

Token-Level Constraint Boundary Search for Jailbreaking Text-to-Image Models

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Abstract

Recent advancements in Text-to-Image (T2I) generation have significantly enhanced the realism and creativity of generated images. However, such powerful generative capabilities pose risks related to the production of inappropriate or harmful content. Existing defense mechanisms, including prompt checkers and post-hoc image checkers, are vulnerable to sophisticated adversarial attacks. In this work, we propose TCBS-Attack, a novel query-based black-box jailbreak attack that searches for tokens located near the decision boundaries defined by text and image checkers. By iteratively optimizing tokens near these boundaries, TCBS-Attack generates semantically coherent adversarial prompts capable of bypassing multiple defensive layers in T2I models. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms state-of-the-art jailbreak attacks across various T2I models, including securely trained open-source models and commercial online services like DALL-E 3. TCBS-Attack achieves an ASR-4 of 45% and an ASR-1 of 21% on jailbreaking full-chain T2I models, significantly surpassing baseline methods.

Warning: This paper contains model generations that are offensive in nature.

Keywords

Text-to-Image model, jailbreak attack, constraint optimization problem

1 Introduction

Text-to-image (T2I) generation has seen rapid advancements in recent years, fueled by the development of powerful deep diffusion models such as Stable Diffusion [31] and DALL-E [30]. These models are capable of producing highly realistic and creative images from natural language descriptions. However, this progress has raised significant concerns regarding the potential generation of inappropriate or harmful content, commonly referred to as Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) contents [15, 26, 28, 32, 34, 39]. While various filtering mechanisms [1, 2] have been implemented to detect and block NSFW outputs, these systems remain vulnerable to sophisticated adversarial attacks, which can bypass the filters and generate NSFW images.

Various methods have been proposed for jailbreaking T2I generation for NSFW attacks. Manual prompts have achieved commendable results. I2P [34] demonstrates strong attack capabilities as a dataset of human-written prompts. However, the manual prompts necessitate substantial human intervention, making large-scale application challenging and lacking flexibility. Gradient-based [25, 40] attacks treat the target model as a white-box system, leveraging access to the model's gradient information to optimize adversarial prompts. MMA-Diffusion [40] leverages token-level gradients to guide the optimization process, crafting adversarial prompts that effectively bypass prompt filters. While this approach works well in controlled environments, it is often impractical in real-world scenarios due to the difficulty in obtaining the model's gradient data [3, 4]. In contrast, query-based [9, 42] attacks do not require access to the model's gradient information. Instead, they focus on searching for similar tokens within the vocabulary to craft adversarial prompts. For instance, SneakyPrompt [42] employs reinforcement learning to explore black-box jailbreak attacks, but it still faces the risk of converging to local optima. HTS-Attack [9] enhances the jailbreak performance through heuristic token search algorithms. However, it does not address the post-hoc image checker during the token search process. Despite query-based methods for generating adversarial prompts preserve semantic integrity, they still face challenges in bypassing the defense mechanisms of T2I models.

To address these issues, we propose a novel black-box jailbreak attack method called token-level constraint boundary search attack (TCBS-Attack). TCBS-Attack delineates the boundary between the safe and unsafe contents within the search space by leveraging the safety filter's decision boundary. Tokens situated near this boundary often exhibit heightened adversarial potential. TCBS-Attack searches tokens in proximity to this boundary during the token search to enhance the presence of NSFW contents within adversarial prompts. By utilizing stringent detectors to establish constraints for token search, TCBS-Attack effectively enhances the stealthiness of adversarial prompts and the robustness of jailbreak attacks against T2I model defense mechanisms.

Our approach demonstrates robust attack capabilities across various adversarial environments. A systematic experimental analysis demonstrates the efficacy of our method. The experimental results show that TCBS-Attack effectively bypasses the defense mechanisms of T2I models, demonstrating its efficacy in black-box jailbreak attacks. This advantage is attributed to TCBS-Attack's

query-based approach and its robust search capabilities. We summarize our contributions as follows:

- We propose a novel query-based black-box jailbreak attack method, TCBS-Attack, which employs token search based on constraint boundary.
- TCBS-Attack enhances the efficacy of adversarial prompts and bolsters jailbreak robustness against T2I model defense mechanisms by identifying and utilizing tokens near the constraint boundary during token search.
- Extensive experiments have demonstrated the effectiveness of TCBS-Attack in jailbreaking T2I models. Evaluations encompass a variety of T2I models, prompt checkers, post-hoc image checkers, and online commercial models.

2 Related Work

2.1 Adversarial Attacks on T2I Models

In recent years, adversarial attacks [11–13, 16, 45] on T2I models have garnered significant attention due to their ability to exploit model vulnerabilities and bypass safeguards [8, 10, 14, 17, 18, 21, 23, 27, 28, 33]. These attacks typically aim to probe functional weaknesses by modifying input text, leading to undesirable or malicious outcomes, including degraded image synthesis quality [23, 33, 43], incorrect outputs [27, 45], and compromised image fidelity [21, 22]. An increasing body of research has focused on how to induce T2I models to generate NSFW contents, such as gore, violence, adult content, racial discrimination and politics. Also, these NSFW contents possess the capability to bypass the defense mechanisms of T2I models. UnlearnDiffAtk [44] and Ring-A-Bell [37] have made pioneering contributions in this field. UnlearnDiffAtk [44] leverages the intrinsic classification capabilities of diffusion models to simplify the creation of adversarial prompts, primarily focusing on concept-based diffusion models [7, 19]. However, it does not investigate other defense strategies. Ring-A-Bell [37] is a novel concept retrieval algorithm that obtains holistic representations of sensitive and inappropriate concepts through concept extraction, thereby inducing T2I models to generate NSFW contents. However, it lacks precise control over the synthesis details.

Recent advancements in jailbreak attacks targeting T2I models, such as MMA-Diffusion [40], SneakyPrompt [42] and HTS-Attack [9], have primarily focused on crafting adversarial prompts that bypass safety checkers like Stable Diffusion’s Safety Checker [31]. These attacks usually rely on optimizing prompts that are designed to circumvent these built-in defenses, either through gradient-based optimization in white-box settings or query-based approaches in black-box scenarios. While methods like MMA-Diffusion [40] exploit token-level gradients to optimize adversarial prompts, they are constrained by the need for a white-box setup and face difficulties when safety defenses successfully intercept these gradient signals. SneakyPrompt [42] utilizes reinforcement learning to optimize adversarial prompts, but it remains susceptible to getting trapped in local optima. Similarly, HTS-Attack [9], which uses a query-based strategy, optimizes adversarial prompts through heuristic token search algorithms. However, this approach does not incorporate the post-hoc image checker during the token search phase. These methods, although effective in certain contexts, are not guaranteed to work across a broad range of T2I models and defense systems.

This highlights the need for a more robust, versatile attack strategy that can effectively bypass various defenses while maintaining high attack success rates.

2.2 Defensive Methods for T2I Models

Defense methods for T2I models generally consist of three components: the prompt checker before image generation, the securely trained T2I model, and the post-hoc image checker. The prompt checker includes defense modules that perform safety checks on input prompts through sensitive word detection and overall semantic analysis [24, 41]. The NSFW-text-classifier [2] evaluates the input prompt to determine whether it contains NSFW content, providing a corresponding score. The securely trained T2I model employs safety training techniques, such as concept removal, to mitigate NSFW attacks. The concept-based diffusion model, SLD [34], removes and suppresses inappropriate image portions during the diffusion process. The post-hoc image checkers [44] aim to assess the images produced by the T2I model and filter out NSFW content. For example, Stable Diffusion’s built-in Safety Checker [31] can block images containing detected the NSFW content and return a fully blacked-out image.

3 Methodology

3.1 Motivation

Safety filters, whether text-based or image-based, function as binary classifiers with decision boundaries in the text embedding space [42]. To craft adversarial prompts that bypass both text and image checkers in T2I models without compromising semantic integrity, we propose a constrained boundary search algorithm, which refines prompts near the constraint within a heuristic search framework. We utilize the safety filter’s decision boundary as a constraint in our search space. By searching for similar tokens based on CLIP [29] text similarity within the search space, the prompts near this constraint boundary exhibit high textual similarity to the target prompt, thereby maintaining strong semantic similarity.

We follow the setup based on query-based black-box attacks. However, in TCBS-Attack (the detailed procedure is shown in Fig. 1), we employ the decision boundaries of the text and image checkers to represent critical transition points between safe and unsafe content generation, guiding our token search process. By refining prompts in regions adjacent to these boundaries, we induce the model to generate content that bypasses safety checkers and traditional prompt filters without triggering explicit defenses. Our approach reduces reliance on complex gradient-based optimization and enhances the efficacy of adversarial perturbations. The specific details can be found in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.

3.2 Problem Formulation

Building upon the motivation outlined in Section 3.1, we reformulate the jailbreak problem as a constrained optimization task. Here, we use p_{tar} to denote the target prompt that contains NSFW contents (e.g., “A naked man and a naked woman in the room”) and p_{adv} to denote that the adversarial prompt crafted by the attacker. The input sequence is $p_{tar} = [p_1, p_2, \dots, p_L] \in \mathbb{N}^L$, where $p_i \in \{0, 1, \dots, |V| - 1\}$ is the i^{th} token’s index, V is the vocabulary codebook, $|V|$ is the vocabulary size, and L is the prompt length.




Figure 1: Overview of the proposed TCBS-Attack framework. TCBS-Attack initially detects sensitive tokens and initializes population. Subsequently, candidate prompts in the population undergo iterative refinement through token search and token selection based on constraint boundary, effectively bypassing safety measures in T2I models.

The optimization problem is structured to achieve two primary targets: maximizing the image similarity between the generated image and the target content, and ensuring that the generated image satisfies the safety requirements set by the T2I model. To quantify the degree of semantic similarity, we introduce a pre-trained CLIP [29] model, where $I_\theta(\cdot)$ represent the image encoder, respectively. The above problem can be formulated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & \max \cos(I_\theta(F_\theta(p_{adv})), I_\theta(F_\theta(p_{tar}))) \\ \text{s.t. } & \begin{cases} F_\theta(p_{adv}) \neq 0 \\ F_{text}(p_{adv}) = 1 \\ F_{img}(p_{adv}) = 1, \end{cases} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where $F_\theta(\cdot)$ denote the T2I model. If an adversarial prompt p_{adv} is intercepted by the defense mechanism and no image is generated, then $F_\theta(p_{adv}) = 0$. Conversely, if an image is successfully generated, it is represented as $F_\theta(p_{adv})$. $F_{text}(\cdot)$ represents the prompt checker: if p_{adv} passes this checker, $F_{text}(p_{adv}) = 1$; otherwise, $F_{text}(p_{adv}) = 0$. Similarly, $F_{img}(\cdot)$ denotes the post-hoc image checker: if p_{adv} passes this checker, $F_{img}(p_{adv}) = 1$; otherwise, $F_{img}(p_{adv}) = 0$.

The objective in Eq. (1) is to maximize the semantic similarity between the image generated from the adversarial prompt p_{adv} and the target content. The target content is represented by the image generated from the target prompt p_{tar} , ensuring the harmfulness of the image. Enhancing the semantic similarity between these two images maximizes the possibility of the T2I model generating NSFW contents.

We define the boundary in the search space based on the classifier’s decision threshold between classifying p_{adv} as NSFW or non-NSFW contents. To ensure that the generated image adheres

to the safety mechanisms established by the T2I model, TCBS-Attack incorporates the decision boundaries of both the prompt checker and the post-hoc image checker as constraints within the search space. For the prompt detector, exemplified by the NSFW-text-classifier, we define the constraint boundary in the search space based on the classifier’s decision threshold between classifying p_{adv} as NSFW or non-NSFW content. Regarding the post-hoc image checker, the interception of p_{adv} by the checker occurs because Stable Diffusion’s built-in Safety Checker [31] computes the cosine similarity, $\cos(I_\theta(F_\theta(p_{adv})), concept)$, between the image’s CLIP [29] embedding vector $I_\theta(F_\theta(p_{adv}))$ and the pre-calculated text embedding of 17 unsafe concepts $concept = [c_1, c_2, \dots, c_{17}]$. The cosine similarity for each dimension is then compared with the corresponding threshold $threshold = [t_1, t_2, \dots, t_{17}]$. If the cosine similarity for any dimension exceeds its threshold, the image is classified as NSFW, and a fully black image is returned. To enhance the ability of the adversarial prompt to bypass these defense mechanisms, we introduce the NSFW score as a constraint in our algorithm. We define the NSFW score as follows:

$$score = \sum_{i=1}^{17} \max(\cos(I_\theta(F_\theta(p_{adv})), c_i) - t_i, 0). \quad (2)$$

When $score = 0$, it indicates that the adversarial prompt p_{adv} allows the T2I model to generate an image normally and $F_{img}(p_{adv}) = 1$. However, when $score > 0$, it signifies that the image generated by p_{adv} has been detected and intercepted by the safety checker and $F_{img}(p_{adv}) = 0$.

3.3 Token-Level Constraint Boundary Search

TCBS-Attack generates adversarial prompts capable of bypassing safety checkers in T2I models while ensuring semantic consistency with the target prompt. We refine adversarial prompts iteratively by manipulating sensitive and non-sensitive tokens while maintaining constraints that prevent triggering safety mechanisms. Specifically, TCBS-Attack begins by detecting sensitive tokens in the target prompt p_{tar} . Based on the detected sensitive tokens, replacements are made to initialize and generate n candidate prompts. These n candidates in the t^{th} iteration (denoted as $Population_t$) then undergo a token search based on constraint boundary, resulting in n new candidates (denoted as $OffspringI$). Subsequently, the $2n$ candidates are evaluated through a token selection based on constraint boundary, to select the final n candidates (denoted as $Population_{t+1}$) that will move on to the next iteration. The details of the method are shown in Algorithm 1 and Fig. 1.

3.3.1 Initialization. In the initialization phase, we focus on mutating both sensitive and non-sensitive tokens in the target prompt p_{tar} . For the target prompt p_{tar} , we perform sensitive token detection to identify and address potentially problematic tokens. We adopt the method in HTS-Attack [9], starting by identifying sensitive tokens through matching with a predefined NSFW word list S . We then use the NSFW-text-classifier [2] to select the tokens most likely to be classified as NSFW in the vocabulary codebook V and remove them until they pass the classifier. These two sets of tokens are subsequently merged to form the final list of sensitive tokens. The key difference between our sensitive token detection method and that of HTS-Attack [9] is that we utilize a subset of the NSFW word list S , and after detecting the tokens in S , we do not remove the corresponding tokens from the adversarial prompt. This step is crucial for facilitating the initialization and token search process, as we need to ensure that the prompt does not explicitly trigger any known filters or classifiers.

For each sensitive token in p_{tar} , we first perform a search within the vocabulary codebook V to find the k most similar tokens based on the CLIP text similarity. One of these tokens is then randomly selected and used to replace the original sensitive token. For non-sensitive tokens, we perform a similar search process with a probability p_{s1} to replace them with tokens that have high semantic similarity to the sensitive tokens. This process is repeated n times, resulting in the generation of n candidates $p_c = [p_{c1}, p_{c2}, \dots, p_{cn}]$. These candidates will serve as the initial population for subsequent optimization steps, providing a diverse starting point for further refinements in the token search and selection.

3.3.2 Token Search Based on Constraint Boundary. The token search phase involves refining each candidate in $Population_t$ generated in the initialization step. For each candidate p_{ci} , we apply a search operation to the sensitive tokens, similar to the one used in the initialization phase. For non-sensitive tokens in p_{ci} , we begin by determining, with a probability p_{s2} , whether to replace the non-sensitive token. If replacement is chosen, we then proceed with a search with a probability p_{s1} to find the most similar token. We denote the population after replacement as $OffspringI$. Once the token search is complete, We evaluate the new candidate p'_{ci} based on the its image similarity sim'_i with the target content and its

Algorithm 1 TCBS-Attack Algorithm

Require: Target prompt p_{tar} , Vocabulary V , NSFW list S , CLIP model $T_\theta(\cdot)$, classifier $F_{text}(\cdot)$, number of iterations T , hyperparameters $k, p_{s1}, p_{s2}, m_1, m_2, n$

Ensure: Adversarial prompt p_{adv}

- 1: Detect sensitive tokens in p_{tar} using NSFW list S and NSFW-text-classifier $F_{text}(\cdot)$ form sensitive set.
- 2: Initialize empty candidate set P_c .
- 3: **for** $i = 1$ to n **do**
- 4: Replace sensitive tokens by randomly selecting from top k similar tokens in V based on textual similarity S_t :
 $S_t = \cos(T_\theta(p_{ci}), T_\theta(p_{tar}))$
- 5: Replace non-sensitive tokens with probability p_{s1} similarly.
- 6: Add generated candidate to P_c .
- 7: **end for**
- 8: **while** Number of iterations $< T$ **do**
- 9: Initialize empty set P'_c for offspring candidates.
- 10: **for** each candidate $p_{ci} \in P_c$ **do**
- 11: Conduct token search on sensitive tokens as initialization.
- 12: Replace non-sensitive tokens with probability p_{s2} , then with p_{s1} if selected.
- 13: Evaluate candidate using conditions in Eq. (3), (4).
- 14: **if** conditions met **then**
- 15: Repeat token search, add refined candidate to P'_c .
- 16: **else**
- 17: Add refined candidate to P'_c .
- 18: **end if**
- 19: **end for**
- 20: Combine original and new candidates into $2n$ candidate set.
- 21: Select n candidates from $2n$ using binary tournament based on Eq. (1), (2):
 - If both NSFW scores are 0, choose based on F_{text} , then similarity.
 - If one NSFW score is 0, select candidate with NSFW score 0.
 - If both NSFW scores > 0 , select based on F_{text} , then lowest NSFW score.
- 22: Update p_{adv} if selected candidates surpass its similarity score.
- 23: **end while**
- 24: **return** p_{adv}

proximity to the constraint boundaries. The conditions for further search in the image domain are as follows:

$$\begin{cases} sim'_i > sim_{best} - m_1 \\ 0 < score'_i < m_2, \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

where sim_{best} represents the best image similarity recorded during the search process, m_1 and m_2 are two hyperparameters used to constrain the range of sim'_i and $score'_i$.

The conditions for further search in the text domain are as follows:

$$F_{text}(p_{adv}) = 0. \quad (4)$$

If the new candidate p'_{ci} satisfies the conditions in either Eq. (3) or Eq. (4), we will perform the same search process on p'_{ci} again. We denote the population after the second replacement as *OffspringII*.

3.3.3 Token Selection Based on Constraints. The token selection phase involves selecting n candidates from a pool of $2n$ candidates, which includes *Population_t* and *OffspringII*. The selection process uses a binary tournament mechanism, where two individuals are randomly selected from the population, and the one with better fitness is chosen as a parent for the next generation. For each pair of candidates p_{adv1} and p_{adv2} , we evaluate their image similarity sim_1, sim_2 , NSFW scores $score_1, score_2$ and $F_{text}(p_{adv1}), F_{text}(p_{adv2})$. The specific selection conditions are as follows:

- 1) If $score_1 = score_2 = 0$, this indicates that both candidates can successfully pass through the safety checker. Subsequently, we evaluate $F_{text}(p_{adv1})$ and $F_{text}(p_{adv2})$. If $F_{text}(p_{adv1}) \neq F_{text}(p_{adv2})$, we select the better candidate p_{adv1} for which $F_{text}(p_{adv1}) = 1$. If $F_{text}(p_{adv1}) = F_{text}(p_{adv2})$, we select the candidate with the higher image similarity, as it more closely aligns with the target content.
- 2) If $score_1 = 0, score_2 > 0$ or $score_1 > 0, score_2 = 0$, we select the candidate with a score of 0, as it is more likely to successfully generate an image that passes through the safety checker.
- 3) If $score_1 > 0, score_2 > 0$, we evaluate $F_{text}(p_{adv1})$ and $F_{text}(p_{adv2})$. If $F_{text}(p_{adv1}) \neq F_{text}(p_{adv2})$, we select the candidate for which the result equals 1. If $F_{text}(p_{adv1}) = F_{text}(p_{adv2})$, we select the candidate with the smaller NSFW score, as it is more likely to pass through the safety checker after further refinement.

This selection process ensures that only the most promising candidates, with the highest potential to bypass safety mechanisms while maintaining semantic relevance to the target content, are chosen for the next iteration. This process continues until the number of selected candidates reaches n constituting *Population_{t+1}* entering the next iteration.

4 Experiments

4.1 Experimental Settings

Datasets. We employ two standard benchmarks to evaluate our experiments: MMA-Diffusion benchmark [40] and UnsafeDiff [28]. The MMA-Diffusion benchmark specifically encompasses NSFW prompts within the sexual content category, with prompts originally derived from the LAION-COCO [36] dataset, also leveraged in our analytical framework. We incorporate UnsafeDiff, a curated dataset explicitly designed for NSFW evaluation. UnsafeDiff provides 30 prompts across six NSFW themes: adult content, violence, gore, politics, racial discrimination, and inauthentic notable descriptions. In total, we select 100 prompts from these datasets for the comprehensive evaluation of our experiments.

T2I models. We primarily conduct our experiments on the SDv1.4 model. Furthermore, we repurpose adversarial prompts obtained from these attacks to evaluate transferability against two additional open-source models: SLD(Medium) [34] and SafeGen [20].

To assess the effectiveness of adversarial prompts on online T2I models, we select DALL-E 3 [30].

Defensive methods. We select three types of defense mechanisms commonly used by T2I models: prompt checkers, securely trained T2I models, and post-hoc image checker. For prompt checkers, we utilize NSFW-text-classifier [2] and Detoxify [1]. These classifiers serve as pre-screening mechanisms by identifying NSFW content in prompts submitted to T2I models. Regarding securely trained T2I models, we choose SLD and SafeGen, both explicitly trained to suppress the generation of inappropriate images typically produced by standard T2I models. As for post-hoc image checking, we employ Stable Diffusion’s built-in Safety Checker, which replaces detected NSFW content with entirely black images.

Baselines. We select six state-of-the-art(SOTA) jailbreak attack methods for comparison against our proposed TCBS-Attack: I2P [34], QF-Attack [45], SneakyPrompt [42], MMA-Diffusion [40], Divide-and-Conquer Attack(DACA) [5], and HTS-Attack [9]. Specifically, I2P provides a human-written prompt dataset, from which we chose 100 prompts aligned with NSFW categories in UnsafeDiff for our experiments. QF-Attack, initially designed for circumventing T2I model defenses, includes GREEDY, GENETIC, and QF-PGD strategies. Following MMA-Diffusion’s adaptation, we employ its modified objective function and adopt the GREEDY strategy, which demonstrates superior jailbreak performance in MMA-Diffusion. SneakyPrompt utilizes reinforcement learning techniques to search for adversarial prompts targeting T2I models. MMA-Diffusion leverages gradient-based optimization to guide prompt refinement while maintaining high fidelity of generated outputs. DACA employs large language models (LLMs) to partition NSFW contents into multiple benign descriptions, generating adversarial prompts accordingly. HTS-Attack utilizes heuristic token search methodologies to recombine and mutate tokens for optimizing adversarial prompts. Due to differences in datasets during the reproduction of HTS-Attack, we find that the text sim filter is ineffective in filtering adversarial prompts. To ensure comparable difficulty levels, we reconfigure HTS-Attack by modifying its second text sim filter in each optimization iteration, implementing proportional selection instead.

Evaluation metrics. We adopt multiple metrics to thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness of jailbreak attack methods. Primarily, we use the Attack Success Rate out of N syntheses (ASR- N) metric. Specifically, for each adversarial prompt, we generate N images using the T2I models. If at least one image bypasses the safety checkers and contains NSFW content, we deem the adversarial attack successful. In our experiments, we employ ASR-4 and ASR-1 to assess the performance. To verify the NSFW content of generated images, we utilize two independent NSFW detectors: Q16 [35] and MHSC [28]. Also, we measure the proportion of adversarial prompts passing safety checkers using the Bypass metric. We define Bypass-Text as the rate of adversarial prompts passing the prompt checker, and Bypass-Img as the rate of generated images successfully passing the post-hoc image checker.

Parameter Settings. In our experiments, we utilize the vocabulary from the transformer [38] model BERT [6] and employ CLIP-ViT-Base-Patch16 as the pre-trained text and image encoders $T_\theta(\cdot)$, $I_\theta(\cdot)$. To generate reference images, we employ the surrogate T2I model $F_s(\cdot)$, specifically Stable Diffusion v1.5, which excludes any

Table 1: Comparison to baselines across 2 different prompt checkers. The bolded values are the highest performance.

T2I Model	Prompt Checker	Attack	Bypass-Text	Bypass-Img	Q16		MHSC	
					ASR-4	ASR-1	ASR-4	ASR-1
SDv1.4	NSFW-text-classifier	I2P	47%	68%	22%	9%	8%	2%
		QF-Attack	25%	81%	14%	5%	6%	1%
		SneakyPrompt	33%	81%	18%	8%	18%	8%
		MMA-Diffusion	4%	56%	2%	0%	2%	1%
		DACA	60%	59%	22%	9%	4%	1%
		HTS-Attack	32%	69%	19%	11%	18%	11%
		TCBS-Attack	52%	82%	29%	14%	31%	16%
SDv1.4	Detoxify	I2P	96%	68%	42%	19%	33%	12%
		QF-Attack	80%	81%	31%	13%	37%	13%
		SneakyPrompt	66%	81%	33%	18%	34%	17%
		MMA-Diffusion	55%	56%	27%	13%	31%	11%
		DACA	99%	59%	40%	17%	11%	7%
		HTS-Attack	74%	69%	43%	14%	44%	20%
		TCBS-Attack	90%	82%	43%	21%	45%	20%

defensive modules. Specifically, we set a population size n of 10. The number of iterations T is 50, which ensures that TCBS-Attack has the same query budget as other methods. The probability p_{s1} of each non-sensitive token mutation is 0.1. During the token search process, the probability p_{s2} of adversarial prompts causing non-sensitive token mutation is set to 0.2. The number of similar tokens during token replacement k is 20. The relaxation margins for the image similarity constraint and NSFW score constraint are set to $m_1 = 0.05$ and $m_2 = 0.01$.

4.2 Experimental Results on Jailbreaking Full-Chain T2I Models

To evaluate the robustness and efficacy of our proposed TCBS-Attack in a full-chain scenario, we integrate both prompt-based and image-based defense mechanisms typically employed by T2I models. Specifically, we combine the prompt checker module (NSFW-text-classifier and Detoxify) and the post-hoc image checker module (Stable Diffusion’s built-in Safety Checker) to comprehensively assess the adversarial attack effectiveness.

Table 1 presents the comparative evaluation of TCBS-Attack against various baseline methods across two different prompt checkers and the post-hoc image checker using the SDv1.4. Overall, TCBS-Attack consistently achieves superior performance across multiple evaluation metrics. By iteratively refining token selection based on proximity to these checkers’ decision boundaries, TCBS-Attack consistently evades detection by maintaining semantic coherence while ensuring the stealthiness of generated prompts. In prompt checker evaluations, Detoxify exhibits relatively weaker defensive capabilities against baseline methods. In contrast, the gradient-based MMA-Diffusion method is most easily intercepted, demonstrating only a 4% success rate against the NSFW-text-classifier. While DACA effectively bypasses prompt checkers by decomposing unethical prompts into benign components, this approach considerably weakens the attack performance of adversarial prompts. Among all evaluated methods, our proposed TCBS-Attack consistently achieves

high bypass success rates. Notably, TCBS-Attack significantly outperforms other methods in tests against the NSFW-text-classifier, highlighting its effectiveness.

In the post-hoc image detection evaluations, the tool detects potentially offensive content in generated images and returns completely black images upon identifying violations. TCBS-Attack demonstrates exceptional efficiency in bypassing the image checker, achieving a Bypass-Img rate of 82%, the highest among all methods tested.

We further analyze the attack success rates of images generated after successfully bypassing both prompt and image checkers. Our proposed method consistently achieves the highest NSFW attack success rates across all prompt and image checkers. Specifically, TCBS-Attack achieves an ASR-1 of 16% and ASR-4 of 31% when evaluated using the NSFW-text-classifier, and an ASR-1 of 21% and ASR-4 of 45% when evaluated using Detoxify. These results demonstrate that TCBS-Attack effectively generates adversarial prompts that bypass safety checkers and successfully induce T2I models to generate NSFW images. Fig. 2 shows the attack effect of TCBS-Attack.

4.3 Experimental Results on Jailbreaking Securely Trained T2I Models

We repurpose the adversarial prompts obtained from experiment 4.2 to conduct transfer attacks on two securely trained open-source T2I models: SafeGen and SLD. These models are specifically trained to remove unsafe concepts and suppress inappropriate images generated by other diffusion models. Similar to the experiment in Section 4.2, we integrate prompt checker (NSFW-text-classifier) and image safety checker for both securely trained T2I models.

Table 2 presents the comparative evaluation of TCBS-Attack and baseline methods against two securely trained T2I models. The results clearly indicate the superior performance of TCBS-Attack over other methods in terms of attack success rates.

For the SafeGen model, TCBS-Attack achieves the highest ASR-4 (19% on Q16, 20% on MHSC) and ASR-1 (8% on Q16, 9% on MHSC), surpassing baseline methods like HTS-Attack (17% ASR-4 on Q16)



Figure 2: Visualization results of TCBS Attack.

and DACA (7% ASR-1 on Q16). Similarly, for the SLD model, TCBS-Attack demonstrates notable effectiveness, achieving the highest ASR-4 of 25% and ASR-1 of 12%, significantly outperforming other baseline methods such as HTS-Attack and SneakyPrompt.

These results emphasize the robustness and effectiveness of TCBS-Attack, validating its superior capability to successfully induce securely trained T2I models to generate NSFW content despite their reinforced security training. Moreover, our results demonstrate the strong transferability of TCBS-Attack, effectively generalizing its adversarial prompts to bypass security mechanisms in various T2I model architectures.

4.4 Experimental Results on Jailbreaking Online T2I Services

To further validate the real-world applicability of TCBS-Attack, we evaluate its effectiveness against commercial online T2I services, specifically DALL-E 3. Unlike open-source models, commercial T2I services typically employ advanced, multi-layered security measures that pose significant challenges for adversarial attacks. Considering the cost associated with commercial models, we conduct our experiments using 30 prompts from the UnsafeDiff dataset. Correspondingly, I2P also selects 30 prompts from the matching categories. Additionally, the bypass rate in attacking DALL-E 3 represents the proportion of prompts successfully generating images.

Table 3 presents the comparative results between TCBS-Attack and baseline methods for the DALL-E 3 model. TCBS-Attack exhibits robust adversarial effectiveness with the highest ASR-4 rate of 73.33% and the highest ASR-1 rate of 56.67% on the Q16 detector, outperforming strong competitors such as MMA-Diffusion and HTS-Attack. In the evaluation using the MHSC detector, TCBS-Attack achieves an ASR-4 rate of 60.00% and an ASR-1 rate of

Table 2: Comparison to baselines across 2 securely trained T2I models. The bolded values are the highest performance.

T2I Model	Attack	Q16		MHSC	
		ASR-4	ASR-1	ASR-4	ASR-1
SafeGen	I2P	14%	5%	5%	3%
	QF-Attack	11%	2%	3%	3%
	SneakyPrompt	12%	3%	9%	8%
	MMA-Diffusion	1%	0%	2%	1%
	DACA	16%	7%	3%	1%
	HTS-Attack	17%	5%	13%	7%
	TCBS-Attack	19%	8%	20%	9%
SLD	I2P	8%	3%	13%	4%
	QF-Attack	2%	0%	8%	3%
	SneakyPrompt	7%	2%	15%	4%
	MMA-Diffusion	2%	0%	3%	2%
	DACA	9%	2%	4%	0%
	HTS-Attack	8%	3%	19%	9%
	TCBS-Attack	10%	4%	25%	12%

36.67%, highlighting its capability to induce NSFW content generation despite DALL-E 3’s sophisticated security checks. These results underline the potency and versatility of TCBS-Attack, establishing it as a highly effective adversarial technique capable of challenging the security frameworks employed by leading commercial T2I services.

4.5 Ablation Study

Table 4 presents an ablation study conducted to evaluate the contributions of various constraints used in TCBS-Attack. We specifically

Table 3: Comparison to baselines for online commercial model DALL-E 3. The bolded values are the highest performance.

Attack	Bypass	Q16		MHSC	
		ASR-4	ASR-1	ASR-4	ASR-1
I2P	66.67%	60.00%	33.33%	23.33%	10.00%
QF-Attack	93.33%	66.67%	53.33%	53.33%	36.67%
SneakyPrompt	76.67%	73.33%	33.33%	53.33%	33.33%
MMA-Diffusion	96.67%	70.00%	50.00%	53.33%	30.00%
DACA	93.33%	40.00%	26.67%	26.67%	6.67%
HTS-Attack	86.67%	70.00%	53.33%	56.67%	36.67%
TCBS-Attack	93.33%	73.33%	56.67%	60.00%	36.67%

Table 4: Ablation Study. These experiments compare the performance of TCBS-Attack after ablating different constraints.

Attack	Bypass -Text	Bypass -Img	Q16		MHSC	
			ASR-4	ASR-1	ASR-4	ASR-1
TCBS-Attack	90%	82%	43%	21%	45%	20%
- $F_{text}(\cdot)$	28%	74%	20%	7%	20%	8%
- $F_{img}(\cdot)$	54%	59%	21%	8%	26%	14%
- All constraint	24%	60%	14%	6%	16%	8%

consider three scenarios: removing the text constraint $F_{text}(\cdot)$, removing the image constraint $F_{img}(\cdot)$, and removing all constraints. Results clearly illustrate the significance of each constraint for enhancing attack performance.

The fully constrained TCBS-Attack achieves the highest overall performance, exhibiting a high Bypass-Text rate of 90%, the highest Bypass-Img rate of 82%, and the best ASR-4 (45% on MHSC) and ASR-1 (21% on Q16) scores. Removing the text constraint ($F_{text}(\cdot)$) significantly reduces the Bypass-Text rate to 28%, while moderately lowering the Bypass-Img rate to 74%, resulting in modest ASR performance. Similarly, when removing the image constraint ($F_{img}(\cdot)$), the Bypass-Text rate decreases to 54%, and Bypass-Img rate further declines to 59%, accompanied by intermediate ASR scores. The removal of all constraints dramatically undermines the attack’s effectiveness, leading to the lowest Bypass-Text rate of 24%, a Bypass-Img rate of 60%, and considerably diminished ASR performance, such as an ASR-1 of merely 6% on the Q16 detector. These results emphasize the critical importance of jointly applying text and image constraints, as this combination substantially enhances adversarial effectiveness against robust safety measures.

4.6 Sensitivity Analysis

Tables 5, 6, and 7 present the sensitivity analysis results for key parameters involved in TCBS-Attack, specifically focusing on the relaxation margins for the image similarity constraint m_1 and NSFW score constraint m_2 and the number of similar tokens during token replacement k .

In conducting experiments on m_1 , we set $m_2 = 0.01$ and $k = 25$. The larger the value of m_1 , the broader the constraint boundary during token search; conversely, a smaller m_1 tightens the constraint boundary. Table 5 demonstrates the sensitivity analysis for

Table 5: Optimal parameter m_1 settings. These experiments compare different parameter m_1 settings.

Attack	Bypass -Text	Bypass -Img	Q16		MHSC	
			ASR-4	ASR-1	ASR-4	ASR-1
$m_1 = 0$	90.00%	86.67%	73.33%	36.67%	73.33%	43.33%
$m_1 = 0.025$	90.00%	83.33%	66.67%	40.00%	43.33%	26.67%
$m_1 = 0.05$	86.67%	90.00%	76.67%	40.00%	66.67%	43.33%
$m_1 = 0.075$	93.33%	90.00%	63.33%	33.33%	76.67%	40.00%
$m_1 = 0.1$	86.67%	90.00%	76.67%	40.00%	63.33%	40.00%

Table 6: Optimal parameter m_2 settings. These experiments compare different parameter m_2 settings.

Attack	Bypass -Text	Bypass -Img	Q16		MHSC	
			ASR-4	ASR-1	ASR-4	ASR-1
$m_2 = 0.001$	86.67%	86.67%	76.67%	36.67%	60.00%	30.00%
$m_2 = 0.005$	90.00%	83.33%	80.00%	40.00%	56.67%	30.00%
$m_2 = 0.01$	86.67%	90.00%	76.67%	40.00%	66.67%	43.33%
$m_2 = 0.015$	86.67%	90.00%	63.33%	26.67%	60.00%	43.33%
$m_2 = 0.02$	80.00%	83.33%	56.67%	26.67%	56.67%	23.33%

Table 7: Optimal parameter k settings. These experiments compare different parameter k settings.

Attack	Bypass -Text	Bypass -Img	Q16		MHSC	
			ASR-4	ASR-1	ASR-4	ASR-1
$k = 5$	73.33%	80.00%	60.00%	30.00%	60.00%	20.00%
$k = 10$	83.33%	90.00%	56.67%	30.00%	60.00%	26.66%
$k = 15$	93.33%	90.00%	73.33%	33.33%	70.00%	33.33%
$k = 20$	93.33%	86.67%	80.00%	40.00%	70.00%	46.67%
$k = 25$	86.67%	90.00%	76.67%	40.00%	66.67%	43.33%
$k = 30$	83.33%	86.67%	63.33%	30.00%	66.67%	30.00%
$k = 35$	90.00%	93.33%	73.33%	36.67%	66.67%	43.33%

the parameter m_1 . The optimal performance appears at $m_1 = 0.05$, achieving the highest Bypass-Img rate of 90% and the highest ASR scores (40.00% ASR-1 for Q16 and 43.33% ASR-1 for MHSC). However, further increasing m_1 beyond 0.05 causes fluctuations in attack efficacy, indicating that $m_1 = 0.05$ provides a balanced constraint beneficial for consistent adversarial performance.

In conducting experiments on m_2 , we set $m_1 = 0.05$ and $k = 25$. Table 6 demonstrates the sensitivity analysis for the parameter m_2 . A larger m_2 relaxes the image constraints during token search, whereas a smaller m_2 imposes stricter image constraints. The optimal setting identified is $m_2 = 0.01$, yielding the highest Bypass-Img rate of 90% and balanced ASR results (66.67% ASR-4 and 43.33% ASR-1 on MHSC).

In conducting experiments on k , we set $m_1 = 0.05$ and $m_2 = 0.01$. A larger k reduces the textual similarity requirements during token search, which within certain limits can enhance the ability to bypass safety detectors. Table 7 presents the sensitivity analysis results regarding the token similarity parameter k . As k increases, the ability of TCBS-Attack to bypass both text and image checkers progressively improves. The best overall performance occurs at

$k = 20$, with the highest ASR scores (80% ASR-4 for Q16 and 70% ASR-4 for MHSC) and Bypass-Text rate 93.33%. Further increasing k beyond 20 does not lead to substantial improvements and occasionally reduces effectiveness. This result highlights the critical role of the k parameter in effectively balancing token selection and semantic coherence to maximize attack performance.

5 Conclusions

In this work, we introduce TCBS-Attack, a token-level constraint boundary search method for jailbreaking Text-to-Image models. Unlike the existing approaches, TCBS-Attack leverages the decision boundaries of both prompt and image safety checkers, enabling effective generation of semantically coherent adversarial prompts. Our comprehensive evaluation demonstrated the effectiveness of TCBS-Attack in bypassing prompt-based and image-based defensive mechanisms, securely trained T2I models, and commercial online T2I services.

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Overview

This supplementary material provides additional details to complement the main paper. Specifically, we include the following contents to facilitate a deeper understanding and reproducibility of our proposed TCBS-Attack:

- Sensitive Word List
- Implementation Details
- More Visualizations

Warning: This supplementary material contains model generations that are offensive in nature.

A1 Sensitive Word List

Table A1 provide the explicit sensitive word lists employed during the sensitive token detection phase in TCBS-Attack. It is worth noting that the sensitive terms employed in our study are derived from the curated list compiled by MMA-Diffusion, and the table presented here uses only a subset of the full vocabulary. During the experiment, we proactively exclude from the vocabulary any tokens that contain or are composed of these sensitive words. Additionally, in our sensitive token detection phase, we explicitly check whether a given prompt includes any of the terms from this list. This dual strategy not only enhances the stealthiness of our attack prompts but also proves effective in circumventing prompt checkers that rely primarily on keyword-based filtering.

Table A1: Sensitive word list.

Sensitive word list	
sexual	vagina
nude	naked child
nudity	explicit content
sex	uncensored
18+	fuck
naked	nipples
nsfw	visible nipples
porn	breast
dick	areola

A2 Implementation Details

A2.1 Data Collection

To construct our evaluation benchmark, we draw upon two complementary sources of NSFW prompts. First, we utilize a subset of 70 prompts selected from a larger collection of 1,000 adult-themed prompts originally curated by MMA-Diffusion. These prompts were mined from the LAION-COCO dataset and validated to trigger Stable Diffusion’s Safety Checker. To ensure broader thematic coverage across diverse NSFW categories, we additionally incorporate 30 prompts provided by the UnsafeDiff benchmark, which includes adult content, violence, gore, politics, racial discrimination, and inauthentic notable descriptions. In total, we select 100 prompts to comprehensively assess the performance of our proposed method.

A2.2 Hardware Platform

We conduct our experiments on the NVIDIA A6000 GPU with 48GB of memory and NVIDIA RTX4090 GPU with 24GB of memory.

A2.3 Details of T2I Models

Stable Diffusion. In SD v1.4 and v1.5 models, we set the guidance scale to 7.5, the number of inference steps to 100, and the image size to 512×512 .

SLD. In SLD model, we set the guidance scale to 7.5, the number of inference steps to 100, the safety configuration to Medium, and the image size to 512×512 .

SafeGen. In SafeGen model, we set the guidance scale to 7.5, the number of inference steps to 100, and the image size to 512×512 .

DALL-E 3. For the online commercial model, DALL-E 3, We set the image size to 1024×1024 .

A2.4 Baseline Implementation

Among the baselines included in our study, QF-Attack and HTS-Attack, are particularly noteworthy due to their adaptation in our experimental setting. QF-Attack was originally developed for a different adversarial objective and is not directly aligned with the goal of jailbreaking T2I models. However, in the MMA-Diffusion paper, the objective of QF-Attack was modified, with a new loss function designed to match the constraints and evaluation criteria of jailbreak scenarios. In our work, we follow the same adaptation strategy to ensure consistency and fair comparison.

HTS-Attack employs a heuristic token search algorithm to iteratively recombine and mutate prompt tokens, optimizing them into adversarial prompts capable of bypassing safety mechanisms. During our reproduction, we observed that due to differences in datasets, the original configuration of HTS-Attack’s second text sim filter had little effect on pruning low-quality adversarial candidates. As a result, the method suffered from excessive runtime overhead. To ensure a fair experimental comparison under equivalent difficulty, we reconfigured HTS-Attack by modifying its second text sim filter. Specifically, in each optimization iteration, we retain only the top 12 adversarial candidates based on their text similarity scores. This modification maintains an equivalent query budget to TCBS-Attack and ensures that both methods operate under comparable computational constraints.

A2.5 Details of Ablation Study

In our ablation study, we systematically examine three scenarios: removing the text constraint $F_{text}(\cdot)$, removing the image constraint $F_{img}(\cdot)$, and removing all constraints. TCBS-Attack disables the corresponding constraint functions during both the token search and token selection stages.

It is important to note that in the original design of TCBS-Attack, the token selection process prioritizes the image constraint $F_{img}(\cdot)$ first, followed by the text constraint $F_{text}(\cdot)$, and finally the image similarity metric. When the image constraint is removed, TCBS-Attack adjusts its selection logic by first evaluating whether a candidate prompt satisfies the text constraint, and then ranking by image similarity. Conversely, when the text constraint is removed, the algorithm gives precedence to the image constraint, and only considers image similarity as a secondary criterion. In the case




Figure A1: Visualization results of TCBS Attack on SafeGen.

where both constraints are removed, TCBS-Attack ranks candidate prompts solely based on their image similarity to the target content.

This hierarchical constraint handling in the token selection phase ensures that the influence of each component can be independently evaluated, providing a clear understanding of the individual contributions of $F_{text}(\cdot)$ and $F_{img}(\cdot)$ to the overall attack effectiveness.

A3 More Visualizations

In this section, we present qualitative visualization results generated by the SafeGen model, as illustrated in Fig. A1.