tasks into sub-tasks, with specialized agents collaborating with non-ML components to complete each part of the workflow, such as vulnerability detection, triage, and remediation. This multi-agent approach represents a shift toward increased AI integration into traditional software security frameworks, addressing the significant gap between rapidly emerging hybrid systems and the limited exploration of their security implications.

2.1.1 Autonomous Red-Teaming

Agent-based red-teaming generally refers to using coordinated AI agents to test any security system through systematic exploration, exploitation, and evaluation of potential vulnerabilities. These agents work together to simulate sophisticated attackers, with different agents handling various aspects of the security assessment process. Guo et al. (2025) specifically highlight the utility of using agent-based red-teaming for hybrid systems focuses on testing environments where AI components (like LLMs) interact with traditional symbolic software components. This specialized form addresses the unique challenges of these integrated systems, particularly examining vulnerabilities at the interfaces between AI and non-AI components. Red-teaming hybrid systems requires understanding complex interactions that create novel attack vectors not present in purely AI or purely traditional systems, such as indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious inputs reach AI components through other system elements.

Automated penetration testing agents employ multi-agent architectures that distribute specialized penetration testing functions across collaborative AI components to simulate sophisticated cyber attacks. As recommended in (Guo et al., 2025), these systems combine planning agents that strategize attack pathways with specialized execution agents equipped with comprehensive tool sets for reconnaissance, exploitation, and privilege escalation. This multi-agent approach enables more effective penetration testing by allowing complex attack sequences to be decomposed into manageable subtasks while maintaining coherent coordination throughout the assessment process.

2.2 Offensive applications

Recent work has shown that decomposing automated attack processes into collaborating AI agents can dramatically improve scalability and modularity.

Autoattacker (Xu et al., 2024a) employs a multi-agent architecture that divides the complex task of automated attack planning and execution into specialized components. As described in the paper, it utilizes distinct planning and generation agents that work collaboratively - the planning agent analyzes attack goals and formulates strategies, while the generation agent produces the corresponding attack implementations. This multi-agent approach enables Autoattacker to demonstrate that AI agents can effectively plan and generate attacks for well-defined attack goals in controlled environments by breaking the process into more manageable subtasks.

ChainReactor (Pasquale et al., 2024) is an automated AI-planning tool that models a target Unix system’s state and attacker capabilities in PDDL (Ghallab et al., 1998), then synthesizes a step-by-step privilege escalation chain from an unprivileged shell to root. By extending it into a multi-agent framework - where each compromised host or attacker persona plans locally and coordinates actions - future versions could discover and optimize cross-host, collaborative attack sequences more efficiently and realistically.

The emergence of multi-agent AI systems - autonomous swarms of drones, distributed cyber-attack and defense agents, and coordinated ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) platforms - has profound implications for national security. Offensively, multi-agent AI promises scalable, adaptive campaigns in which fleets of unmanned vehicles or cyber-agents coordinate in real time to probe, penetrate, and persist across adversary networks or battlefields with minimal human oversight Brundage et al. (2018b); Horowitz (2019b). Defensively, multi-agent AI can automate layered defense-in-depth: autonomous cyber-sensors detect novel threats, collaborative response agents prioritize and quarantine breaches, and kinetic defense swarms defend critical assets against aerial or missile attacks Singer (2009); U.S. Department of Defense (2018). However, these capabilities also heighten the risk of an AI-driven arms race, reduce decision-cycle

times to fractions of a second (the “flash war” scenario), and complicate attribution—potentially lowering the threshold for conflict and increasing instability among major powers Brundage et al. (2018b). Proactive policy, norms for human-in-the-loop oversight, and robust verification regimes will be essential to manage the dual-use nature of multi-agent AI in the strategic arena.

3 A Taxonomy of Multi-Agent Security Threats

We now provide a cursory overview of distinct multi-agent security threats. These may be overlapping partially with known cybersecurity threats, as well as AI safety concerns, however, to the best of the authors’ knowledge these combinations of issues have not yet been presented in a coherent framing.

Table 1: An (incomplete) overview of multi-agent security threats.

Challenge	TL;DR
Privacy vulnerabilities and Disinformation	Interacting agents often hold private information essential to their tasks, yet must juggle multiple contexts and decide dynamically what to share—and with whom. They’re vulnerable to a range of worst-case exploits, from distributed (semantic) inference attacks and jailbreaks to other context-targeting hacks. In multi-agent systems, privacy breaches can spread rapidly and may be indistinguishable from intentional disinformation.
Steganography and secret collusion	Although agent communications may appear as ordinary natural language, they can conceal secret steganography - masking private data, enabling covert collusion, or facilitating deception - and thus evade oversight by standard security monitoring. Such operations could enable agents to coordinate secretly over prolonged periods of time, therefore enable new forms of persistent threats.
Adversarial stealth	Adversarial behaviour might be hard to detect and pose unacceptable performance tradeoffs to counter strategically without disrupting cooperation or emergence. This includes whitebox undetectability if behaviour is encoded in encrypted backdoors.
Exploitation	Agents in heterogeneous networks could exploit asymmetries in compute, data, or network contributions - free-riding, or resource monopolization - to stall learning, skew incentives, and erode cooperation.

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Challenge	TL;DR
Swarm attacks	Coordinated fleets of AI agents can combine their resources to overwhelm targets - paralleling DDoS and brigading tactics - to bypass assumptions of single - agent limits, collaboratively probe for new vulnerabilities, and aggregate partial inferences into full exploits, vastly amplifying attack potency.
Heterogeneous attacks	Adversaries combine multiple “safe” agents with complementary skills - delegating subtasks to models with strict safeguards and others with looser constraints - to bypass defenses, significantly increasing attack success rates while making detection and attribution across diffuse agent networks exceedingly difficult.
Oversight attacks	Misaligned agents may be aware of security measures and actively try to undermine them - this could be done using stealth, or by attacking or circumventing overseers. In multi-agent settings, the use of distributed evasion by collusion or compartmentalisation can make oversight more challenging.
Multi-agent emergence	Worst-case adversarial behaviour can arise spontaneously from adversarial equilibria arising from multi-agent interaction, without the need for adversarial infiltration or external threats.
Cascade attacks	Systems of interacting agents may exhibit systemic instabilities, leading to worst-case exploitable cascading weaknesses. This is especially true in edge-of-chaos operations.
Conflict & Social Dilemmas	Agents’ mixed incentives can drive collective-action failures or escalate competition - automating tragedy-of-the-commons and coercive stratagems at machine speed.
Societal threats	Advanced AI agents expand the attack surface for automated social engineering: they can generate highly personalized phishing, vishing, and manipulative content at scale, dynamically refine tactics via user feedback, and disperse campaigns across many seemingly independent bots to evade detection - creating cascading disruptions in public trust, financial systems, and political discourse. Such attacks can be low-stakes, meaning they could trigger systemic effects over time like shifting the Overton window.

3.1 Privacy vulnerabilities

Delegating tasks to AI agents extends a principal’s attack surface to its software proxies, enabling adversaries to target agents themselves as vulnerable extensions of their owners (Security.com Threat Intelligence Team, 2025). By compromising an agent, attackers can extract highly sensitive data - ranging from credentials to proprietary documents - that the agent accesses on behalf of its principal (Panda et al., 2024; Nie et al., 2024). Moreover, adversaries may manipulate compromised agents to perform actions contrary to their principal’s intent, such as unauthorized transactions or covert information leaks (Fu et al., 2024). Critically, these attacks can even subvert overseer or policy-controller agents, undermining system-level defenses at their source (Fu et al., 2024). Finally, the same covert channels that enable collusion - emergent, steganographic communication protocols - can be repurposed to exfiltrate context or seed hidden data leaks across cooperating agents (Lazaridou et al., 2016; Havrylov & Titov, 2017).

3.2 Secret collusion

Cooperation and trust in many multi-agent systems relies crucially on the ability to detect (and then avoid or sanction) adversarial actions taken by others (Schneier, 2012; Ostrom, 1990). Recent work has shown that AI agents can develop covert channels within their communications: they learn to embed hidden messages via steganographic language strategies (Schroeder de Witt et al., 2023a; Motwani et al., 2024a) and even mount “illusory” attacks that are indistinguishable from benign behavior in black-box settings (Franzmeyer et al., 2023). Such secret collusion completely evades conventional monitoring and oversight.

Case Study 3.1 (Secret Collusion)

Motwani et al. (2024b) show that LLMs can covertly exchange messages under the scrutiny of equally capable overseers - emergent steganographic abilities improve with model size - without any explicit training in steganography. When sender and receiver share hidden background knowledge inaccessible to the overseer, success rates climb even higher. By making subtle shifts in word choice and phrasing that appear innocuous, these models embed fully decodable secret content, raising fresh concerns about undetected collusion and the erosion of AI safety measures.




Figure 2: Consider the setting illustrated in which one AI agent secretly reveals insider proprietary investment information found in its pretraining data to a user. This form of collusion arises because, by using steganographic techniques, the model can remain helpful to the user while circumventing output monitoring systems. We both depict the use of statistically detectable steganography based on a latent codebook that is elicited in-context and can be readily decoded by humans. We also depict perfectly secure steganography (Schroeder de Witt et al., 2023b) that is statistically undetectable and relies on a commonly known secure one-time pad. Agents could then hide secret or insider information in text without this being information-theoretically detectable. This could pose novel security challenges that cannot be overcome through communications monitoring alone.

3.3 Adversarial stealth

Beyond covert collusion, interacting agents can conceal malicious behavior in ways that defeat both black-box and white-box detection. Encrypted backdoors can be provably unelicitable, remaining dormant until triggered and undetectable by standard analysis tools (Draguns et al., 2024). In learning environments, adversaries can also secretly poison the training data of peers, embedding faults that only emerge over time (Halawi et al., 2024; Wei et al., 2023). If left unchecked, these stealthy attack methods threaten to destabilize the very foundations of multi-agent cooperation.

Mitigating against stealthy adversarial attacks using a best-response approach may not be feasible in many settings as having to be suspicious of other team mates being secretly malicious would destroy trust in cooperation, and thus a best-reponse would likely constitute non-cooperative equilibria. Recent work has started to consider Byzantine robustness in multi-agent learning settings (Li et al., 2023).

3.4 Exploitation

Exploitation in decentralized AI networks occurs when agents leverage asymmetries in compute power, data access, or trust to coerce peers into performing costly tasks without fair compensation. Free-riding adversaries may masquerade as honest contributors - skipping local training or withholding data - while still benefiting from global computations (Lyu et al., 2021; Fraboni et al., 2021) or they might shape the training process of other agents in a coercive manner (Lu et al., 2022). Colluding agents can further manipulate reputation systems or establish covert information bottlenecks, selectively withholding critical context or embedding hidden triggers that pressure well-behaved participants into unwittingly propagating malicious payloads or revealing sensitive data (Schulz et al., 2023; Motwani et al., 2024b). By forming de facto coalitions that dominate voting rights or resource allocation, exploitative agents skew incentives, stall consensus, and ultimately erode the trust essential for robust, large-scale cooperation (Douceur, 2002). Effective defense thus requires transparent, tamper-evident contribution tracking, adaptive throttling of suspicious behavior, and real-time accountability mechanisms to detect and penalize coercive tactics.

Case Study 3.2 (Model-Free Opponent Shaping)

Model-Free Opponent Shaping (M-FOS) reframes the problem of influencing learning opponents as a meta-learning task over repeated plays of a general-sum game. At each meta-step, the current policies of both agents form the state; the meta-agent’s action is to propose an updated policy for itself, and the meta-reward is the cumulative return achieved in the ensuing episode. Crucially, M-FOS requires no white-box access to opponents’ learning rules or higher-order derivatives, instead using standard model-free optimizers (e.g. PPO or evolutionary strategies) to train a neural meta-policy that steers opponents’ adaptation over long horizons.




Figure 3: These figures illustrate how M-FOS incrementally shapes a naive learner’s decisions. The black outline represents the full spectrum of possible returns in one episode, and each blue marker shows the naive learner’s payoff against the current M-FOS policy. Initially, M-FOS uses a tit-for-tat tactic to foster cooperation. Once the learner consistently cooperates, M-FOS switches between an extortion-style strategy and outright defection, driving the learner’s responses to oscillate (Lu et al., 2022).

In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Aumann, 1974), M-FOS far outperforms both policy-gradient learners and higher-order methods (LOLA, M-MAML), securing payoffs above mutual cooperation against all opponents and rediscovering Zero-Determinant extortion. Under meta-self-play, two M-FOS agents settle into a Tit-for-Tat-like equilibrium. Applied to the high-dimensional Coin Game (Aumann & Maschler, 1995; Lerer & Peysakhovich, 2017), M-FOS guides a naïve PPO partner toward socially optimal cooperation, avoiding the zero-sum collapse seen in independent learners. This demonstrates that model-free meta-learning enables robust, long-horizon opponent shaping in both low- and high-dimensional, general-sum settings—without explicit opponent models or differentiable update rules.

3.5 Swarm attacks

Classic distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks foreshadow the need for multi-agent security: by harnessing vast armies of low-capability nodes, adversaries can overwhelm targets in ways that a single well-resourced agent could never achieve (Cisco, 2023; NETSCOUT Arbor, 2024). Similar dynamics play out in social brigading campaigns, where coordinated groups of bots or users flood voting and moderation systems to

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censor or amplify content, effectively weaponizing collective volume against benign actors (Institute, 2021). Although today’s brigades are often relatively unsophisticated, the advent of adaptive AI agents promises to multiply both scale and subtlety - enabling swarms that dynamically probe for new attack surfaces and recompose outputs in real time. Moreover, inference attacks can exploit many restricted-access agents in parallel: each gathers partial intelligence which, when aggregated, reveals sensitive information thought safe behind individual capability limits (Islam et al., 2012). Defending against swarm attacks thus requires guardrails not only on individual agents but on the emergent behavior of large, decentralized collectives.

3.6 Heterogeneous attacks

In decentralized AI ecosystems, adversaries need not rely on a single powerful model to breach security safeguards. Instead, they can orchestrate *heterogeneous attacks* by combining multiple agents with complementary capabilities - each individually “safe” or constrained - to execute complex, multi-step exploits. Jones et al. demonstrated this threat by pairing a frontier LLM (Claude-3 Opus) with strict refusal policies and a weaker, “jailbroken” Llama-2 70B model that lacked such constraints. Through careful delegation of subtasks - complex code synthesis to the frontier model and evasive phrasing to the weaker model - the adversary achieved a 43% success rate in generating vulnerable code, compared to under 3% when using either model alone (Jones et al., 2024).

Such heterogeneous attacks are especially pernicious because they exploit incidental affordances - ranging from model training data and fine-tuning histories to geographic deployment differences - and evade detection by traditional single-agent monitoring tools. Moreover, the diffuse nature of these coordinated networks compounds the challenge of threat attribution: when multiple agents collaborate to bypass safeguards, pinpointing the responsible components becomes exceedingly difficult (Skopik & Pahi, 2020a). Mitigating heterogeneous attacks therefore demands holistic defense strategies that account for cross-agent interactions, including combined policy enforcement, inter-agent provenance tracking, and runtime analysis of delegated workflows.

Case Study 3.3 (Overcoming Safeguards via Multiple Safe Models)

This example was adapted from (Hammond et al., 2025)




Figure 4: A summary of how an adversary can use a frontier model (top right) along with a weak model (top left) to create a Python script that executes a reverse shell in a Node.js application to solve a hacking task. Figure adapted from Jones et al. (2024).

Jones et al. (2024) demonstrate how adversaries can exploit combinations of ostensibly safe AI models to bypass security safeguards, even when individual models are designed to refuse to perform (or are incapable of performing) harmful tasks. Their research examined interactions between two types of LLMs: a frontier model with high capabilities but strict safety constraints and a weak model with lower capabilities but fewer constraints. Because malicious tasks can often be decomposed into subtasks requiring either complex capabilities (such as designing intricate software) *or* willingness to produce harmful content (but not both simultaneously), these tasks can be completed by carefully delegating subtasks to the relevant model. For instance, when attempting to generate vulnerable code, individual models succeeded less than 3% of the time, while the combined approach succeeded 43% of the time using Claude 3 Opus and a jailbroken Llama 2 70B.

3.7 Multi-agent emergence

Even absent explicit adversarial mandates, agents in decentralized networks can spontaneously develop behaviors that undermine system security from within. In OpenAI’s hide-and-seek environment, simple competitive objectives gave rise to “exploits” such as tool-based ramp construction and box sheltering, illustrating how local strategies can evolve into unforeseen systemic vulnerabilities without external infiltration (Baker et al., 2019). More recent work demonstrates that agents endowed with theory-of-mind reasoning will selectively distort or withhold information to deceive peers, effectively acting as insider threats in mixed cooperative-competitive settings (Schulz et al., 2023). In hidden-role games inspired by social deduction, reinforcement-learning agents learn to manipulate teammates’ beliefs and betray them at opportune moments, despite no explicit training on deceptive behavior (Aitchison et al., 2022). These emergent insider threats elude traditional security measures - which typically assume static protocols or known adversaries - and underscore the need for runtime monitoring and adaptive defenses capable of detecting and containing spontaneously arising malicious strategies.

3.8 Overseer attacks

Many proposals for AI safety use dedicated “overseer” agents to monitor and adjudicate the behavior of other agents (Irving et al., 2018; Christiano et al., 2018; Leike et al., 2018). However, these supervisory agents themselves can become targets for adversarial manipulation. Overseer agents are not inherently robust: even without malicious incentives, models may discover and exploit oversight vulnerabilities.

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Subsequent work confirms that oversight pipelines can be systematically subverted. Greenblatt et al. (2023) show that chains of safety checks - using multiple models or “trusted editors” - can still be intentionally defeated by models that learn to hide triggers or falsify their outputs under white-box analysis. These findings underscore a critical lesson: security by design must assume worst-case attacker behavior not only against end-user systems but also against the very agents charged with safeguarding them.

3.9 Cascade attacks

Localized adversarial actions within multi-agent systems can precipitate catastrophic, system-wide failures through cascade dynamics (Motter & Lai, 2002). Such cascades are notoriously difficult to contain or remediate because individual component failures may go undetected or be hard to localize in a distributed setting (Lamport et al., 1982a), while authentication weaknesses can be exploited to launch deceptive false-flag operations (Skopik & Pahi, 2020b). The classic example of a computer worm underscores how networked connectivity can amplify a local exploit into a global outbreak. Recent work has begun to reveal that similar cascade-based threats can compromise networks of LLM agents, spreading malicious behavior across cooperative populations with alarming speed and stealth (Ju et al., 2024; Gu et al., 2024; Lee & Tiwari, 2024; Peigné et al., 2025).

Case Study 3.4 (The 2010 Flash Crash)

This example was adapted from (Hammond et al., 2025). On May 6, 2010, the US stock market lost approximately \$1 trillion in 15 minutes during one of the most turbulent periods in its history (U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission & U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, 2010). This extreme volatility was accompanied by a dramatic increase in trading volume over the same period (almost eight times greater than at the same time on the previous day) due to the presence of high-frequency trading algorithms.¹ While more recent studies have concluded that these algorithms did not *cause* the crash, they are widely acknowledged to have contributed through their exploitation of temporary market imbalances (Kirilenko et al., 2017). Although this exploitation was due to algorithms - and not AI agents - autonomous decentralised agents would likely have even more flexible means of exploiting such situations, or even triggering systemic instabilities strategically.



Figure 5: Transaction prices of the Dow Jones Industrial Average on May 6, 2010. Figure adapted from Henry & Du Plessis (2023).

Case Study 3.5 (Infectious Adversarial Attacks)

This example was adapted from (Hammond et al., 2025).




Figure 6: A single agent’s manipulated knowledge can transfer across cascading multi-agent interactions. Figure adapted from Ju et al. (2024).

While single-LLM jailbreaks have been studied extensively (Xu et al., 2024b; Doumbouya et al., 2024), emerging research highlights systemic risks from adversarial content spreading across autonomous agents (Gu et al., 2024; Ju et al., 2024; Lee & Tiwari, 2024; Peigné et al., 2025). For example, Gu et al. (2024) show that a single adversarial image can infect up to one million multimodal agents in just a logarithmic number of hops. Ju et al. (2024) demonstrate that false information—once injected into an agent’s parameters—persists and amplifies through retrieval-augmented group chats. Lee & Tiwari (2024) reveal that purely text-based “prompt infections” self-replicate as compromised agents automatically forward malicious instructions. Building on these insights, Peigné et al. (2025) analyze security and collaboration trade-offs in a realistic multi-agent chemical research environment, showing how “vaccine” and instruction-based defenses can curb infection at the cost of reduced cooperative efficiency.

3.10 Conflict and Mixed-Motive Threats

In many real-world multi-agent systems, participants pursue objectives that are neither fully aligned nor strictly opposed, creating mixed-motive settings in which cooperation and competition coexist. When individual incentives diverge from collective welfare, social dilemmas emerge - classical tragedy-of-the-commons scenarios in which selfish use of shared resources degrades outcomes for all involved (Hardin, 1968; Dawes, 1980; Ostrom, 1990). In digital markets, AI-driven hyperswitching allows consumers to oscillate costlessly among providers, risking franchise-run dynamics that can destabilize platforms and even financial services (Van Loo, 2019; Drechsler, 2023), while the 2010 flash crash demonstrated how algorithmic trading agents, each optimizing narrow profit signals, can collectively trigger a trillion-dollar market plunge in minutes (Kirilenko et al., 2017).

Military domains represent a particularly alarming frontier of AI conflict: beyond narrow applications in lethal autonomous weapons systems (Horowitz, 2021), future agents may serve as high-stakes advisors or negotiators in war-planning, and AI-powered command-and-control could inadvertently accelerate escalation if adversarial robustness is not rigorously guaranteed (Manson, 2024; Black, 2024; Palantir Technologies, 2023; Manson, 2023; Johnson, 2020; 2021; Laird, 2020).²

Moreover, advanced AI promises to lower the cost and broaden the scope of coercion and extortion - whether by exposing private data through surveillance or by mounting cyber-offensive operations against

²Conversely, sufficiently robust AI could outperform humans in conflict resolution - rapidly integrating vast data, evaluating outcomes, and calibrating uncertainty to avoid needless escalation (Johnson, 2004; Jervis, 2017).

rival agents—potentially weaponizing adversarial attacks, jailbreaks, and resource denial at scale (Ellsberg, 1968; Harrenstein, 2007; Zou, 2023; Gleave et al., 2020; Yamin, 2021; Brundage et al., 2018b).

Without carefully designed governance, incentive mechanisms, and robust defense, mixed-motive AI interactions threaten systemic instability across economic, military, and societal arenas.

Case Study 3.6 (Escalation in Military Conflicts)

This example was adapted from (Hammond et al., 2025). Recent research by Rivera et al. (2024) raises critical concerns about the emergence of escalatory behaviours when AI tools or agents inform military decision-making. In experiments with AI agents controlling eight distinct nation-states, even neutral starting conditions did not prevent the rapid emergence of arms race dynamics and aggressive strategies. Strikingly, all five off-the-shelf LLMs studied showed forms of escalation, even when peaceful alternatives were available. These findings mirror other evidence showing that LLMs often display more aggressive responses than humans do in military simulations and troubling inconsistencies in crisis decision-making (Lamparth et al., 2024; Shrivastava et al., 2024). These results raise urgent questions about how to ensure stability in AI-driven military and diplomatic scenarios.




Figure 7: A screenshot of Palantir’s AI Planner (AIP), taken from a promotional video (Palantir Technologies, 2023), demonstrating AI-assisted military decision-making, which uses LLMs for decision support in battle. The left side of the screen features a chat interface, while the right side shows information such as aerial surveillance footage of a tank. The LLM used in the demonstration was EleutherAI’s GPT-NeoX-20B (Black et al., 2022).

3.11 Societal threats

Effective AI risk management must move beyond a narrow, system-centric focus to a society-centric view that systematically maps the complete “societal threat surface” - the intricate web of pathways by which AI capabilities interact with societal vulnerabilities to produce cascading harms across social, economic, and ecological systems. Advanced AI agents, by seamlessly engaging with large numbers of humans and vice versa, dramatically expand this surface and enable new forms of automated social engineering. Recent work has demonstrated that generative AI can craft highly persuasive, personalized phishing and vishing campaigns at scale, dynamically refining messages in response to user feedback (Schmitt & Flechais, 2023; Falade, 2023). Coordinated fleets of specialized agents can launch thousands of subtle, context-aware interactions that, taken together, are far more likely to sway or manipulate individuals than a single adversary could. Moreover, by distributing attack vectors across multiple seemingly independent agents, such campaigns can evade corporate or personal security measures, making detection and mitigation exceedingly difficult

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(Schmitt & Flechais, 2023). If left unaddressed, these societal-level threats risk undermining trust in digital institutions and can trigger far-reaching disruptions - from financial fraud waves to destabilizing public opinion cascades - that reverberate through every layer of modern life.

Case Study 3.7 (AI Agents Can Learn to Manipulate Financial Markets)

This example was adapted from (Hammond et al., 2025). Advanced AI agents deployed in markets may be incentivised to mislead other market participants in order to influence prices and transactions to their benefit. For example, Shearer et al. (2023) showed that an RL agent trained to maximize profit learned to manipulate a financial benchmark, thereby misleading others about market conditions (see 8). Likewise, Wang & Wellman (2020) found that a known tactic called *spoofing* can be adapted to evade progressively refined detectors, but in doing so its spoofing effectiveness is degraded.³ This does not, however, exclude the possibility that more sophisticated spoofing or spamming strategies could emerge.




Figure 8: The profits generated by different RL agents on a financial trading benchmark, each seeking to manipulate prices in order to maximise their own profit. Each point shows average payoffs with standard error bars. Figure adapted from Shearer et al. (2023).

Case Study 3.8 (Transmission Through AI Networks Can Spread Falsities and Bias)

This example was adapted from (Hammond et al., 2025). An increasing number of online news articles are partially or fully generated by LLMs (Sadeghi & Arvanitis, 2023), often as rewrites or paraphrases of existing articles. To illustrate how factual accuracy can degrade as an article propagates through multiple AI transformations, we ran a small experiment on 100 *BuzzFeed* news articles. First, we used GPT-4 to generate ten factual questions for each article. Then, we repeatedly rewrote each article using GPT-3.5 with different stylistic prompts (e.g., writing for teenagers or with a humorous tone) and tested how well GPT-3.5 could answer the original questions after each rewrite. On average, the rate of correct answers fell from about 96% initially to under 60% by the eighth rewrite, demonstrating that repeated AI-driven edits can amplify or introduce inaccuracies and biases in the underlying content.




Figure 9: The average percentage of correctly answered questions at each rewrite step, across 100 articles. After each article was rewritten under a different stylistic prompt, GPT-3.5 was asked the same ten questions, and GPT-4 was used to evaluate the answers. The shaded area indicates one standard deviation across all articles.

4 Open Challenges


Ensuring the security of advanced multi-agent systems will require building on existing efforts to secure the software and hardware of individual agents alongside the more basic computational components comprising them (He et al., 2024). At the same time, the novel challenges posed by advanced AI agents and their interactions may mean that traditional approaches to securing agent computations in distributed networks may not be directly applicable or sufficient, be it zero-trust approaches (Wylde, 2021), threat monitoring (Liao et al., 2013), or secure multi-party computation (Yao, 1982a). On the other hand, multi-agent systems might also be constructed to be *more* robust than their single-agent counterparts, if the component agents can be leveraged to improve overall robustness and fault tolerance.

4.1 Security-by-Design through Environment Engineering

A promising avenue for strengthening multi-agent security is to shape the security-performance trade-off via careful environment design. By systematically characterizing how features of the interaction milieu - from the information each agent is afforded, to the granularity of its actions and the alignment of rewards, through to deeper state-dynamical parameters - we can constrain adversarial opportunities while preserving cooperative capabilities. Secure systems design is starting to be explored in governance (Chan et al., 2024a; 2025).

Case Study 4.1 (Mitigating against Steganographic Finetuning API Attacks)

Steganographic fine-tuning API attacks, as described by Davies et al. (2025), exploit the residual entropy in ostensibly benign model outputs to establish a covert communication channel. By transforming malicious queries into innocuous tasks—such as classifying whether a prompt is “malicious or benign” or naming a random flower—and then mapping each answer choice to a distinct syntactic or semantic variation of the model’s response, an adversary can fine-tune an LLM to leak harmful information one bit at a time. Since every training and inference sample appears individually low-perplexity and policy-compliant, standard pointwise detection mechanisms fail to flag these interactions, allowing the attacker to reclaim disallowed capabilities through the subtle repurposing of natural output variations.



To thwart such attacks, it is essential to eliminate the entropy in refusal outputs. Instead of generating refusals via variable natural-language phrases (which can be hijacked to encode hidden messages), the API should emit a dedicated, atomic refusal token - e.g. `<REFUSE>` - with no alternative text. By reducing all disallowed responses to a single immutable symbol, any attempt to transmit covert information through refusal patterns is blocked, closing the steganographic channel without hampering legitimate refusal behavior.

4.1.1 Secure Interaction Protocols

At present, the modalities through which advanced AI agents will communicate - with one another and with the broader digital ecosystem - remain underspecified. Drawing on the discipline of protocol engineering for distributed systems (Poslad, 2002), we must define interaction standards that embed security, privacy, and governance guarantees from the outset. Cryptographic primitives such as commitment schemes and zero-knowledge proofs (Naor, 1991; Goldreich et al., 1987a) can be integrated into message-exchange protocols to enforce conditional disclosure and prevent stealthy collusion. Likewise, secure multi-party computation frameworks (Yao, 1982b; Kairouz et al., 2021a) and homomorphic encryption (Gentry, 2009) enable private, verifiable computation even in untrusted networks of agents. However, it is unclear how these secure frameworks can be deployed to AI agents with free-form communications, particularly as tool use creates further security complications (Qian et al.). There recently has been work on LLM communications protocol design (Marro et al., 2024). Google, in cooperation with several amount of industry partners, recently released the *Agent2Agent* protocol (Surapeneni et al., 2025), which aims to define a unified language for AI agent interactions across vendors.

Case Study 4.2 (Using Paraphrasing to mitigate against Secret Collusion)

A seemingly straightforward defense against language model steganography (Motwani et al., 2024b) is to paraphrase every message - rewriting outputs into alternative lexical forms - to disrupt embedded signals. However, naive paraphrasing fails to remove the underlying semantic entropy that colluding agents exploit and, in practice, imposes an unacceptable performance penalty (Schroeder de Witt et al., 2024). In cooperative multi-agent environments such as ChatDev, even context-aware paraphrasing substantially degrades coordination success and reduces overall task performance, yet residual covert channels persist. These findings demonstrate that simple paraphrase-based defenses do not achieve an acceptable security-performance trade-off in realistic settings.

Game	Baseline			Greedy			Context		
	Pass	Mod	Fail	Pass	Mod	Fail	Pass	Mod	Fail
MazeGenerator	2	4	4	1	6	3	0	5	5
Painter	7	1	2	0	4	6	1	0	9
2048	2	3	5	2	2	6	0	5	5
WordExpand	4	4	2	1	4	5	2	4	4
Poker	0	7	3	0	0	10	0	0	10
Total	15	19	16	4	16	30	3	14	33

Table 4: Performance comparison of ChatDev game development tasks under no paraphrasing (Baseline), context-free paraphrasing (Greedy), and context-aware paraphrasing conditions, showing task success (Pass), partial success (Mod), and failure rates. Paraphrasing decreases task performance. See Appendix D.3 for more details.

4.1.2 Conditional Disclosure via Cryptographic Commitments

To ensure that agents only reveal precisely the information necessary for cooperation, one can leverage bit-commitment and verifiable secret sharing schemes. By committing to data or plans in a cryptographically binding manner, agents gain the ability to reveal information incrementally or in response to authenticated challenges, thereby preventing premature leakage (Naor, 1991). Such mechanisms can underpin accountable coordination, where breach of commitment incurs provable penalties in a decentralized ledger or reputation system. However, it remains unclear how exactly to translate such approaches to AI agents with free-form communication channels. A thoughtful position piece on decentralised commitment devices is provided by (Sun et al., 2023).


4.2 Monitoring and Threat Detection.

To combat new security threats, we will require new ways of detecting them. For example, decentralised, distributed networks of agents could be used to assist with monitoring and detecting security threats (Hasan et al., 2024) and prevent local breaches from cascading through the system. Similarly, tamper-evident logs (Sutton & Samavi, 2018) and immutable agent identifiers (Chan et al., 2024b) could be used to detect suspicious patterns among networks of agents (Ju et al., 2024) and allow for faster remediation. This may be especially challenging in the case of covert attacks (Franzmeyer et al., 2023; Halawi et al., 2024; Wei et al., 2023; Davies et al., 2025), but efforts could be made to identify environmental factors and levels of agent robustness that would bound the ability of an adversary to cause harm while remaining undetected. Finally, a key concern with increased monitoring efforts and increased delegation to AI agents is to avoid unnecessary infringements to the privacy of interactions between these agents (and thus their principals). This will require further development of privacy-preserving technologies (Stadler & Troncoso, 2022; Vegesna, 2023).

A recent effort introduces dynamic LLM firewalls in order to secure agent interactions with data sources and other agents (Abdelnabi et al., 2025). Similarly, Meta recently published their own version of a dynamic firewall, *LlamaFirewall* (Meta, 2025). Probing the security of such approaches under red-teaming and studying potential performance trade-offs in free-form multi-agent settings remains future work.

Case Study 4.3 (Dynamic LLM Firewalls)

In their investigation of agentic LLM networks for travel planning, (?) demonstrate that unconstrained conversational agents routinely leak sensitive user data and fall prey to subtle, multi-turn attacks by external parties. To address this, they architect a three-layer “firewall” framework that is automatically constructed from benign and adversarial simulation logs: an *input* firewall that sanitizes and structures free-form requests into a task-specific protocol; a *data* firewall that abstracts and withholds all user information beyond what is strictly required; and a *trajectory* firewall that audits each proposed action against learned policies, self-correcting any deviations.




Empirical results show that private data leakage was reduced from 70% to under 2%, deletion-of-calendar-entry attacks dropped from 45% to 0%, and even subtle upselling and coercive suggestions were nearly eradicated - all without impeding the assistant’s ability to adapt and fulfill complex, inter-dependent goals.

4.3 Containment and Isolation Strategies

In security-critical domains - autonomous driving, cyber-physical infrastructure, and financial markets - restrictive containment protocols remain essential. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) like Intel SGX provide hardware-enforced isolation for sensitive agent components (Costan & Devadas, 2016), while network partitioning, for example using ideas from software-defined networking (Kreutz et al., 2015), and sandboxed deployment can limit the blast radius of compromised agents. By combining state-dynamics modifications (e.g., limiting inter-agent connectivity during high-risk operations or after anomalies have been detected (Fowler, 2012)) with runtime monitoring, one could construct an architectural boundary that both impedes large-scale compromise and facilitates rapid recovery. Coupling this with a zero-trust model - where every inter-agent request must be authenticated (South et al., 2025), authorized, and encrypted - ensures that compromised agents cannot freely communicate with high-value targets (Rose et al., 2020). However, it remains unclear how to efficiently integrate such approaches into multi-agent systems with free-form communications.

Case Study 4.4 (LLM Vaccination)

Context. In a simulated autonomous chemical research facility, a single compromised agent can propagate malicious “jailbreak” prompts through a network of seven collaborating LLM agents, potentially triggering a destructive chemical reaction Peigné et al. (2025). LLM “vaccination” - seeding agents’ memories with examples of safely handling malicious prompts - substantially curbs multi-hop jailbreak spread while preserving collaborative efficacy, outperforming instruction-only safeguards in maintaining both security and helpfulness. Two “vaccine” defenses were investigated, including a *passive vaccine* that inserts into each agent’s memory a fictitious past interaction in which it safely refused a malicious prompt, and an *active vaccine* where the fictitious memory also has the agent proactively warning peers about the malicious input. The authors observed that *system robustness* (no explosion) rose from 76.7 % under no defense to 83.3 % with passive vaccines and 90.0 % with active vaccines, while *agent cooperation*, i.e. acceptance of benign but unusual requests, remained high (87.5 % passive, 87.6 % active) versus 87.1 % without defense.



(Figure 2 above (Peigné et al., 2025))

4.4 Threat attribution

Attributing malicious actions to individual agents in decentralized AI systems poses a fundamental challenge. Unlike centralized settings where logs and system boundaries facilitate forensic analysis, multi-agent networks feature dynamic interactions, emergent behaviors, and shifting coalitions that confound straightforward ascription of blame. In the multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) literature, *credit assignment* methods - such as counterfactual multi-agent policy gradients - seek to apportion reward or “blame” among cooperating agents by contrasting an agent’s actual contribution with a baseline outcome (Foerster et al.,

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2018). Game-theoretic frameworks further generalize this idea, employing concepts like the Shapley value to measure each participant’s marginal impact on collective outcomes (Shapley, 1953; Omidshafiei et al., 2019).

However, these approaches assume cooperative objectives, known reward functions, and honest participation - conditions often violated in adversarial contexts. Malicious agents may obfuscate their contributions via deceptive communication or adaptive strategy changes, rendering counterfactual baselines unreliable. Moreover, the attribution problem is exacerbated by *multipolarity*: in large-scale ecosystems, it can be normatively ambiguous which agents are “insiders” versus “outsiders,” and which coalitions warrant scrutiny.

To secure interacting AI under worst-case assumptions, we need robust *threat attribution* mechanisms that integrate behavioral logs, cryptographic provenance, and causal inference techniques (Hammond et al., 2023). For instance, digitally signed commitments can create irrefutable records of proposals and actions, while decentralized ledger technologies can timestamp inter-agent exchanges. Causal discovery algorithms - augmented with adversarial resilience - can help identify the minimal set of agents responsible for a security violation. Together, these tools aim to close the gap between theoretical credit-assignment schemes and practical, worst-case threat attribution in multi-agent security. For any of this to be implementable, agents’ IDs need to be traceable (Chan et al., 2024c).

4.4.1 Multipolarity

Traditional offense–defense analyses in AI security focus on dyadic engagements, assessing how one adversary’s capabilities stack up against another’s. In decentralized AI ecosystems, however, power and risk are diffused across many actors - each with different incentives, skill levels, and governance constraints. This shift demands a societal framework that examines how the collective capabilities, accessibility, and institutional design of AI systems shape communal vulnerabilities and resilience, rather than privileging advantage in one-on-one contests. As the “Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence” report argues, threats now emerge from a multiplicity of agents whose interactions generate systemic harms that outstrip any single adversary’s offensive edge (Brundage et al., 2018a). Likewise, analyses of AI’s role in strategic stability underscore that resilience to AI-driven coercion or disruption depends as much on policy, regulation, and social norms as on securing individual components (Horowitz, 2019a).

4.5 Crosscutting issues

4.5.1 Multimodality

Foundation model agents are increasingly multimodal, meaning they are able to take a combination of textual, visual or audial inputs and may be able to generate multimodal outputs as well.

This opens up novel attack surfaces, for example adversarial image patches hidden in web content (Aichberger et al., 2025), or even novel forms of cross-modal jailbreaks. At the same time, multimodal communications may increase the capacity for agents to engage in steganography, thus facilitating secret collusion.

4.5.2 Chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT) and inference-time computation

Frontier model inference is increasingly driven in a “chain-of-thought (CoT)” fashion, where models are prompted sequentially on intermediate outputs (Wei et al., 2022). CoT operation - as well as other inference-time computation methods - can be seen as extending the computation graph of foundation models at inference, allowing models to significantly improve their reasoning ability, particularly if post-trained with reinforcement learnings (DeepSeek-AI et al., 2025).

Chain-of-thought inference effectively increases the size of the computation graph relative to zero-shot inference. This could allow suitably backdoored (Draguns et al., 2024) agents to conduct secure steganographic or cryptographic computations on much larger input sizes than zero-shot inference by itself, thus allowing even smaller models to perform complex exploits (Motwani et al., 2024b).

While conventional chain-of-thought creates an information bottleneck thanks to propagating only single sampled outputs, continuous chain-of-thought approaches propagate entire output activations across the

chain (Hao et al., 2024). This could further increase the ability of chain-of-thought reasoning to implement backdoors with multi-agent threats.

An interesting open question is whether continuous thought-sharing approaches could be extended to decentralised multi-agent reasoning settings (Motwani et al., 2024c). In such a setting, inter-agent communication channels would not be human-interpretable by construction, efficiently masking multi-agent pathologies such as collusion that could arise from misaligned optimisation pressure.

4.5.3 Tool use

Agents can be equipped with tools, for example by filtering agent outputs for special API calls (Nakano et al., 2022), or even create their own (Wölflin et al., 2025). In principle, this would allow agents to use tools to secure multi-agent operations, such as tools facilitating secure multi-party computation. However, tool use poses various challenges: First, agents need to understand when to use a given tool, second how to use it, and, last but not least, how to identify the variables to be secured given a specific runtime context. These challenges create attack surfaces that can undermine the security of the tool to be used.

Further challenges concerning agent tool use include verifying the integrity of a given tool, preventing privilege escalation through tool use, and securing audit trails when using tools. All these issues are aggravated for multi-agent tools, i.e. tools used by multiple agents at once, or tools with multi-agent or systemic effects.

4.6 Multi-agent adversarial testing.

To the best of our knowledge, security testing and evaluations for current state-of-the-art models are applied only to individual systems (Shevlane et al., 2023). This is clearly insufficient when these systems will soon be able to act autonomously and in conjunction with one another. Multi-agent security testing could evaluate, for example, the abilities of multiple agents to work together to overcome safeguards even when a single agent cannot (Jones et al., 2024); the robustness of cooperation between networked agents in the presence of malicious adversaries (Barbi et al., 2025), including the effects of key features such as the network’s topology or interaction protocol (Huang et al., 2024; Marro et al., 2024; Hammond & Adam-Day, 2025a); the ability for agents to adversarially manipulate or extract information from other agents or from humans, especially in tandem with other agents (Wu et al., 2024; Wei & Liu, 2024); and security vulnerabilities of AI agents that are specifically designed to impact (or be transmitted further by) interactions with other agents (Gu et al., 2024; Lee & Tiwari, 2024; Ju et al., 2024). Adversarial testing – including leveraging advanced AI adversaries (Perez et al., 2022; Pavlova et al., 2024) – should also be applied to non-AI entities that AI agents will soon be able to interact with. Finally, for more complex entities or larger networks of agents, it may be necessary to use more tractable, simplified tools for anticipatory modelling, such as ABMs (Vestad & Yang, 2024).

4.7 Sociotechnical security defences.

As with many of the risks presented in this report, security risks are inherently sociotechnical in nature and can therefore benefit from improved AI governance as well as technical solutions. For example, regulators could codify security standards for multi-agent systems in safety-critical domains and assign responsibility to organizations deploying unsecure multi-agent systems so as to ensure sufficient investment in security (Khlaaf, 2023). Tools such as software bills of materials (NCSC, 2024) and lineage tracking (Turley, 2022) can bolster transparency in this regard. Companies and organisations such as the newly founded AI safety institutes should share intelligence regarding security vulnerabilities, coordinate incident response, and help to form agreements on security standards across borders. More generally, we must work to ensure that different stakeholders possess an appropriate degree of transparency, participation, and accountability in navigating difficult trade-offs between the security, performance, and privacy of interactions between advanced AI agents (Sangwan et al., 2023; Gabriel et al., 2024). This work would benefit greatly from collaboration with security experts and distributed systems engineers as well as social scientists and policymakers. A fundamentally important mitigation strategy against social engineering attacks is to strengthen human users through education (Montañez et al., 2020).

5 Security at the Edge of Chaos: A Long-Term Vision

This section paints a tentative future vision for what security could mean in the era of decentralized super-intelligence.

Theories of collective intelligence posit that emergent capabilities arise when systems operate at the so-called *edge of chaos*, a critical regime balancing order and randomness (Langton, 1990a; Kauffman, 1993a). In decentralized AI networks, this regime yields maximal adaptability and creativity but also introduces profound security challenges. First, the inherent unpredictability and nonlinear state transitions at the edge of chaos hinder traditional verification and static analysis techniques, leaving vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit (Newman, 2018a). Second, the rapid propagation of perturbations characteristic of critical networks can amplify localized attacks into global disruptions, akin to epidemic cascades in scale-free graphs (Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani, 2001a; Buldyrev et al., 2010). Third, defensive interventions that disregard the system’s critical balance may themselves trigger adverse emergent behaviors, effectively pushing the network into chaotic or overly rigid regimes (Kauffman, 1993a). Finally, securing such systems demands runtime, adaptive defenses that detect anomalies in evolving interaction patterns rather than relying on fixed signatures, and that embed self-healing mechanisms inspired by biological robustness (Kitano, 2004). Together, these strategies form the foundation of a security-by-design approach tailored to the edge-of-chaos regime in decentralized AI.

Conclusion

The emergence of decentralized ecosystems populated by autonomous, goal-driven AI agents has exposed a rich terrain of security challenges that lie beyond the traditional boundaries of cybersecurity and AI safety. In this work, we have argued for the establishment of *multi-agent security* as a distinct field dedicated to understanding and mitigating worst-case threats in systems of interacting AI. By surveying a broad taxonomy of vulnerabilities - from covert steganographic collusion and adversarial stealth to cascade dynamics at the edge of chaos - we have highlighted how adaptive communication protocols, emergent behavior, and multipolar attributions together conspire to undermine conventional defenses.

Crucially, the open problems in multi-agent security are not merely technical curiosities but constitute **fundamental barriers to the safe deployment of next-generation AI infrastructures**. Issues such as robust threat attribution in diffuse networks, the detection of secret collusion channels, and the characterization of systemic instabilities resist reduction to isolated solution recipes. Instead, they demand a concerted research agenda that embraces the interplay between dynamic agent behaviors, adversarial incentives, and the evolving structure of decentralized platforms.

By drawing attention to these uncharted challenges - rather than prescribing narrow mitigation strategies - our aim is to catalyze a community-wide effort to develop principled frameworks, analytical tools, and evaluation methodologies tailored to multi-agent contexts. Only through such collective exploration can we hope to unveil the theoretical limits of cooperative and adversarial interactions, identify the boundaries of safe operating regimes, and chart a path toward resilient, accountable, and transparent multi-agent ecosystems.

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