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A D V I S O R Y
97.23
******************************************************************************
Topic: SunOS rpcbind Vulnerability
Source: CIAC
Creation Date: June 6, 1997 23:00 GMT
Last Updated:
To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, FedCIRC is
forwarding the following information from CIAC bulletin H-70. FedCIRC urges
you to act on this information as soon as possible.
If you have any questions, please contact FedCIRC:
Telephone: +1 888 282 0870
Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov
=======================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================
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****************************** FOR PUBLIC RELEASE ****************************
__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
SunOS rpcbind Vulnerability
June 6, 1997 23:00 GMT Number H-70
________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: A vulnerability has been identified in the rpcbind function
in the libc library.
PLATFORM: SunOS versions 5.5.1, 5.5.1_x86, 5.5, 5.5_x86, 5.4, 5.4_x86,
and 5.3.
DAMAGE: This vulnerability may allow an attacker to gain
unauthorized
access if exploited.
SOLUTION: Apply vendor patches specified below.
________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY It is highly recommended that patches be installed
ASSESSMENT: immediately.
________________________________________________________________________
[****** Start Sun Microsystems, Inc Advisory ******]
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sun Microsystems, Inc. Security Bulletin
Bulletin Number: #00142
Date: June 4 1997
Cross-Ref:
Title: Vulnerability in rpcbind
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Permission is granted for the redistribution of this Bulletin, so long as
the Bulletin is not edited and is attributed to Sun Microsystems. Portions
may also be excerpted for re-use in other security advisories so long as
proper attribution is included.
Any other use of this information without the express written consent of
Sun Microsystems is prohibited. Sun Microsystems expressly disclaims all
liability for any misuse of this information by any third party.
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Bulletins Topics
Sun announces the release of patches for Solaris 2.5.1, 2.5, 2.4, and 2.3
(SunOS 5.5.1, 5.5, 5.4, and 5.3), that relate to a vulnerability in the
rpcbind program, which can aid an attacker to gain unauthorized access if
exploited.
Sun strongly recommends that you install the patches listed in section 4
immediately on every affected system.
2. Who is Affected
Vulnerable: SunOS versions 5.5.1, 5.5.1_x86, 5.5, 5.5_x86,
5.4, 5.4_x86, and 5.3.
Not vulnerable: All other supported versions of SunOS
This vulnerability is fixed in the upcoming release of Solaris.
3. Understanding the Vulnerability
The rpcbind program is a server that converts RPC program numbers into
universal addresses. When an RPC service is started, it tells rpcbind the
address at which it is listening, and the RPC program numbers it is
prepared to serve. When a client wishes to make an RPC call to a given
program number, it first contacts rpcbind on the server machine to
determine the address where RPC requests should be sent.
Under Solaris 2.x, rpcbind listens not only on TCP port 111 and UDP port
111, but also on a UDP port number greater than 32770. The exact number
depends on the OS release and architecture. This results in a large number
of packet filters which intend to block access to rpcbind/portmapper being
ineffective. Instead of sending requests to TCP or UDP port 111, the
attacker simply sends them to the other UDP port. This vulnerability
allows
an attacker to obtain remote RPC program information even if TCP or UDP
port 111 is being filtered. It can also aid an attacker to gain
unauthorized access to hosts running vulnerable versions of the software.
4. List of Patches
The vulnerability relating to rpcbind is fixed by the following patches:
OS version Patch ID
---------- --------
SunOS 5.5.1 104331-02
SunOS 5.5.1_x86 104332-02
SunOS 5.5 104357-02
SunOS 5.5_x86 104358-02
SunOS 5.4 102070-03
SunOS 5.4_x86 102071-03
SunOS 5.3 102034-02
5. Checksum Table
The checksum table below shows the BSD checksums (SunOS 5.x:
/usr/ucb/sum),
SVR4 checksums (SunOS 5.x: /usr/bin/sum), and the MD5 digital signatures
for the above-mentioned patches that are available from:
ftp://sunsolve1.sun.com/pub/patches/patches.html
These checksums may not apply if you obtain patches from your answer
centers.
File Name BSD SVR4 MD5
- --------------- --------- --------- --------------------------------
104331-02.tar.Z 64512 111 17253 222 29C2D5649C56A3D64E1F1DFCE3783842
104332-02.tar.Z 56808 111 23404 221 4B5D28F4A686166C4C147BE4E9563B8C
104357-02.tar.Z 27488 111 31772 222 316B03F737FC61DC09877C2BB822E7EE
104358-02.tar.Z 22598 110 46888 220 1665E8724D0A3DB401A00BE812630A37
102070-03.tar.Z 32763 100 14089 200 31FB11BC9D89A6D540F87624D4A2CFAE
102071-03.tar.Z 21217 100 18859 199 76DDAF2CAE25535A9AE932F3B0C98E3A
102034-02.tar.Z 23648 100 49973 199 243CD25673D87D0277F5CFE06E327347
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sun acknowledges with thanks Secure Networks, Inc. for their assistance in the
preparation of this bulletin.
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDICES
A. Patches listed in this bulletin are available to all Sun customers via
World Wide Web at:
ftp://sunsolve1.sun.com/pub/patches/patches.html
Customers with Sun support contracts can also obtain patches from local
Sun answer centers and SunSITEs worldwide.
B. To report or inquire about a security problem with Sun software, contact
one or more of the following:
- Your local Sun answer centers
- Your representative computer security response team, such as CERT
- Sun Security Coordination Team. Send email to:
security-alert@sun.com
C. To receive information or subscribe to our CWS (Customer Warning System)
mailing list, send email to:
security-alert@sun.com
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Command Information Returned/Action Taken
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[****** End Sun Microsystems, Inc Advisory ********]
________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems,
Secure Networks, Inc. for the information contained in this bulletin.
________________________________________________________________________
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========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE=============================
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National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
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This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
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process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
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Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.